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Abstract
A strategy for the disposition of US and Russian surplus Pu is proposed. The US would,
in cooperation with Russia, immobilize its Pu with sufficient rare earth neutron poisons to
comply with expected regulatory limits for subcriticality in a geologic repository. If
proven feasible, remote tracking capability would be added as an integral part of the
matrix as a deterrent for unauthorized diversion. Russia would retain the right to retrieve
the Pu for direct use in civilian nuclear fuel. Alternatively the US could compensate Rus-
sia for the fuel value of its dispositioned Pu. A market based method for pricing Pu using
derivative theory is proposed. Plutonium is valued as a European call option on the equiv-
alent amount of uranium fuel. With the assumed parameters the maximum value of hold-
ing 50 tonnes of WGPu (with no storage costs) was found to be $524 M.
The environmental durability of a Pu loaded borosilicate glass was investigated. Leach
tests in deionized water at 90 'C demonstrated that the durability of the reference glass,
which contained simulated fission products, was not affected by the addition of an analog
for Pu in glass (Th) and several rare earth elements (Eu, Gd, Sm) each at 2 wt% (oxide).
After one year of testing, leachate concentrations for the added elements remained at or
below instrumental (ICP-AES) detection limits. A coupled glass dissolution and critical-
ity model was developed to assess the potential for a repository criticality event. Bound-
ing calculations indicated that the reference waste glass could reach a critical state due to
glass reaction with groundwater, and subsequent boron removal, at weapons-grade PuO 2
loadings greater than 0.45 wt%. The addition of relatively small quantities of rare earth
elements was shown to increase the predicted time to criticality to millions of years, how-
ever indefinite subcriticality could not be assured under the assumed conditions.
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1.0 Introduction
Historic achievements in arms control were the catalyst for an international debate on sur-
plus weapons-grade plutonium disposition. For the first time, superpowers are develop-
ing strategies for eliminating a portion of their nuclear stockpiles. While the reductions
are welcomed, managing the fissile materials from retired warheads is a complex technical
and political challenge. To be implemented, any proposal must satisfy constraints
imposed in both areas
The nuclear arms race is estimated to have produced more than 200 metric tonnes (MT) of
weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu). 1 Surplus and scrap WGPu represents a proliferation
hazard and to some a fuel source of the future. No longer needed for mutually assured
destruction, the question becomes "how should surplus plutonium be managed?" Each
country will assess the question from decidedly different perspectives.
Russia is facing uncertain times as a newly democratic nation. It has a transition economy
struggling to provide basic goods and services, and compensation for its people. This
instability provides adequate reason for avoiding non-essential expenditures and focusing
on near-term revenues when possible.
To some degree the management of surplus special nuclear material has reflected this
larger reality. Russia has welcomed the opportunity to blend and sell its highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) as low-enriched uranium fuel. However, an acceptable market for WGPu
does not exist. Absent of a financial incentive to act, Russia continues to store its pluto-
nium as part of its long-term energy policy.
The United States is Russia's opposite in these areas. It has relatively stable economic
markets with no official energy policy. In the US, plutonium is presently viewed as an
uneconomical energy resource. The official government policy is to not encourage the use
of a Pu fuel cycle due to the associated proliferation risks.
1. Data taken from Albright (1993: 34 and 37). US 97 MT and Russia 115 MT.
While steps are underway to blend its HEU, the US also views surplus WGPu as a "clear
and present danger." The US is vigorously pursuing alternatives to process its Pu to meet
the Spent Fuel Standard.2 While Russia has expressed little interest in US plutonium
activities, a major objective of the US plan is to spur Russian action. The storage of Pu in
Russia during a period of economic and political volatility is a source of concern for the
US. Clearly each country has different objectives and priorities related to surplus pluto-
nium.
In the present work, a strategy for WGPu disposition has been developed by the author
that is sensitive to technical realities, national objectives and future uncertainties. The
option of immobilizing surplus Pu without fission products was deemed attractive as it
provides a relatively quick and inexpensive way to move the material to a verifiable, safe
and disposable form.
While adding a radiation barrier may provide some security benefits there are risks.
Requiring Pu to be treated as either a fuel or a waste is likely to cause disposition delays.
Russia will not dispose of its potential fuel source and the US is reluctant to finance Pu
fuel cycle investments in Russia. In contrast, processing Pu into large, environmentally
durable, matrices without fission products could be supported by both nations. Such a
form would be easily verified and safeguarded, providing virtually all the nonproliferation
benefits attainable by material processing. Adding remote tracking capability as an
inherent part of the matrix would provide security approaching that of the Spent Fuel
Standard, if not exceeding it.
A complementary strategy was also devised to compensate Russia for any WGPu she
would transfer to the US for dispositioning. A market based valuation of Pu was per-
formed using derivative theory. The reasoning and methodology used to develop both
strategies are outlined in the remaining chapters.
2. The Spent Fuel Standard seeks to make excess Pu from weapons as inaccessible and unattractive for
weapons use as the much larger quantity of plutonium that exists in spent fuel.
Chapter 2 provides a description of WGPu issues and national initiatives. In Chapter 3 the
system analysis used in strategy formulation is discussed and a proposal for WGPu dispo-
sition is presented. Disposition objectives were identified and various processing steps
evaluated to determine their effect on postulated proliferators. Chapter 4 contains a tech-
nical evaluation of WGPu vitrification. The environmental durability of a glass matrix
was experimentally tested. A coupled dissolution and criticality model was used to assess
the potential for criticality in a geologic repository. Chapter 5 proposes a financial strat-
egy for pricing Pu so that the US could purchase Russian WGPu or allow vitrification to
proceed in Russia. Chapter 6 contains a summary of the work performed and presents the
conclusions. The appendices contain detailed data, calculations and analyses as referred
to in the body of the thesis.
2.0 Background for Surplus Pu Management
2.1 Arms Control Agreements
Weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) will be retired from military use in Russia and the US
as a result of a series of arms control treaties. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF) was signed December 8, 1987 by President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev. The Treaty called for the dismantling and destruction of the delivery systems
for all intermediate and shorter range missile systems in the US and the (then) Soviet
Union. The treaty was ratified on June 1, 1988 and by May 1991 the US had eliminated
all of its delivery systems covered under the treaty.3
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as START I) was signed by President Bush
and General Secretary Gorbachev on July 31, 1991. The intent of this treaty was to reduce
stockpiles of strategic weapons to equal aggregate levels. The initial goal was to limit the
number of strategic warheads to no more than 9,000 in each country. Follow-on agree-
ments (Memoranda of Understanding) have placed the limits at 8111 warheads for the US
and 7984 warheads for Russia.4 The Treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994 and is
scheduled for completion in 15 years.5
On January 3, 1993, and before START I was ratified, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed
a treaty to pursue further strategic arms reductions. Under the so-called START II Treaty,
the number of strategic warheads would be reduced to 3,000 for Russia and 3,500 for the
US by the year 2003. This agreement effectively encompasses START I by requiring
lower warhead levels to be achieved by an earlier deadline.
3. The INF Treaty does not require the actual dismantlement of nuclear warheads.
4. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Affairs, April 1, 1997. Information related
to the START treaties can be obtained through the US ACDA web site: http://www.acda.gov.
5. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union on Dec. 25, 1991 a separate agreement called the Lisbon Proto-
col was signed that made the new republics Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine Parties to START I.
The two Presidents further agreed that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the US and
Russia will deactivate all delivery systems covered by START II by removing their
nuclear warheads or taking other necessary steps to remove them from combat status.
They also expressed a desire for additional strategic arms reductions in the future.
Execution of the START agreements will reduce the number of deployed, strategic war-
heads for each country by more than 70%.6 Adding warheads from tactical weapons
scheduled for dismantling, the US could have as many as 15,000 retired warheads to dis-
position. 7 The total number of strategic and tactical warheads for Russia is unknown but
is expected to be greater than that of the US. Using official CIA estimates for the number
of Russian tactical weapons, the total number of Russian warheads for retirement is
between 14,000 and 22,000.8
These arms control agreements contain detailed verification and monitoring protocols to
eliminate nuclear equipped missiles, aircraft and launchers. However, provisions for the
elimination of the fissile materials to be removed from dismantled warheads were not
included.
2.2 Inventories of Separated Pu in Russia and US
The total US inventory of all grades of Pu (both in the Department of Energy and Depart-
ment of Defense) is 99.5 MT (OFMD 1996b: Ch.1 p.2). This includes 85 MT of WGPu
(<7% Pu-240), 13.2 MT fuel grade (7-19% Pu-240), and 1.3 MT of RGPu (>19% Pu-
6. It is estimated that the US had 12,646 deployed strategic warheads and Russia had 11,012 in 1990 (Men-
delsohn 1992).
7. Of the estimated 8,000 US warheads from tactical weapons, 1,600 are likely to be retained (NAS 1994:
40).
8. Some estimates of the initial Soviet stockpile are much higher and could mean that 30,000 Russian war-
heads or more could ultimately be retired (NAS 1994: 41).
240). 9 The Russian inventory has been estimated at a total of 140 MT of Pu but Russia
has not made public the true value.
With an assumed mass of 4 kg WGPu per warhead the US would have 60 MT and Russia
56 to 88 MT of Pu to disposition as a result of the arms control treaties described in Sec-
tion 2.1. The Pu inventories of each country are categorized in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Estimated Plutonium Inventories (metric tonnes)
US 1  Russia
Deployed
(START II Levels)
Retired
(post-START II)
Other Military Use 25.5 15-473
Separated Civilian -0 254
Total 99.5 140
1. US figures taken from declassified DOE data.
2. CIA estimates (NAS 1994: 41)
3. Based on an estimated total production of 115
MT of WGPu (Albright 1993: 37).
4. (Albright 1993: 109).
The 25.5 MT figure in Table 1, for US Pu other than that deployed in or retired from war-
heads, includes 7 MT of Pu in the form of scrap and residues (Dalton 1995). However,
this relatively small amount of Pu is contained in over 200 MT of solid residues and 400
MT of solutions. The amount of Pu in scrap form in Russia is unknown and may be very
small. The Russians have stated that they reprocessed their scrap material to retrieve any
Pu. 10
9. The isotopic concentration of Pu-240 in Pu determines its classification as the spontaneous fission of this
isotope increases the potential for predetonation in an explosive device. The effect of Pu isotopics on
weapons design is discussed in Section 2.9.
10.Communication with Matthew Bunn, former Plutonium Study Director, National Academy of Sciences.
April 17, 1997.
On March 1, 1995 President Clinton declared 38.2 MT of WGPu Surplus to national secu-
rity needs.11 The DOE has also designated all of its non-WGPu as excess to national secu-
rity needs (GAO 1997: 6). Figure 1 describes the how Pu in the US stockpile will be
designated after START II is implemented.
FIGURE 1. Post START II Pu Stockpile Configuration
(quantities in MT)
On the basis of present arms control agreements and official declarations a total of 52.7
MT will be dispositioned in some manner. If no further arms reductions are pursued, 14
MT will remain deployed and a strategic reserve of 32.8 MT of WGPu will be maintained.
The following section describes how the present US disposition framework developed.
2.3 US Disposition Framework
In a speech before the United Nations on September 27, 1993 President Clinton
announced a series of initiatives designed to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion. The President stated that the US would "seek to eliminate where possible accumu-
lation of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium and to ensure that where
these materials already exist they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security,
and international accountability" (Clinton 1993).12 He also called for "a comprehensive
11.Bill Clinton, Address to the Nixon for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference and the Department of
Energy, March 1, 1995.
12.White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, September 27, 1993.
retained deployed 
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review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, non-
proliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic conditions." President Clinton
invited Russia and other nations with relevant interests and experience to participate in the
study. This set of initiatives was termed the U.S. Nonproliferation and Export Control
Policy.
In a related press release the President reaffirmed US Pu fuel cycle policy. The policy
reads: "The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly,
does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear
explosive purposes." 13 However, it was also noted that the policy does not prevent the US
from maintaining existing commitments involving the civilian Pu programs of Western
Europe and Japan.
In January of 1994 President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued a joint statement on
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. The presi-
dents stated that the proliferation of such systems represents "an acute threat to interna-
tional security in the period following the end of the Cold War."l14 They also established a
joint working group to investigate ways of ensuring the transparency and irreversibility of
arms reduction.
As a result of these policies the following US nonproliferation objectives were adopted
(OFMD 1996a: S-I):
1. secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union;
2. ensure safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus fissile
materials;
3. establish transparent and irreversible nuclear reductions;
4. strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime; and
5. control nuclear exports.
13.ibid.
14.Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, US Department of Energy, "Strategic Plan," September, 1995.
To coordinate the DOE's disposition efforts, the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition
was formed. The Office was given responsibility for "all activities of the Department
relating to the management, storage and disposition of fissile materials from weapons and
weapons systems that are excess to the national security needs of the United States." 15
A major portion of OFMD's responsibility was to analyze disposition options and prepare
a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS attempts to identify
any significant environmental impacts from long-term storage or disposition of WGPu as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The results of this assess-
ment were to be combined with nonproliferation and technical assessments to aid the Sec-
retary of Energy's Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD determines a course of action
for the Department. Following a decision, a detailed Environmental Impact Assessment is
required for activities to be undertaken pursuant to the ROD. The PEIS has been com-
pleted and a ROD issued. Both documents are discussed later in this chapter.
2.4 National Academy of Sciences Report on Pu Disposition
At the request of the National Security Advisor in President Bush's administration, the
National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security and Arms Control
(CISAC) was asked to perform a study of the management and disposition options for plu-
tonium. The CISAC committee is comprised of a variety of distinguished scientists, engi-
neers, and policy experts. Their report entitled "Management and Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium" was published in 1994.
The NAS Report included several recommendations related to fissile material manage-
ment. It encouraged a reciprocal and transparent regime for monitoring warhead disman-
tlement in Russia and the US, and a halt in the production of fissile materials for weapons.
The Committee recommended the application and improvement of safeguards for fissile
materials both from weapons and other sources.
15.The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.L. 103-335)
Regarding disposition of excess Pu, the Committee identified several objectives (NAS
1994: 2):
1. minimize the time during which the plutonium is stored
in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons
2. preserve material safeguards and security during the dis-
position process, seeking to maintain the same high
standards of security and accounting applied to stored
nuclear weapons
3. result in a form which the plutonium would be as diffi-
cult to recover for weapons use as the larger and grow-
ing quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel; and
4. meet high standards of protection for public and worker
health and for the environment.
Of particular interest to the development of Pu disposition alternatives is the third NAS
objective listed above. This recommendation was formalized into the Spent Fuel Standard
(SFS). The Committee determined that all surplus Pu should be processed so that it meets
this standard.
The NAS report stated that disposition options that did not meet this standard would repre-
sent "a unique safeguards problem indefinitely" (NAS 1994: 12). It was also noted that
going beyond the standard would not be justified unless the same treatment was per-
formed on the much larger stocks of Pu presently found in spent fuel. As this seemed
unlikely, due to the enormous cost and complexities, the SFS was adopted.
The Standard was subsequently revised by the DOE. The more precise disposition goal
was restated as: "to make the plutonium as unattractive and inaccessible for retrieval and
weapons use as the residual plutonium in the spent fuel from commercial reactors"
(OFMD 1996c: ES-1). The word unattractive was added ostensibly to avoid debate
regarding the inaccessibility of various Pu matrices. The modification is widely inter-
preted as requiring a radiation barrier. 16 However, no specific measurable parameters
were, nor have been, established to determine compliance with the Standard.
The Standard has become the basis for the administration's disposition activities. The
Standard was used by the OFMD in its screening of options for inclusion in its disposition
PEIS as described in Section 2.7. Indeed it has received international attention. At the
Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in April of 1996, the Leaders of the P-8 countries
expressed support for the Standard. It has had a major impact in defining and bounding
the national and international debate on surplus Pu management.
The NAS report identified several preferred options for meeting the SFS. The primary
two were burning the Pu in existing or modified reactors and vitrification with high-level
waste. The option of disposing of Pu in deep boreholes was mentioned as potentially hav-
ing comparable benefits but had not been studied as extensively. As the borehole option
was ultimately not chosen as part of the preferred US disposition strategy it is not dis-
cussed further in this document.
Reactor Burning
Surplus WGPu can be fabricated into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) and used to produce
energy in a reactor. The exposure to a thermal neutron flux would reduce the isotopic con-
centration of fissile isotopes in the Pu. A portion of the Pu would also be eliminated.
Complete elimination of Pu in present light-water reactors (LWRs) is not possible in a
once-through cycle unless non-fertile fuels are utilized. If U-238 is present in the fuel
additional Pu will be bred as the fuel is burned. By definition the Pu matrix produced by
this form would meet the SFS.
The prospect of using current LWRs as well as new reactors in the US, Russia and Canada
was evaluated. While the US has no industrial MOX fabrication capability, Pu fuel has
16.Actually a radiation barrier would not be required for the direct disposal in deep boreholes or space dis-
posal options.
been fabricated and burned in LWRs for a number of years in Europe. The Committee did
not identify any technical difficulties associated with this option.
If new reactors were to be built the Committee recommended proven designs rather than
advanced (e.g. liquid metal, high temperature gas cooled, etc...). They predicted that costs
and delays in the licensing of advanced reactors would make them inferior to other
options.
Vitrification
In this disposition alternative, WGPu would be mixed with radioactive high-level waste
(HLW) and immobilized via vitrification (turning into glass). Aqueous HLW produced
during the chemical processing required to retrieve Pu from irradiated fuel would be used.
The process involves mixing preprocessed HLW with glass forming elements and heating
to the requisite temperature. The melt is then poured into stainless steel canisters, decon-
taminated, sealed and allowed to cool. The Academy considered that the presence of
radioactive elements and other chemical constituents in a multi-tonne glass 'log' would
approximate the diversion barrier of spent fuel. Therefore the Academy affirmed that vit-
rification with HLW would meet the SFS.
The US currently has an operating HLW vitrification facility in Aiken, South Carolina.
The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is scheduled to operate until 2021 and
will vitrify the roughly 430 MCi of radioactive waste at the site. 17
The NAS found this approach to be technically feasible but noted further research was
needed. In particular the Report noted the potential problem of repository criticality in Pu
loaded glass logs. Over extended periods of exposure to groundwater, sufficient neutron
absorbers could migrate from the near-field to induce criticality. Plutonium has a half-life
of 24,000 yrs and decays to fissile U-235. Uranium can be relatively insoluble as well.
Criticality is a concern as fresh fission products would be given an aqueous transport path-
17. US Department of Environmental Management (1995: Table 2.2).
way, potentially to the biosphere. Such concerns during processing or in a repository
could force a reduction in Pu loading.
In characterizing the security risks from surplus Pu, the NAS report identified the risk of
theft of nuclear weapons in Russia as "serious" (NAS 1994: 45). The Soviet system of
security relied heavily on command and control to protect its weapons and sensitive
nuclear material. The Committee noted that while weapons seemed to remain under firm
control in Russia, other fissile material in Russia was at risk.
At the time the NAS report was written, dozens of unconfirmed thefts had been reported.
The Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov confirmed one theft of HEU and noted
that "many people in Russia live on the edge of poverty and there is a great temptation to
steal in these plants." 18 The following section further describes the security of fissile
materials stored in Russia and several proposals to mitigate nonproliferation concerns.
2.5 Security in Russia
Concern over the control of sensitive nuclear material in the former Soviet Union
prompted US legislative action. In order to combat the immediate risk of theft Congress
passed The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, also known as the Nunn-Lugar
Act. The primary purpose of Nunn-Lugar was to support the safe secure storage, transpor-
tation and dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the New Independent States (NIS). This
legislation provided the funding authority for several US nonproliferation initiatives.
The act provided funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for a variety of
activities in the NIS. The Program provided equipment and services to aid the dismantling
and actual destruction of weapons delivery systems and secure nuclear material. Assis-
tance was also given to support the return of warheads to Russia as required under the Lis-
bon Protocol.
18.Reported in NAS (1994: 46) from an interview conducted by Elizabeth Martin, "A Conversation with
Viktor Mikhailov," NUKEM Market Report, October, 1993.
In order to promote demilitarization, the CRT promoted defense conversion industrial
partnerships. This effort provided US funds to support joint ventures between US compa-
nies and NIS weapons scientists. This was designed to reduce the incentive for weapon
designers to sell their skills abroad.
In the area of Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A,) the Nunn-Lugar
Program was less successful. A series of failed negotiations prevented any meaningful
improvements in this area until June of 1995. At that time an agreement was reached to
improve MPC&A at five sites in Russia. The sluggish start was blamed in part on US
requirements to "buy American" whenever possible (Allison 1996: 83). Failure to pur-
chase Russian goods and services did not foster cooperation.
Efforts to build a storage facility for the fissile components of dismantled Russian war-
heads have generated similar results. Funded by the Nunn-Lugar Program in 1992, dis-
agreements of inspection rights and details related to the specific materials to be stored in
the facility have produced many delays. The facility will store only intact weapon compo-
nents. While construction commenced in 1994, the facility is not scheduled to open until
1998 at the earliest.
In contrast a US-funded collaboration between weapons laboratories in each country was
somewhat more effective. This smaller initiative did not have to meet the procurement
requirements of the Nunn-Lugar Program and was free to spend US money in Russia.
Within a year, new fences, portal monitors, alarms and other security devices were
installed at the Kurchatov Institute which contained more than 150 lbs of HEU. Similar
success were obtained at sites containing other sensitive material. However, it has been
noted that US MPC&A programs have not targeted the largest Russian facilities where
much greater quantities of fissile material exist (Allison 1996: 101).
Unfortunately the improvements in MPC&A did not stop reports of unauthorized diver-
sion in Russia. During Senate testimony in 1996, John Deutch, then Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, described four confirmed thefts of weapons-usable material.
This included thefts of 6 grams of Pu, a single gram of HEU, and approximately 500
grams of a Pu/U mixture (Deutch 1996: 9). The most significant was a case involving
three kg of HEU in December of 1994.
Dr. Deutch also stated that while theft from non-Ministry of Defense sites was more likely,
insider theft at a weapons facility was still a concern. Citing a Russian source, Deutch
said that warhead accounting procedures were so bad that an officer with access "could
remove a warhead, replace it with a readily available training dummy, and authorities
might not discover the switch for as long as six months."
Several proposals have been made to address security concerns in Russia. Thomas Neff of
MIT proposed a direct purchase of Russian HEU. The US, through its legislated executor
the US Enrichment Corporation (USEC), approved the purchase of 500 MT HEU over 20
years. The uranium, blended to LEU, had an estimated value of $12 B.
Due to its structure, the execution of the HEU agreement has been problematic. USEC is
not required to purchase any uranium from Russia. Indeed if a price cannot be negotiated
that is favorable to USEC it has been demonstrated that a purchase will not be executed. If
executed as proposed the purchase would be a major arms control success. This plan is
described in more detail in Chapter 6.
Removal of Pu from Russia via a direct purchase has also been proposed. Brian Chow of
the RAND Corporation suggested a price based on the value of equivalent uranium fuel in
LWRs. The author presents another approach to valuing Pu in Section 5.0.
The NAS study considered a US purchase of Russian Pu but did not recommend it as a
primary objective. The Committee determined that if it were only limited to excess Pu,
significant amounts of Pu remaining in Russia would still represent a threat (NAS 1994:
129). It also noted that the purchase could not be justified based on economics as a legiti-
mate market does not exist for Pu.
If incentives were to be pursued the Academy stated that they should be carefully negoti-
ated such that additional reprocessing was not encouraged. Despite advising flexibility on
financial incentives for Russia, the NAS criticized the option to burn Pu in Canadian reac-
tors due to the likelihood of having to "pay Russia for the Pu as well."
The reluctance to transfer funds to Russia seems prevalent in US disposition policy. The
HEU deal provides Russia with a market price for her HEU, but the US government is not
contracted to provide funds for the material. The effectiveness of the Nunn-Lugar pro-
gram was reduced due to spending restrictions in Russia. Indeed others have noted that
many US legislators view security projects in Russia as unpopular foreign aid (Allison
1996: 136).
2.6 Russian Disposition Strategy
Russia has recognized the importance of WGPu disposition and has expressed interest in
progressing with the US. Indeed the US will not process its Pu until equivalent action has
been taken on Russian Pu (MacDonald 1996). However, it has been repeatedly stated that
the technology used will not necessarily be the same.
From the beginning of Pu disposition discussions, Russia has made clear its intention to
use Pu in a MOX fuel cycle. This represents a continuation of Soviet plans to develop a
closed nuclear fuel cycle utilizing fast reactors. Russia presently has two experimental
fast reactors, a BN-600 in Russia and a BN-350 in Kazakhstan that have operated prima-
rily on HEU (NAS 1994: 242). It also has several small scale Pu fuel fabrication facilities
and is constructing a large MOX facility at Chelyabinsk. Construction is 50% complete
but has been halted for several years due to lack of funds.
Minatom wishes to use surplus WGPu in commercial-scale 800 MW fast reactors (BN-
800 reactors) initially operating in a once-through cycle. 19 It has plans to construct 3-4 of
these reactors when funding can be attained. Russia could burn Pu in the VVER-1000
(LWR) reactors that it possesses or sell MOX fuel abroad. However, pending the comple-
tion of its MOX fabrication facility, Russia's current plan is to store its separated Pu.
19.Working Group on Plutonium Disposition, "Interim Report to the President's Advisor on Science and
Technology," December 12, 1994.
To aid the Russian disposition effort the US could fund the completion of Russian MOX
fabrication facilities and/or fast reactors. Alternatively, proposals have been made to fab-
ricate Russian Pu into MOX in European plants, presumably with US financing (von Hip-
pel 1994). However, on the surface these approaches would appear to be in direct conflict
with US Pu fuel cycle policies.
Immobilizing Russian Pu with HLW would have a higher probability of US financial sup-
port. It has been reported that 250,000 m3 of liquid radioactive waste with 570 MCi exists
in tanks in Russia (Kushnikov 1995: 25). Another 400 million m3 with 700 MCi is stored
in open ponds and pools. For comparison, the Savannah River Site currently possesses
432.5 MCi of HLW and Hanford 324.4 MCi.20 However Russia has flatly rejected any
proposal that would not extract the fuel value of the Pu.
Even if Russia could afford to build the required infrastructure today, it may not not burn
its WGPu first. It has been proposed that WGPu burning would not proceed until RGPu
has been depleted (Kushnikov 1995: 29). This is likely due to the buildup of Am-241
which is a radiological hazard due to its 60 keV gamma.
2.7 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the Office of Fissile Material Disposition was tasked with
producing a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for Pu disposition.
For the immobilization option a screening process was necessary to identify options for
full evaluation in the PEIS.
The PEIS screening process had a major impact on the US disposition program. The
results of the screening not only identified potentially environmentally acceptable options
but define which alternatives were to be studied at all.
20.Data taken from US Department of Environemental Management (EM 1994)
The screening process began by gathering information from a variety of resources. The
NAS report, various technical summaries and expert briefings were used to identify alter-
natives for consideration. This produced thirty-seven distinct options for Pu disposition
(OFMD 1995: Ch. 1 p.5). These options were organized into categories: continued stor-
age, direct disposal, immobilization with radionuclides, and reactor/accelerator consump-
tion.
An initial screening was performed to eliminate 'unreasonable' alternatives. Eliminated
options were deemed to have a fatal flaw relative to disposition criteria. The criteria were
selected to reflect the policy objectives of the US Nonproliferation And Export Control
Policy of September 1993 (see Section 2.3) and the analytical framework set forth by the
NAS Report. The adopted criteria were (OFMD 1995):
1.Resistance to Theft or Diversion in Processing and Storage
2.Resistance to Retrieval, Extraction and Reuse
3.Technical Viability
4.Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S)
5.Cost Effectiveness
6.Timeliness
7.Cooperation With Russia and Other Countries
8.Public and Institutional Acceptance
9.Additional Benefits
If an alternative could not meet one or more of these criteria it was immediately dropped
from consideration. Several of the criteria warrant further explanation. The Resistance to
Theft criterion required adherence to the Spent Fuel Standard at disposition. To be
excluded on the basis of Resistance to Retrieval was taken to mean the form offered no
nonproliferation benefits over long term storage in pit form. Assurance of detection was
a factor used in the Retrieval criterion. The Technical Viability criteria required that an
option could be demonstrated in time for the option to be considered in the decision pro-
cess itself.
Cooperation With Russia was taken to mean an appropriate international standards for dis-
position of nuclear materials was produced. A description of factors affecting this crite-
rion included language concerning leverage for negotiating with Russia and other
countries. The measure for assessing the capability of a disposition option to provide such
leverage was not identified.
Of the 37 options, 13 could not meet all of the criteria listed above and were eliminated.
The remaining were given rough scores of high, medium and low by a panel of technical
advisors chosen by OFMD. Alternatives were given scores based on their ability to
achieve each criteria but the criteria themselves were not weighted. Instead, alternatives
that were rated low for a "significant" number of criteria and/or were dominated by a sim-
ilar alternative were eliminated. This removed another 12 alternative from consideration.
This left 11 options for further evaluation in the PEIS. These included reactor burning
options in the US, Europe and Canada, emplacement in deep boreholes, and various
immobilization options. As the focus of the work presented in this document relates to the
immobilization options, only these alternatives will be elaborated upon. The PEIS and
related documents can be surveyed for information regarding the reactor and borehole
options.
The selected immobilization options resulted in several different Pu storage forms. Each
involved mixing Pu with radionuclides and ultimately disposing of the material in a geo-
logic repository. The material forms considered included glass, ceramic, or metal cast-
ings. These options were then analyzed in the PEIS.
The vitrification option actually consisted of several variants. The 'vitrification -green-
field' option would vitrify Pu at an entirely new facility. The 'vitrification - adjunct
melter' option would use a new melter at the DWPF for dispositioning. These two vari-
ants would use separated Cs-137 from either the Savannah River Site or the Hanford Site.
The 'vitrification - can-in-can' variant would vitrify the Pu in small canisters without
additional radionuclides prior to insertion in a DWPF canister. High-level waste glass
would then be poured into the canister, encasing the smaller cans.
The option of using the current DWPF melter for commingling Pu directly with HLW was
eliminated. Criticality regulations require double contingency, "two unlikely, indepen-
dent and concurrent changes in the process conditions before a criticality event is possi-
ble" (Gray 1995: 8). The order gives preference to passive geometry controls whenever
possible. Because the Pu loading in HLW is extremely low the present DWPF melter and
feed lines were not designed to be criticality safe. Therefore the Facility would have to be
modified for Pu disposition.
As the Facility is currently 'hot,' this would increase worker exposure and delay the
DWPF mission. The adjunct melter seemed a reasonable alternative therefore this option
was not developed further. As noted in the Technical Summary Report (discussed in the
following section) all immobilization alternatives will be two stage approaches - initial
immobilization and then the addition of a radiation barrier - due to criticality concerns.
The ceramic variants are similar to those of the vitrification option except a ceramic host
form will be the Pu host matrix. The metal castings option refers to an electrochemical
process under development for treating DOE spent fuel. In this process Pu is converted to
chloride form, dissolved in a molten-salt solution, sorbed on zeolites and then immobi-
lized in a glass-bonded zeolite waste form (LLNL 1996a).
The PEIS compiled a variety of data related to the expected environmental impact of the
selected alternatives. Issues assessed ranged from land resources to socioeconomic
effects. The environmentally preferred alternative was the "No Disposition" alternative as
Pu would remain in storage and no new federal actions would be required. However, this
alternative was not selected by the Secretary of Energy in her ROD. A discussion of the
environmental impacts of the elected alternative, a so-called hybrid option that includes
reactor burning and immobilization in glass or a ceramic, is discussed in Section 2.10
along with the ROD.
2.8 Technical Assessment
The Technical Summary Report For Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition contains
information related to the technical viability, cost and schedule of the PEIS alternatives.
This section describes the key findings in each of these areas.
Technical Viability
The recovery of Pu from pits is a necessary step for all alternatives. For Pu-bearing mate-
rials and other mixed forms processing will be required for use in the reactor alternatives.
For many alternatives this head-end processing composes the majority of technical effort
and costs associated with dispositioning.
For extracting Pu from pits a dry separation process termed the Advanced Recovery and
Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) has been developed. In the ARIES process, the Pu
pit is sliced into two hemispheres and Pu is purified through a hydride/dehydride step.
Either plutonium oxide or metal can be formed in the process.
Each of the immobilization forms are expected to be acceptable for geologic disposal
according to the DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OFMD
1996c: Ch.3 p.9). However the Summary Report stated that all matrices will require addi-
tional R&D for waste form qualification purposes. Little data exists on the environmental
durability of the glass-bonded zeolite. It was noted that a ceramic form could have benefi-
cial long term performance over borosilicate glass. Processing issues remain for each of
the immobilization options.
For the options that use Pu vitrified in glass several different formulations are under inves-
tigations. A lanthanum borosilicate glass, termed a Loffler glass, is being investigated for
the vitrification can-in-can variant. This glass is expected to have high durability and can
accept large loadings of neutron poisons. An alkali-tin-silicate or ATS glass may be used
for the adjunct melter variant. This glass would possess a low melting temperature to pre-
vent the volatilization of Cs. These glasses are discussed in greater detail in Section 4.2.4.
As noted previously long term criticality is a concern, for the reactor waste forms as well
as the immobilization alternatives. The Summary Report noted that criticality assess-
ments have been made but only for completely intact waste forms (OFMD 1996c: Ch.3
p.5). The prospect of a criticality event occurring during the dissolution of a borosilicate
glass is evaluated in Section 4.9.
The reactor alternatives utilizing existing LWRs were noted as possessing fewer technical
uncertainties. The Report said these reactors could be easily modified to support Pu burn-
ing. There is also an experimental database for MOX burning in LWRs in Europe. How-
ever, technical risks would be higher for options using CANDU reactors, unfinished or
new reactors.
A caveat was added that the reactor options may require additional aqueous processing
after Pu removal from pits in order to remove gallium (OFMD 1996c: Ch.3 p.6). Gallium
was used to alloy WGPu in a thermally stable phase. Aqueous processing (after a dry
ARIES type process) may be required as Ga is a reactive metal and could have an impact
on fuel fabrication and performance. In addition adequate particle size for MOX fabrica-
tion has not been proven for dry processing.
Cost & Schedule
Large cost uncertainties exist for both the reactor and immobilization options. Regulatory
oversight was noted as an important and common factor for both. Reactor cost are depen-
dent on business agreements for burning with individual utilities. Immobilization costs
are dependent on waste form qualification expenses. It was estimated that immobilization
could begin in 7 years and reactor alternatives 10 years. Both require roughly $1 B
investment costs. Again, a large fraction of cost is Pu processing. Cost and schedule
uncertainties are further discussed in Section 3.3.
2.9 Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment
The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment was prepared by the DOE's Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation with support from the OFMD. It contains a nonprolif-
eration assessment of the various disposition alternatives using a set of technical and pol-
icy factors.
Technical factors included: how quickly an option could be initiated and finished, the
degree of susceptibility to diversion during processing, the ease of international monitor-
ing, and the ability to meet the Spent Fuel Standard (DOE 1997: ix).
Policy factors in the assessment were: the ability to impact Russian disposition activities
(described as a "major motivation" for US action;) the support of arms reduction by ensur-
ing irreversibility of the process; the commitment to US nonproliferation obligations such
as the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty; and the impact on fuel cycle choices
of other nations.
As part of the Nonproliferation Assessment, a Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team report
was solicited by the OFMD and produced by a Sandia National Laboratories led group.
This Report provided a technical assessment of security vulnerabilities of the disposition
options for the Assessment.
While the Assessment concluded that each alternative could provide high levels of secu-
rity and none was clearly superior, several important findings were presented.
2.9.1 The Use of RGPu in Nuclear Explosives
The Red Team confirmed prior statements regarding the usability of various isotopic
grades of Pu in weapons (Mark 1993). It issued a single summary statement on the matter
(Sandia 1997: Ch.4 p.7):
"All plutonium is good plutonium; some is better than other."
In the past there have been debates regarding the suitability of reactor-grade Pu (RGPu)
for weapons use. RGPu has higher concentrations of Pu isotopes higher than Pu-239.
This results in two potential problems for weapons designers: pre-initiation and heat dissi-
pation.
Nuclear weapons contain cores of hollow Pu spheres termed 'pits.' The configuration of
the Pu is initially subcritical but when the sphere is imploded, using high explosives, the
system goes super-critical. Pre-initiation results when the fission chain reaction is initi-
ated to soon, before the highest levels of compression are reached. This can cause the
device to heat up too quickly and expand. This expansion force ultimately reduces the
number of fission generations and thereby the ultimate yield.
Plutonium-240 has a higher spontaneous fission rates than Pu-239 and thereby increases
the risk of pre-initiation. This isotope and the other shorter lived isotopes Pu-238 and Pu-
241 also increase the heat generation in the weapon. High temperatures may be a problem
with regard to the high explosives used in the weapon.
Despite the problems associated with RGPu, it's ability to produce a nuclear explosion
seems certain. "Even if pre-initiation occurs at the worst possible moment (when the
material first becomes compressed enough to sustain a chain reaction), the explosive yield
of even a relatively simple first-generation nuclear device would be of the order of a few
kilotons" (DOE 1997: 38). It has also been noted that the issue of heat generation can be
mitigated by heat sinks and/or delayed assembly of the weapon until just before use (NAS
1994: 33). Therefore the Assessment concluded that "reactor-grade plutonium is weap-
ons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon
states" (DOE 1997: 39).
2.9.2 Radiation as an Accessibility Barrier
Another significant finding of the Red Team related to the effectiveness of the radiation
barrier produced by each of the alternatives. In their estimation "none of the alternative
final forms emit radiation fields large enough to require shielding for dedicated aggres-
sors" (Sandia 1996: Ch.4 p. 16). Therefore, the inherent radiation levels of the alternatives
under investigation would not be a "significant accessibility barrier to unauthorized par-
ties."
In assessing the radiation barrier of spent fuel the Red Team assumed a decay time of 10
years after irradiation. US BWR or PWR spent fuel would have a dose rate of 1000 rem/
hr at 1 m from the surface. (As the can-in-can variants use older fission products the dose
would be lower). They estimated that a successful overt theft would take roughly ten or
twenty minutes in which case the accumulated dose would be about 300 rem. Based on
dose/effect relationships taken from the reference "Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing
Radiation" they determined that while such a dose would eventually produce radiation
sickness effects, it "is unlikely to produce any symptoms during the course of the theft and
is unlikely to result in death."
The Red Team accounted for the fact that a proliferator might have to touch the surface of
the container for some period during the theft which would increase the dose rate. How-
ever, they made a distinction between extremity dose (e.g. to the hands) and that to the
midline of the body. The extremities are less sensitive to dose than vital organs. They fur-
ther noted that the midline dose might be much less than 300 rem as they would not need
to be near the waste during the entire 10-20 minute period.
Nonetheless, the Assessment Report warned of underestimating the effort required to suc-
cessfully divert a SFS form. While acknowledging the Red Team's devaluation of radia-
tion as an accessibility barrier, it asserted that the larger barrier would be executing the
theft, transportation, extraction and fabrication of a weapons without being detected and
stopped (DOE 1997: 54). It went on to describe how the radiation field would make the
transport vehicle easier to detect and that gaseous fission products would be released upon
reprocessing that could be detected. The fact that the proposed immobilization alterna-
tives do not contain volatile fission products was not noted in the Assessment.
Both the Assessment and the Red Team report stated that none of the alternatives make the
plutonium impossible to recover. The Red Team Report further noted that only after the
Pu was emplaced in a geologic repository would proliferation resistance be dominated by
intrinsic barriers rather than institutional ones (Sandia 1996: Ch.4 p.38). Safeguards
would be necessary until the Pu was placed underground and sealed.
2.9.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Individual Options
Some comments were made regarding specific alternatives. The reactor alternatives and
can-in-can variants were noted for their ability to allow detailed accounting of Pu content
during the production of fresh fuel and small cans , thereby easing verification. However,
it was also noted that the can-in-can variants need additional research to prove that the
individual cans could not be mechanically separated from the HLW without great effort.
On the issue of timing, the can-in-can variants provide some advantage as they could be
initiated sooner. Conversely, it was remarked that the borehole option could possibly have
large delays related to approvals for siting and construction. Similarly, it was stated that
the electrometallurgical treatment option would be prone to delays as it is less technologi-
cally developed than the other immobilization options.
Finally, the Assessment urged caution in US participation in alternatives that would
expand foreign MOX fabrication. It was recommended that financing for foreign MOX
capability should be avoided to the extent possible (DOE 1997: xxi). If it were pursued,
limits should be established such that the supported facilities would only be used for sur-
plus WGPu disposition.
2.10 Record Of Decision
The Record of Decision (ROD) represented a formal statement of the DOE's strategy for
WGPu disposition. It supports a "dual-track" approach in which both the reactor and
immobilization options will be pursued. The ROD specifies that at least 8 MT of surplus
Pu will be immobilized due to its impurity. Based on current evaluations the ROD con-
cluded that the can-in-canister variant is likely to be used at the DWPF.
The remaining plutonium will either be immobilized or burned in a reactor depending on
the results of further technical and non-technical feasibility studies. Reactor burning
would occur in existing, US commercial reactors. To support this activity a government
owned MOX fuel fabrication facility would be built at a DOE site. It was stressed that any
MOX fabrication facility used during the program would be shut down upon mission com-
pletion and not used for any other purposes.
The ROD specified that the PEIS, Technical Summary Report, and the Nonproliferation
Assessment were all taken into account in the decision making process. The ROD stated
that reactor burning and immobilization were essentially environmentally comparable.
Neither one of the alternatives appeared superior from a nonproliferation or arms control
perspective as well. Each provided high level of security and were technically feasible.
While no weighting or even ranking of criteria was offered, several key issues were noted
in the ROD. The importance of swift processing was stated repeatedly in the ROD. The
impact on Russian processing was also highlighted. The ROD states that benefits of Pu
disposition would be greatly increased if Russia took comparable steps with its own Pu
(O'Leary 1997: 13).
The ROD justified the dual path strategy based on its ability to provide flexibility and
insurance. By pursuing a hybrid approach the ROD contends that WGPu disposition
could begin earlier and be completed faster. It was also argued that the two paths will
serve as insurance for meeting schedule goals.
Additional support for the dual path strategy has been expressed. A letter, described in the
ROD, from members of the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposi-
tion of Excess Weapons Pu supports the hybrid approach due to its impacts on Russia.
They assert that the reactor burning option is needed in the US in order to influence Rus-
sian decisions related to the conditions and safeguards accompanying their Pu burning
activities. It has also been argued that if the US pursued immobilization alone, hawks in
Russia would stall disposition as US Pu would remain weapons-grade (Holdren 1997).
This statement is offered despite published US/Russian agreements to accept separate dis-
position approaches.
This chapter described the Pu disposition challenge today and the present US response.
The following chapter provides a cost/benefit analysis for incremental Pu processing
steps. The effectiveness of various disposition actions is combined with an understanding
of the relevant risks to identify valuable components of any proposed disposition strategy.
Using this framework a critique of the current US strategy is presented and an alternate
strategy for WGPu disposition is proposed.
3.0 System Analysis
To design an effective disposition strategy it was necessary to understand the components
of a successful outcome. In this chapter the desired objectives and the effect of material
processing on those objectives are presented. The potential role for immobilization is fur-
ther explored and an implementation strategy proposed.
The U.S. disposition program possesses many objectives. From its inception, the OFMD
was tasked to evaluate "technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and eco-
nomic" issues related to fissile material disposition. The 9 criteria chosen as a basis for
comparison of disposition alternatives were identified in Section 2.7.
In this work, proliferation risk, cost, and (indirectly) timeliness were assumed to be the
three most important attributes. The relative impact of the material form on each of these
factors was explored to form the basis of strategy formulation.
The remaining criteria were treated separately. Public acceptance was viewed as adding
uncertainty to any disposition schedule and will be discussed in Section 3.3. The issue of
Russian reciprocity was recognized as important and the impact of US disposition is
assessed in Section 3.4. A review of the PEIS shows all alternatives to possess somewhat
similar environmental impacts. As environmental factors would not distinguish between
disposition strategies they were not investigated further. The Technical Summary Report
characterized each of the disposition alternatives as "viable" yet encouraged further
research , especially for the immobilization alternatives. The technical feasibility of vitri-
fication is explored in detail in Chapter 4.0.
It is proposed that an appropriate disposition strategy would reduce the proliferation risk
from surplus plutonium to an acceptable level with an eye to cost. Flexibility for respond-
ing to future known and unknown uncertainties was identified as an additional attribute.
This counters the oft stated U.S. goal of irreversibility. However, as none of the options
under consideration achieve true irreversibility, and the potential downside risk is sizeable,
reversibility was taken as a disposition asset. This point will be developed in detail later in
this chapter.
The following section describes how proliferation risk was addressed in the analysis. The
effect of material processing on risk is assessed for several credible categories of prolifer-
ators. In this way risk reduction over time can be compared with the associated cost pro-
file. A disposition strategy that provides the greatest risk reduction in the near term at low
project costs should be pursued.
3.1 Proliferation Risk
If proliferation risk reduction is desired, a comprehensive understanding of what is meant
by risk is needed. Proliferation risk was taken to be dependent on three factors: desire,
ability and opportunity. The greater the motivation and the ability of a group to divert fis-
sile material given the opportunity, the greater the perceived risk.
Each of these factors is needed for proliferation risk to exist, however the relative risk con-
tribution of each is unknown. The material form of Pu will affect each of these factors and
thereby the perceived risk. In this section individual processing steps were evaluated to
gauge their ability to minimize proliferation risk by attacking the individual risk factors.
Issues other than material form are clearly capable of also affecting risk. However, the
contribution of material form is the focus of this section.
3.1.1 Potential Diverters
In order to assess the impact of material processing on risk it is necessary to identify the
proliferator. This is because processing has unique and disparate effects on individual
proliferators. In this section four general classes of proliferators were selected and their
potential proliferation motives and capabilities postulated. While the categories are com-
plete in the sense that all proliferators could be placed in a class, the proposed motives are
not likely to be exhaustive. The classifications were assumed to be sufficiently represen-
tative for use in this analysis.
Host Nations: Russia and US - Diversion amongst these parties would represent the
"breakout" scenario referred to in the literature.2 1 Given the size of their post-START II
stockpiles and unspecified reserves they would appear to have little reason to seek addi-
tion fissile material. Only in a renewed arms race would this seem plausible. In such a
case they would be seeking large quantities of Pu, preferably of the same isotopics found
in present designs. Regarding capability, both countries posses warhead production expe-
rience. While material production capabilities are declining, both countries have vast
experience and access to large industrial infrastructures.
Other Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) - In general this class would have little interest in
Russian or US Pu as they have weapons capability of their own. Advancing their strategic
nuclear position (to a superpower level) would require diversion of massive numbers of
warheads. The risk of detection and conflict with another weapons state would seem an
adequate deterrent. However, perhaps one or a few intact pits would be desired for their
design information (particularly after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). This may
also introduce a new era of data espionage (even amongst allies).
Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) - These countries could desire any number of
warheads, merely to gain entrance into the nuclear club. They have limited if any infra-
structure for weapons production but could have access to a wide range of technical exper-
tise.
Subnational Groups - These organizations have no fissile material production capability
whatsoever. Their resources are likely to be smaller than a NNWS and their technical
expertise more narrow. For this reason they may attach a premium to attaining the fissile
material in pit form to avoid the manufacturing of a weapon altogether. However, they
would desire Pu regardless of its material form.
21.See NAS (1994: 47) for example.
In the following section the effect of processing on the desire, ability and opportunity on
the risk of proliferation for each class of threat is examined. From the perspective of a
proliferator, surplus plutonium in a storage matrix represents:
* something I want to some degree (defined by my ability to use it and
alternate sources of the fissile material);
* something I have some prospect of successfully obtaining (defined by
degree of safeguards, physical form, tracking potential);
*and, given a degree of opportunity, I will acquire it.
The general material modifications assumed for this investigation are:
*pit processing - submitting the pit to an ARIES type process where its
geometry is changed and perhaps transformed into oxide form;
Sisotopic blending;
Schemical dilution with or without a radiation barrier, and
Sincreasing the unit size and mass.
Both desire and capability are directly affected by the material characteristics of the Pu.
Opportunity is primarily a function of institutional control. However, if this is expressed
as a function of time then the storage matrix may indirectly influence this factor as certain
processing steps will take longer to implement and are more prone to delays than others.
Such delays impede the application of direct verification and safeguards which are capa-
ble of reducing opportunities for diversion. The following sections describe the effect of
each processing step on the proliferation risk from each class of proliferator.
3.1.2 Processing Effect on Desire
Altering the physical characteristics of the Pu can reduce its desirability in several ways.
The processing may degrade the utility of the material or make alternate sources more
attractive. Again the aspirations and capabilities of the proliferator determine the magni-
tude of the effect.
Host State
The only processing that could directly affect the utility of the material for the host state
would be isotopic blending. This is not due to US or Russia's inability to use RGPu as a
weapon - clearly they can. The affect is a logistical one. Both countries have a fleet of
warheads designed for a particular grade of Pu. It may be that sufficient isotopic blending
would make the Pu unusable in a significant portion of the designs (Sylvester 1996).
While new designs could be utilized, the inability to test them due to the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could be an obstacle.22 This may effectively demilitarize the Pu
as the reliability of new designs may be insufficiently characterized.
The Vulnerability Report does not completely address this point. They noted that " a sim-
ple fission design would not require testing to prove that it would work," and "the only
debate would be about the yield" (DOE 1997). This debate may be unacceptable for
deployment in a military arsenal.
While the focus here is on arms control, the effect of pit processing on military readiness
should also be noted. Nuclear weapons, if they were ever to be used, would most likely be
launched in one or a few waves over a relatively short period of time. Any Pu that was not
in pit form, would possess no military value as the time required to manufacture a weapon
would be too long. If the Pu were processed out of pit form it would also greatly diminish
the usefulness of the material from a military readiness perspective.
Processing the pit into an oxide would eliminate geometry information, force reduction to
metallic Pu and require machining to reconfigure a weapon but the uncontaminated oxide
material would still be attractive. While chemical dilution with a radioactive barrier may
cause a delay, remote, industrial solvent extraction capability exists in both countries.
This was how the Pu was initially produced.
22.The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions. All declared weapon states have signed
the treaty.
However, such dilution could reduce the desirability of the material if reversal were more
expensive than alternatives such as uranium enrichment. The cost of retrieval will depend
on the status of the host nation's reprocessing infrastructure as well as waste management
policies. The cost would range from a low value representing operational reprocessing
capability with no waste treatment and a high value for mothballed or decommissioned
canyons and vitrification facilities.
Several observations were made regarding material processing effects on host state desire.
A chemical barrier alone could result in the same degree of host state deterrence as a radi-
ation barrier. The combination of an operational reprocessing facility and concerns over
criticality safety may result in a "clean" storage form loaded with Pu to be processed in a
remote facility. In that sense, a matrix that required the same processing should be
viewed as equivalent to radioactive spent fuel.
In addition, the cost of reprocessing relative to uranium enrichment may also affect desir-
ability. Roughly 200 SWU are required per kg of natural uranium feed enriched to 95
wt% U-235 (optimum tails).23 At $100/SWU that equals $20,000/kg just for enrichment
services. Each kg of enriched U would require 240 kg of natural U. At a cost of 16.50 per
lb of uranium ore (U30 8) this results in $10,370/kg enriched U. Adding these costs
together, the total cost is $30,370 for each kg of enriched uranium.
However, if the starting material is uranium from reprocessed spent fuel, as may be the
case in Russia, the price of enrichment may be lower. Assuming a discharge enrichment
of 1%, only 143 SWU would be required to reach 95% enrichment. This enrichment
would cost $14,300/kg. The requisite 172 kg of 1% U-235 required may actually be
viewed as free if the costs for retrieving it were assigned to reprocessing. If other contam-
inants (e.g. U-236) do not force additional processing, the total cost of HEU derived from
reprocessed fuel would be $14,300 per kg.
23.SWU stands for Separative Work Unit in kg. It is a measure of the amount of enrichment services needed
to achieved a desired isotopic concentration of fissile U-235 in U-238. Natural uranium has a concentra-
tion of 0.711 wt% U-235.
The OECD places a cost of 720 ECU/kg U on reprocessing and vitrification services. 24
Assuming a disposition loading of 5 wt% Pu, this results in a cost of $14,400/kg to
retrieve Pu. The HEU derived from natural U is more than twice the price of Pu recovery.
However if Russia has access to slightly enriched U from reprocessing the prices are com-
parable.
While either country might desire Pu for weapon design purposes, the economic incentive
for retrieving Pu can be reduced by material processing, even when operational facilities
exist. For Russia the accessibility to tonnes of separated RGPu from civilian operations
could also lessen the attractiveness of safeguarded Pu. In any regard the host nation's fuel
cycle choices and weapons design flexibility determine the potential impact of material
processing on desirability.
Nuclear Weapons State
The CTBT could give some incentive for another NWS to obtain surplus Pu from US or
Russia. However, merely altering the pit would eliminate any design information that
might be available and thereby the desirability of this proliferator. Isotopic blending may
effectively demilitarize the Pu as well. As mentioned above, the only other possible
incentive another NWS may have would be to dramatically increase their stockpile in a
short period. The prospect of attempting to steal large quantities of Pu even in concen-
trated form seems implausible given any reasonable safeguards. Further processing could
make such an unlikely assault even more infeasible.
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
For a NNWS that wishes to develop some level of nuclear weapons capability, any of the
processing steps would seem to have marginal effect on their desire for the material. The
radiation barrier would be a nuisance, requiring additional time and personnel for Pu
extraction. (The effect of radiation on the act of theft is discussed in Section 3.1 on
24.Reprocessing and vitrification cost taken from OECD (1994: 50). (1 ECU - 1 US$.)
page 40). But according to the Vulnerability Assessment only 2 additional weeks and 2
additional people would be needed to retrieve 8 kg of Pu (Sandia 1996: Ch.4 p.6).
This can be understood by examining the PUREX process for extracting Pu and U from
spent fuel. Upon mechanically shearing the fuel rods, the fuel is dissolved in a hot nitric
acid. Plutonium, uranium and fission products are all brought into solution. Dissolution
times are on the order of minutes to hours. The pH of the aqueous mixture is then adjusted
to around 2.5 and a reducing agent is added (e.g. sodium nitrite) to place Pu in a +4 state.
The Pu and U are then separated from 99% of the fission products by solvent extraction
with TBP (tributyl phosphate) in an organic carrier (Benedict 1981: 484). Further pro-
cessing is performed to separate Pu from U and further purify the product, however multi-
ple order of magnitude reductions in radiation dose rate can be achieved in a single step.
If a Pu SFS form could be subjected to a similar process, a radiation barrier could be
swiftly removed.
If the production of many weapons was desired the loss of design information would per-
haps have the greatest effect as this would prevent production of high quality replicas. If
merely a few weapons were desired it would seem that any form of Pu would be attractive.
Small batch sizes and shielded laboratory equipment could be employed to subvert a radi-
ation barrier. Industrial size, canyon type facilities would not be needed if only one or two
weapons were desired and the proliferator was patient.
The status and availability of enrichment technology would also be important for this pro-
liferator. Cost is likely to be less a factor for a NNWS. If Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope
Separation (AVLIS) technology were available and could be operated in a clandestine
manner, the dispositioned Pu would become less appealing. A uranium weapon would
also be simpler to design as only a gun-type assembly would be required.
Subnational Group
It appears that processing would have little effect on subnational desire as well. However,
for certain groups Pu in pit form could be valued significantly more as weapon fabrication
and design capability may be limited. Obtaining the Pu in pit form would also reduce the
time needed after diversion to assemble a weapon which would reduce the chances for
detection. As no stockpile ambitions would exist, one or two explosives of uncertain
yields would be strongly desired. Therefore, as with the NNWS, the radiation barrier
could be undermined.
The prevalence of uranium enrichment technology would also be important for determin-
ing the risk from this proliferator. The risk of immediate detection through uranium
enrichment is likely to be lower than that of diversion of Pu from a safeguarded facility,
particularly if the information and technology comprised in centrifuge and/or AVLIS
enrichment becomes widely available.
Desirability Summary
The material processing of surplus WGPu would do little to reduce the ultimate desirabil-
ity of the material to potential proliferators and then only under certain conditions. Pit
conversion would eliminate design information eliminating any gain for a NWS prolifera-
tor. Isotopic dilution may be capable of demilitarizing the material for service in the host
nation's existing weapon's infrastructure.
The most additional processing is capable of achieving is reduced attractiveness by forc-
ing recovery and purification through chemical processing. If waste management is not a
concern of the proliferator and it has the infrastructure for such processing or is willing to
accept clumsy and slow laboratory scale reprocessing, the addition of a radiation barrier
will not reduce the attractiveness of the material. In contrast, the nuclear fuel cycle infra-
structure available to the proliferator can greatly affect desirability, particularly for the
host state.
3.1.3 Ability to Divert
Another component of proliferation risk is the proliferators' estimated and actual capabil-
ity to successfully transfer the Pu off-site. It is assumed that after disposition processing
the Pu will be placed in a storage facility for monitoring. If all proliferators view removal
from the site as virtually impossible there is no risk of proliferation as none will be
attempted. The material form can affect the ease of safeguarding and/or off-site removal.
This can dramatically decrease the proliferators expectations for success and thereby the
proliferation risk. Clearly the level of institutional control (guns and guards) also affects
diversion capability. However, as the same institutional controls may be applied to any Pu
matrix, only the material contribution to deterrence was addressed in this work.
Host State
The host state would always be able to take possession of the material. The material form
would have little if any impact. Access to military force, industrial equipment, knowledge
of site operations, and the location of the storage site within the host nation's boundaries
make removal or repossession of large quantities quite feasible. Inspectors could merely
be forced to leave.
Verification would have some deterrence for the host state as the international community
would be alerted. There have been some questions regarding the ability to adequately
verify pit storage. The Nonproliferation Assessment stated that "acceptable verification
and monitoring measures for pits in storage have not yet been resolved" (DOE 1997: Ch.5
p.51). Processing the Pu into non-pit form would allow the material to be accounted for
directly and safeguarded by multinational parties. In this sense, ARIES processing could
reduce the ability of the host state to reverse the disposition process.
Nuclear Weapons State
The addition of safeguarding and direct verification of processed pits would sufficiently
deter diversion by a NWS proliferator. This is especially true if all design data were elim-
inated through ARIES processing. While military forces could be used, such an act would
risk full scale confrontation with the host state. The severity of this outcome would seem
adequate deterrence to NWS diversion.
Non-Nuclear Weapons State
The safeguarding of PuO2 may not be sufficient to deter NNWS diversion attempts. How-
ever increases of unit size and mass would reduce the potential for diversion as detection
would be much easier and transport more difficult. To the extent emitted radiation can be
detected, the inclusion of HLW would provide an added reduction in proliferation risk.
However, the radiation fields projected for the MOX and immobilization alternatives will
not be capable of making the forms "self-protecting."
As noted in Section 2.9, the Red Team Report provides a detailed analysis of the self-pro-
tecting issue. To the extent a radiation field forces the use of heavily shielded equipment
to move Pu containing material, it would hamper diversion. However, the Assessment
notes "none of the alternative final forms emit radiation fields large enough to require
shielding for dedicated aggressors" (Sandia 1996: Ch.4 p. 16). An aggressor that is willing
to take a non-incapacitating dose of a few hundred rem will not be deterred. The Assess-
ment goes on to estimate that dose rates of several thousand rem/hr at 1 meter would be
needed to produce lethal effects during the execution of a theft. They estimate 10 year old
spent fuel to possess a dose rate of 1000 rem/hr at 1 meter.
Subnational Group
The analysis for the subnational group is identical to that for the NNWS. While a NNWS
may have access to greater military resources and training, subnational groups have dem-
onstrated their willingness to sacrifice their lives in execution of a terrorist act.
Ability Summary
There is virtually nothing to prevent retrieval by a host state. However, material process-
ing may somewhat reduce the prospects for successful diversion by other proliferators.
The most effective strategy would appear to be processing the material into an easily mon-
itored form and safeguarding it. To the extent verification of pits is hampered due to the
presence of classified data, at a minimum ARIES processing may be required. Beyond
that the most import factor appears to be the use of unit/size and mass to hamper on-site
manipulation and off-site transport by requiring industrial size equipment. However, the
Assessment notes: "In all cases, it is estimated that intrinsic resistance to theft could be
overcome in 15 to 30 minutes by one heavy lift helicopter and a few people on the
ground" (Sandia 1996: Ch.5. p.40).
3.1.4 Opportunity
While form is important, when and where the Pu is processed also affects proliferation
risk. This relates to the strength of institutional control. Much has been made of the doc-
umented smuggling attempts in Russia. This has been attributed to the relative economic
and political turmoil in that nation. The lack of sufficient accounting also leads to vulner-
ability concerns. Therefore, it would appear that the greatest proliferation benefits would
come from quickly securing Russian Pu. Additional gains could be had from moving Pu
in Russia to a more stable country for processing.
Material processing could reduce the opportunity for proliferation. As execution of the
present disposition alternatives will require decades, the near-term focus has been on safe,
secure storage. However, as mentioned earlier, storage in pit form may not allow adequate
verification. In addition, observer presence may be intermittent. For perhaps unrelated
political purposes, inspectors may simply be forced out of storage facilities. Independent,
direct verification would be desirable under such circumstances. Processing into non-
classified forms would allow for such verification if the final form was suitable for non-
destructive evaluation. If the present instabilities are believed to exist indefinitely, the
benefits of a non-pit storage form over pit form become larger.
Pit conversion/Pu recovery operations could be initiated immediately if sufficient ship-
ping/receiving facilities along with glove box and ventilation systems were available
(LLNL 1996b: Ch.2 p.21). The availability of of such facilities in Russia is unknown.
The ARIES process is currently being designed to process 250-500 pits per year (OFMD
1996c). Such a prototype could be replicated to increase throughput.
The operational start time for the ARIES process, combined with a vitrification step was
estimated as 7 years (OFMD 1996c: Ch.5 p.10). For the immobilization alternative these
processes were not individually evaluated as they would be treated as a single, integrated
front-end process for combining the vitrified Pu with HLW. This estimate includes further
R&D and licensing activities. It is possible that such processing could be done faster and
cheaper in Russia.
For completeness the schedule for supplying a unit size and mass as well as radiation bar-
rier is discussed. For the reactor alternative unit size and mass, and chemical dilution will
be added in the MOX fabrication stage. If foreign fabrication facilities were utilized this
would occur as Pu is extracted from pit form. Otherwise it is estimated that a domestic
MOX facility could be operational in 10 yrs. It is estimated that reactors could be avail-
able in 9 yrs to provide a radiation barrier.
For the can-in-can and adjunct melter alternatives (described in Section 2.7), chemical
dilution will occur in the first immobilization step. Unit size and mass, as well as a radia-
tion barrier would be attained immediately after extraction from pits. This would occur
through loading of the cans into a DWPF canister and filling the canister with HLW glass.
The DWPF is already in operation.
While processing beyond ARIES may be pursued for other reasons (e.g. ability to divert),
it would not reduce further the opportunity for proliferation. The potential benefits (in
terms of reducing proliferator opportunity) of material processing are attained exclusively
through processing the Pu into a directly verifiable form for storage in a safeguarded,
international facility.
However if pit processing were delayed due to the unavailability of additional processing
facilities, pursuing the SFS could increase the risk of proliferation as Pu would remain in
pit form for an extended period. In addition if the rate of pit processing were constrained
by MOX fabrication or HLW vitrification capacity, larger stocks of Pu would remain in pit
form for longer periods. This too would increase the opportunity for proliferation. Given
the limited benefits of a radiation barrier the risk of processing delay should be carefully
assessed.
3.2 Costs
The potential proliferation benefits and detriments of material processing were identified
above. The processing alternatives selected by the Secretary of Energy for surplus Pu dis-
position were then examined to determine the costs associated with each step of Pu pro-
cessing. While other processes and forms are possible, cost estimates were not available.
The data presented in the Technical Summary Report was used to form general conclu-
sions regarding the relative marginal cost of processing Pu into various forms.
For both the reactor and immobilization alternatives the initial pit processing (common to
both alternatives) was estimated to be the greatest contributor to life cycle costs. In the
Existing LWRs - Existing Facilities alternative, a net life cycle cost of $1390 M was
assigned to ARIES processing with Ga removal. The total undiscounted life cycle cost for
this alternative was estimated to be $1920 M. For the vitrification can-in-can variant,
front-end costs were $1340 M including the initial vitrification step. The total life cycle
cost for this variant was $1830 M.
For the reactor alternative, chemical dilution in a large unit size and mass container is
achieved at the price of MOX fuel fabrication. This results in an added life cycle cost of
$1540 M. The addition of a radiation barrier would require $380 M in reactor related
costs but result in a fuel displacement credit of $1390 M.
For the immobilization variants, chemical dilution would be achieved as the last stage of
pit processing. A single facility would perform "all plutonium recovery operations and all
immobilization operations not involving the final pour of the HLW glass" (LLNL 1996b:
Ch.2 p.21). Therefore the marginal cost of chemical dilution for this alternative was
included in the ARIES estimate above. This processing would "require similar glove box
and ventilation systems as those used for the recovery operations and would not be con-
tained in a separate facility in any reasonable implementation." The unit size and mass,
and radiation barriers were estimated to cost an additional $490 M, $390 M for vitrifica-
tion with HLW and $100 M for added disposal costs.
3.3 Relevant Uncertainties
Disposition strategies must recognize significant uncertainties and develop strategies for
minimizing potential negative outcomes. Future events can dramatically affect Pu dispo-
sition activities and ultimate benefits. Several uncertainties are particularly important.
These factors are identified and discussed in this section.
A particularly meaningful uncertainty is Russian Pu disposition activities. The Technical
Summary Report noted that Russian reciprocity will be required for US disposition to pro-
ceed (OFMD 1996c: Ch.6 p.1). None of the disposition alternatives address this reciproc-
ity issue. The disposition of US Pu will not reduce the obstacles Russia faces in burning
its Pu. Without an accompanying strategy for effectively promoting Russian disposition,
it is likely that US Pu will remain in pit form.
Each of the identified alternatives may face other scheduling delays. Licensing and public
opposition may cause delays in the MOX alternative in the US. While licensing will be
needed for all processing, opposition to MOX burning has already been organized
(O'Leary 1997: 16). For immobilization options utilizing the DWPF, processing sched-
ules will rely on its continuous availability. The risk of operational problems with such a
complex, remotely-operated facility are possible. These factors weaken confidence in the
proposed disposition schedule.
All of the immobilization alternatives may face delays due to waste form qualification
issues. Even if Pu disposal forms meet disposal requirements at the beginning of process-
ing, they may not be acceptable upon completion as standards are subject to change.
Indeed, the performance requirements for Yucca Mountain have not yet been established.
Nor has Yucca Mountain been selected as a nuclear waste repository. In the worst case
scenario a reversal of disposition processing may be required.
Even if predicted schedules are met, uncertainties will also affect the realized proliferation
benefits of disposition actions. As mentioned earlier, the diffusion of centrifuge and
AVLIS technology over the several decades of disposition may dominate the long-term
proliferation risk posed by surplus Pu. In addition, the subjective nature of the Spent Fuel
Standard may result in the rejection of forms previously ruled as acceptable (e.g. the can-
in-can variants).
Finally, the existence of a repository in the near and intermediate future is far from certain.
This is relevant as all of the proposed alternatives rely on disposal in an underground
repository for ultimate proliferation resistance. If such a facility is delayed or never mate-
rializes, the Pu will need to be safeguarded indefinitely. In such a scenario, the benefits
realized from pursuing a Spent Fuel Standard matrix for Pu storage will be debatable.
3.4 Comments on the Present US Disposition Strategy
This section provides a critique of the present US disposition strategy. The expected pro-
liferation gains and costs over time are discussed. The ability of the US strategy to man-
age the uncertainties described in Section 3.3 is also examined.
The Nonproliferation Assessment describes the impact on Russian programs for disposing
of its surplus plutonium as a "major motivation for U.S. Action." From the perspective of
proliferator opportunity the risk appears to be in Russia right now. In addition, the Red
Team Vulnerability Report characterized the threat from unauthorized parties to be "the
greater near-term concern," compared to host nation retrieval (Sandia 1996: Ch.2 p.1).
Therefore it appears our strategy should be to encourage the secure storage of Russian Pu.
The current US approach is to clearly separate short term storage options and long term
disposition options. Pit storage is viewed as the primary strategy for addressing near term
risks. However, questions over the verification of pits in storage due to their classified
form does exist. In addition the Nunn-Lugar facility (described in Section 2.5) is only
designed for pits. Pu in other forms throughout Russia is of equal if not more concern. In
any regard paving the way for long term storage of pits when other options exist seems
undesirable.
The physical processing of Pu could allow direct verification and provide added security
benefits. However, the current US disposition strategy seems incapable of providing near-
term results. The current strategy has focused on processing Pu into a form that meets a
proposed nonproliferation standard for an (optimistic) period of 100 years beginning 10-
20 years from now. 25 While the impetus has been insecure Pu in Russia, our strategy has
been to process US plutonium despite any indication that this will impact Russian action.
All this when the long-term benefits of doing so are mixed at best, and significant down-
side risks exist.
Some might argue that swift US disposition will indeed affect Russian action. As US Pu
is processed, political pressure can be applied on Russia to do the same through prior reci-
procity statements. Yet current US plans do not include a strategy for attaining such reci-
procity and significant obstacles exist.
Russia has stated that it wishes to burn the Pu but lacks the funds to do so. This will be
true whether US processes its Pu or not. Russia may also simply lack the desire to adopt
our disposition schedule. The ability to process US plutonium without a parallel strategy
for enabling or encouraging Russian action seems unproductive.
Contrary to encouraging Russian action, the US strategy is likely to impede it. The adop-
tion of the Spent Fuel Standard as the only acceptable form for long-term Pu disposition
seems certain to delay Russian processing. Such a standard requires Russia to either treat
Pu as fuel or as waste. Russia flatly rejects treating the material as waste but has
expressed a willingness to burn the Pu. As the US cannot financially support a Russian Pu
fuel cycle due to its nonproliferation policies and Russia refuses to treat the material as
waste, stagnation seems predictable. Even if burning did not run counter to US policy, the
25.The 10-20 year figure roughly represents the time when a large amount of Pu could be dispositioned. If
at the time of fabrication the forms possess a 1000 rem/hr dose rate, in 100 years the rate will be below
even the IAEA self-protecting standard of 100 rem/hr.
US has demonstrated an unwillingness to spend federal monies in Russia (see Section
2.5).
Setting aside for a moment the implementation problems associated with the SFS, the ben-
efits of attaining it have been brought into serious question. The Red Team Report
strongly challenges the nonproliferation benefit of the radiation barrier afforded by any of
the alternatives. The radiation levels are simply not high enough. The impression that the
alternatives under investigation leave plutonium in a "self-protecting" matrix is false.
Indeed safeguards are required on all of the SFS forms until emplacement and ultimate
closure in a repository. Regardless, whatever protection the SFS is proposed to provide
will decay over time with fission product inventory.
The SFS form will also hamper if not prevent direct verification. The Nonproliferation
Assessment notes that it will "no longer be possible with current technology to accurately
measure the amount of Pu in the glass - just as it would not be possible to accurately mea-
sure Pu in spent fuel" (DOE 1997: 111). While this is also true for civilian spent fuel it is
not a viewed as a beneficial trait. It appears the desire for uniformity in Pu storage matri-
ces has exceeded the desire for acquiring meaningful nonproliferation tools.
The political debate has also produced confusion over what can be achieved by the Record
of Decision alternatives. While irreversibility has been stated as a major political objec-
tive, it simply cannot be attained through the alternatives under investigation. Only
through a deep-burn alternative (Pu elimination in a non-fertile matrix) or a similar
approach would Pu disposition be entirely irreversible. 26
For the alternatives examined, irreversibility is more a function of proliferator infrastruc-
ture and required retrieval rate. If irreversibility were truly desired each country could
destroy its reprocessing facilities. This would greatly increase the time and cost of extrac-
tion and make uranium enrichment more attractive. In this scenario a radiation barrier
26.Virtually complete elimination of Pu can be achieved with existing reactors using non-fertile fuels and
periphery assemblies (Chodak 1996).
would produce tangible benefits if a large amount of Pu were desired as expensive
shielded facilities would necessarily be reconstructed.
The destruction of reprocessing infrastructures would also be a stronger statement of the
US commitment to arms reduction than Pu disposition. If such capability is maintained,
the world would recognize that relatively small investments in infrastructure would be
needed to reverse any disposition action.
Cost issues related to Pu disposition are more difficult to judge. Each of the ROD alterna-
tives were shown to possess somewhat comparable life cycle costs. The cost risks of each
seem high. The MOX alternative will require significantly greater initial investments and
rely on revenues from the use of fabricated fuel to reduce total costs. To rely on the avail-
ability of MOX burning capacity over an extended period appears risky.
There is significant cost risk associated with the immobilization alternatives as well.
While investment and processing costs appear somewhat more controllable, if the final
waste form is characterized as unacceptable, reprocessing charges could be enormous.
The probability of this occurring could be minimized but it is nonetheless possible.
As a means of managing implementation risks the 'hybrid' alternative promoted in the
ROD has limited effectiveness. By pursuing two paths, certain types of programmatic risk
can be reduced somewhat. Having two alternatives does increase the odds of actual
implementation. However, this does not eliminate the significant uncertainties facing the
individual options as described in Section 3.3. In addition the individual options share
common risks (e.g. delays due to the inability of Russia to reciprocate). In this sense the
hybrid alternative is not robust as its components possess 'common mode failures.'
It would appear that a shift in the focus of US disposition is needed. The next section
describes a potential new direction for disposition.
3.5 Disposition Strategy Needs
An effective disposition strategy must be capable of responding to identified threats in a
timely manner. Preference therefore should be placed on simple actions that can be exe-
cuted in a short time period. Efforts should focus on incremental processing that can pro-
vide meaningful security while allowing for future improvements.
As lack of US/Russian consensus may hamper progress, options that do not require con-
tentious fuel cycle commitments should be pursued. Incentives for Russian action, that
can receive full US support, should also be formulated.
While the ultimate benefits are bounded, material processing is capable of meeting valu-
able nonproliferation objectives. However, strategy formulation must begin with well
articulated nonproliferation objectives. What is the threat that is to be reduced? As
described in Section 3.1 material processing has different effects on individual prolifera-
tors. Therefore, actions should be selected and implemented in a manner that minimizes
this threat.
General conclusions regarding the effect of processing on individual classes of prolifera-
tors should be used to guide strategy formulation. The processing of Pu out of pit form for
ease of verification and safeguarding reduces the opportunity for diversion by all would be
proliferators. As this would be the first step for any disposition action it would appear that
every effort should be made to achieve this action immediately.
For all but the host-state proliferator it appears on-site manipulation and removal is a
major concern. If a proliferator successfully transports a Pu matrix off-site, security
would rely on detection and interdiction. It has been said that "The current inability to
locate a nuclear device without intelligence cueing is perhaps the greatest limitation of our
neutralization capability" (Mullen 1996: 20). As noted in Section 2.9, the DOE's Nonpro-
liferation Assessment stated that the primary benefit of the radiation barrier was its ability
to aid the detection of Pu after a theft. This should be noted in strategy formulation.
The presence of significant uncertainties imply that disposition strategies should include
insurance against future unknowns. In such conditions flexibility and reversibility are
desirable attributes. Robust strategies capable of changing with evolving states of the
world should be pursued.
Summarizing the above observations, it seems that the appropriate question that Pu dispo-
sition should answer is:
What is the most easily safeguarded, verifiable, trackable and flexi-
ble form for storing Pu capable of being implemented in the near-
term?
The following section presents an alternate Pu disposition strategy.
3.6 Proposal - Pu Material Bank
The following US strategy is designed to reduce the near-term risk of subnational or
NNWS diversion in the near term. The US should propose the following processing steps
be executed in coordination with Russia:
* initiate ARIES processing immediately;
* immobilize surplus Pu in a glass or ceramic phase without
HLW;
* do not require the addition of HLW in the future;
* produce a high unit size/mass form via a can-in-can approach;
* add integral off-site tracking capability; and
* allow the conditional retrieval of Russian Pu in the future for
use in energy production.
It is proposed that the US and Russia address their mutual proliferation concerns by initi-
ating bilateral processing of their surplus WGPu immediately. Plutonium should be pro-
cessed into a glass or ceramic matrix expected to be acceptable for repository disposal.
The matrix would include sufficient neutron absorbers for long-term criticality control
based on the present state of knowledge. High-level radioactive waste could be added at a
later time but should not be required under any agreement.
Large unit size and mass would be achieved through small containers loaded into DWPF
canisters. This would be identical to the can-in-can variants without the HLW glass.
Glass or ceramic cans of the diameter of a DWPF canister would be produced in glove box
facilities appended to the end of an ARIES processing line. The cans would be slid into a
DWPF type canister and stored at an internationally safeguarded facility where it would
be subject to periodic direct verification.
In addition, it is proposed that electronic devices allowing the tracking of individual cans
be encapsulated during glove box operations. A 'beacon' from such a device could be
used to locate and retrieve individual cans should they be diverted. The design of this
device has not been explored in detail, however the absence of highly radioactive elements
would appear to make this option feasible.
Plutonium would be processed in negotiated, incremental steps. Each host state would
select the portion of the other's stockpile that it viewed as the most vulnerable, for imme-
diate processing. In this way the most immediate security concerns of each nation could
be addressed.
Russia could retain the option of retrieving the Pu but only if her energy needs demanded
it. Russia would have to prove alternate stockpiles of RGPu were not available and Pu
would be directly fabricated into MOX. The processed Pu would be treated as a safe-
guarded ore, much like a HLW repository. The US could financially support the produc-
tion of this storage matrix as it would not contribute to the development of a Pu fuel cycle
in Russia.
If Russia refused even this offer the US could propose a purchase of the material. The
agreed upon Pu could be transferred directly for processing and storage in the US. Such
proposals have been offered before but pricing has been an issue. A market based meth-
odology for valuing Pu was developed and is described in detail in Chapter 5.
3.7 Discussion
The proposal would reduce the risk of subnational and NNWS diversion.
Processing Pu into a clean storage form would provide virtually all the proliferation risk
reduction attainable by material processing. Removal from pit form and placement in a
safeguarded facility would reduce the ability and opportunity of any proliferator to divert
the material. Critical design information would also be lost.
Increasing the unit size and mass of the Pu host matrix would reduce the ability for NNWS
and subnational groups (the primary target of the proposal) to successfully divert the mate-
rial. The presence of off-site tracking capability would provide a new form of deterrence
for these proliferators.
A detectable signal would probably be most useful during the initial transport off-site,
before the transmitter could be removed. This capability would benefit the DOE's
Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) whose responsibility is to find nuclear materials
both in the US and abroad under such conditions. The signal frequency could also be
known by the international community, allowing any nation to independently monitor the
location of Pu at any time. This would serve to further increase confidence in the arms
control process.
The proposed processing would also prevent retrieval and subsequent direct use by the
host nation. As noted in Section 3.1.2 , chemical dilution, combined with criticality con-
cerns, could cause the Pu to be processed using shielded equipment. However, it is not
clear whether this would meaningfully reduce the attractiveness of the Pu to the host state.
The material may still be superior to other fissile sources such as HEU. The fact that it has
been declared surplus and would be under international safeguards most likely provides
the highest deterrent for host state retrieval. In any case, it is recognized that host state
retrieval of Pu in any form is possible. It is for this reason that the proposal was largely
designed to reduce the security risk from other proliferators.
By completely separating Pu disposition from other fuel cycle activities its execution can
begin quickly. Processing could proceed at virtually any pace through the use of multiple
process lines and/or higher capacity systems. This combined with the ability to process
the most worrisome Pu first would produce tangible security gains in the near-term.
The possibility for direct verification would be retained by this proposal. Without the
background radiation from HLW, isotopic and total Pu concentration in the matrix could
be non-destructively determined. This was not developed in this work but it would appear
that standard spectrometry techniques could be utilized.
It could be argued that given the marginal cost of adding a radiation barrier ($390 M for
the can-in-can variants) is so low that we should add it even though the benefits are debat-
able. This would be true if there were no risks associated with the radiation barrier. If
waste form qualification issues arise we run the risk of having to re-extract Pu, vitrify the
HLW again and determine a suitable form for the Pu. This potentially immense cost must
be weighed against the benefits of such processing.
Criticism of such an approach does exist. Previous work by this author and colleagues
was referenced in the NAS's Reactor Related Options report. The CISAC committee dis-
missed non-radioactive storage forms as not providing enough of a barrier to be seriously
considered as a long-term option (NAS 1995: 226). However they did note that it would
be an "inexpensive and rapid method for transforming the existing metallic WGPu pits
and ingots into a glass form" for storage until vitrification with HLW. Given the question-
able benefits of the radiation barrier, the timeliness aspects of this approach may be more
valuable.
If the presence of a radiation barrier were truly desired, the DWPF canisters could be
stored alongside fully radioactive DWPF canisters. This would not differ appreciably from
the can-in-can alternatives which have been promoted in the disposition Record of Deci-
sion.
The Nonproliferation Assessment also notes that anything less than the SFS would pose a
unique risk "indefinitely." However, this statement is not supported by the Assessment's
own investigations. The Report notes that SFS forms would not be 'self protecting' after
100 years according to IAEA's standards. The US currently possesses several decades old
spent fuel. By the middle of the next century we will have a growing inventory of non-
SFS forms. Even if such a form was adopted for Pu disposition it is not clear what the
penalty would be for having a 'non-standard' security threat.
Timely processing of both US and Russian surplus Pu would be possible.
Perhaps the biggest benefit of this alternative is its prospect for US/Russian cooperation.
The proposal was designed to harmonize with Russian fuel cycle ambitions and yet allow
for US financial support. The proposal represents a compromise between two polar alter-
natives for Pu disposition and in doing so provides a reasoned path forward for both coun-
tries.
Without a resolution to the Russian fuel value issue it appears no processing will move
forward. By allowing retrieval or providing compensation, the proposal provides two
means of addressing this concern. Either approach appears capable of being accepted.
The flexible nature of the strategy would reduce risks.
The modular nature of this design could provide valuable flexibility to address both tech-
nical uncertainties and political differences. If criticality control was deemed insufficient,
the DWPF canisters could be repackaged to address regulatory concerns. (This is dis-
cussed further in Section 4.11.) In the extreme case the Pu could be reprocessed for other
waste treatment without requiring the re-vitrification of HLW.
As time goes on, political tensions may cause intermittence in international oversight at Pu
storage facilities. Confidence in treaty compliance may erode during such periods. The
ability to directly verify Pu content would eliminate such uncertainties.
This approach would also buy time for each country to fully evaluate their respective Pu
objectives. The US could further weigh disposal options and Russia could develop the
necessary infrastructure to bum Pu. Neither would be forced to execute Pu programs
requiring large industrial investments without thorough analyses.
The proposed form could be utilized in further Pu disposition initiatives.
The proposal could be formalized into a Surplus Plutonium Storage Standard which could
be applied globally. The Red team noted that some non-weapons states may eventually
want to disposition their excess Pu. This form would give them an alternative other than
MOX fuel or mixing with HLW. Indeed the country may have neither alternative at their
disposal. Such a form could be used to demonstrate a commitment to arms reduction, ease
safeguarding and storage cost, and give verifiable proliferation resistance.
3.8 Future Work
Proposals of this nature warrant serious consideration for their ability to address stated
disposition objectives while recognizing the limitations of all disposition alternatives and
providing flexibility for dealing with future uncertainties.
The tracking capability must be developed and experimentally tested. To the extent possi-
ble the transmitter should be an integral part of the host matrix such that on-site separation
would be infeasible. The system must be able to withstand the immobilization process
environment and the power source should be long lived. Similarly, techniques for verify-
ing the composition of an immobilized Pu matrix should be developed.
For countries such as Japan and Germany that possess separated RGPu but not burning
capability, Pu storage forms that could easily be fed into a fuel fabrication process should
be examined. For this purpose a UO2/PuO 2 form would be more appropriate: a kind of
rough MOX form, that contained mechanically separable reactivity control so the material
could be moved directly into a fuel fabrication line or disposed of directly. Again, an
alternative to fuel or processing with HLW would give these nations an alternate, less
polar nonproliferation path.
The cost savings associated with storing Pu in an 'intermediate' form should be evaluated.
With sufficient reactivity control, Pu could be stored in more dense configurations. Stor-
ing Pu in chemically stable, bulk particle matrix would reduce the risk of oxidation with
exposure to air and dispersion. This may reduce the costs of installing and maintaining
safety systems. Costs of safeguards could also be reduced.
Much would be gained by further investigation and quantification of the Spent Fuel Stan-
dard. The functional purpose of individual criteria embodied in the Standard should be
further explored and alternate, potentially superior solutions evaluated (e.g. a trackable
storage form). The focus should be on nonproliferation performance not the ability to
mimic spent fuel. Indeed the verification questions posed by spent fuel are a concern.
The effect of future uncertainties could also be explicitly treated in the evaluation of dis-
position alternatives. Dynamic programming would be one approach. The probability of
certain events could be altered to determine their impact on expected outcomes. In this
way factors critical to programmatic success can be identified and robust strategies
designed to reduce risk.
A major uncertainty of any Pu storage form is environmental performance. The next
chapter addresses key technical issues for the vitrification of Pu both with and without fis-
sion products. The environmental performance of a Pu glass form is evaluated and the
potential for a criticality event in a geologic repository is assessed.
4.0 Technical Feasibility
As significant quantities of plutonium have never been vitrified, the technical feasibility of
such a proposal must be demonstrated. The feasibility of vitrification will require confi-
dence in repository subcriticality. Neutron absorbers may necessarily be vitrified with Pu
to control reactivity over geologic time periods. Rare earth elements have been identified
for their neutron absorption capabilities and relative insolubility in groundwater. The
homogeneous dissolution of these elements in glass is desired. The environmentally dura-
bility of the glass is especially important if Pu is to be vitrified with HLW. Each of these
issues were investigated and the results are described in the following sections.
4.1 Introduction
The term glass is used to classify solids that possess an amorphous rather than a crystalline
structure. While most liquids adopt a crystalline structure upon cooling, glasses do not.
They become increasingly viscous until a rigid condition is obtained.
The most fundamental building block of silicates is the SiO4 tetrahedron. As shown in
Figure 2, this structure consists of a single Si atom at the center of four oxygen atoms.
Both crystalline and amorphous silicates possess this tetrahedron structure.
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FIGURE 2. SiO 4 Tetrahedron (Vogel 1994: 35)
However, the two phases utilize this building block in different ways. The electron octet
of silicates is formed by accepting electrons from adjacent metal ions or by linking the tet-
rahedra through what is termed "bridging oxygen." In both quartz and glass, oxygen link
at most two tetrahedron and then only at the corners, not on the edges or faces. However,
in quartz only two oxygen exist for every silica. In this matrix each and every oxygen link
two tetrahedron together and a ridged crystalline structure is obtained. In amorphous sil-
ica, oxygen from added compounds free some SiO2 oxygen from providing such linkage
(Scholes 1974: 27). This results in a random structural arrangement. Figure 3 compares
the ordered structure of SiO2 with that of a Si-Na glass.
(not to scale)
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FIGURE 3. Ordered and Random Arrangement of SiO4 a) regular crystalline
arrangement b) tetrahedrons in a sodium silicate glass (crystalline phase shown for
comparison)
Zachariasen and Warren proposed a network theory for glass formation (Vogel 1994: 42).
Amongst other requirements, for simple mixtures to enter the vitreous state polyhedral
groups of less than 6 corners must be easily formed and anions should not bind more than
two of the central atoms. These polyhedra are linked at their corners rather than their
edges allowing a random structure to be formed.
The addition of other oxides can break the bridges between tetrahedra. The oxygen will
share electrons at the free end of a tetrahedron with the cation occupying the space formed
at the broken site. (See the Na atoms in Figure 3.) This produces what are termed "non-
bridging oxygen" sites. These sites tend to be the first attacked when exposed to water
and play a significant role in glass durability.
Cations that might exist in glass can be classified in three general categories: network-
formers, network-modifiers and intermediates. Network-formers are capable of forming
chains of polyhedra in the above described manner. These cations typically have coordi-
nation numbers of 3 or 4. Besides silica the oxides B20 3, P20 5 and As 20 3 are examples
of network-formers.
Network-modifiers typically have coordination numbers of greater than 6 and by them-
selves would form crystalline structures. Sodium, calcium and barium oxides are net-
work-modifiers. Modifiers increase the number of non-bridging oxygen sites in the glass.
This results in the decreased viscosity of the glass melt and aids in the fabrication process
by lowering the required melting temperature.
Some elements form oxides that cannot be easily placed in either category. These "inter-
mediates," while incapable of forming glass networks themselves, will adopt the coordi-
nation of network-formers in the glass. In this way they are capable providing linkage in
the glass network.
Predicting the behavior of elements in glass is aided by inspecting the field strength of a
particular cation. Field strength 'F' was defined by Dietzel to be:
z
C
F= 2 (EQ 1)
a
where, Zc is the valence of the cation, and
a is the sum of the cation and anion radii in the glass
This relation is analogous to Coulomb's law and roughly describes the electrostatic charge
density of a single cation. Table 2 provides a comparison of several elements as published
in Vogel (1994: 46) which was adapted from Dietzel.
TABLE 2. Field Strength of Various Glass Elements1
lable adopted from Vo gel (1 l.
A correlation between field strength and participation in glass formation was observed by
Dietzel. The compounds with relatively high field strength are capable of maintaining a
glass network. Oxides with smaller field strengths tend to disrupt the network. The abil-
ity of intermediate elements such as Mg, Fe, and Al to increase their field strength through
reduced coordination is displayed in the Table.
It has also been shown that, in binary melts, the difference between field strengths in the
mixture is important (Vogel 1994: 49-50). Mixtures of glass formers and modifiers with
field strengths that do not differ by large amounts will compete strongly for oxygen. The
modifier is likely to be successful and form a stable oxide. However as the coordination
of the modifier is higher it will not be structurally compatible with the glass former and
crystallization will occur. This phase transformation is undesirable for waste glasses and
will be discussed in Section 4.2.2.
If the difference between field strength is sufficiently high the modifier will be prevented
from forming a separate phase. With field differences (> 1.33) homogeneous, ternary
Most Frequent Ionic Field
Element Valence Coordination Distance for Strength Functionin GlassNumber Oxides (A) (1/A2)
K 1 8 2.77 0.13
Na 1 6 2.30 0.19
Network-Modifiers
Li 1 6 2.10 0.23
F = 0.1...0.4
Pb 2 8 2.74 0.27
Fe 2 6 2.15 0.43
Mg 2 6 2.10 0.45
4 1.96 0.53
Zr 4 8 2.28 0.77 Intermediates
Fe 3 6 1.99 0.76
F= 0.5...1.04 1.88 0.85
Al 3 6 1.89 0.84
4 1.77 0.96
B 3 4 1.50 1.34 Network-Formers
Si 4 4 1.60 1.57
F= 1.5...2.0
P 5 4 1.55 2.1
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oxide compounds can be formed. The cation with the higher field strength will form an
anion complex, charge balanced by the cation of lower field strength. This prevents the
modifier from assuming its desired coordination and thereby disrupting the glass network.
4.2 Radioactive Waste Glasses
Glasses have been studied (and used) for the solidification of aqueous radioactive
wastes. 27 In this application glass is used to sequester radionuclides in an environmen-
tally durable matrix for disposal. Its non-crystalline structure will incorporate many dis-
similar elements allowing diverse or poorly characterized waste streams to be treated.
This was a major reason for its selection for radioactive waste management.
Design issues for waste glasses include: fabrication ease, loading (or elemental solubility)
and repository performance. 2 8 Glass design is often a complex process of balancing
between these desired attributes. The dependence of elemental behavior in glass on pro-
cess parameters such as temperature adds to the complexity. The following sub-sections
describe the relevant issues and how they were investigated for Pu immobilization.
4.2.1 Fabrication
Waste glass is fabricated by mixing a frit with the waste stream to be immobilized, heating
to above the glasses' softening temperature and cooling to form a vitreous state. The melt
temperature is a particularly important parameter for HLW vitrification as radionuclides
such as Cs have relatively high vapor pressures. For Cs containing wastes, melt tempera-
tures are typically kept below 12000C in order to retain Cs in the glass.
To reduce softening temperatures and thereby processing temperatures, network-modifiers
are added. Soda (Na20) is the principal flux used in glass making. Unfortunately soda
also reduces the ultimate durability of glass. For this reason boria (B20 3) is often used in
27.For a comprehensive review of radioactive waste glass development see Lutze (1988).
28.Other factors such as radiation effects, mechanical and heat transfer properties are also general concerns
in waste glass production.
concert with soda in waste glasses. At low temperatures boron possesses a coordination
number of 4 and is a glass former. However, at higher temperatures its coordination is
reduced to 3 and it adopts a triangular, planar geometry. In this state it acts as a network-
modifier thereby reducing the viscosity of the melt (Lutze 1988: 22). This dual property
of boron is quite useful in waste glass design. Most HLW glass formations consist of a
Na 20-B 20 3-SiO2 ternary system.
The volatility of Pu or any rare earth neutron control element is not likely to force further
reductions in process temperatures. While some volatilization is anticipated, requiring the
use of critically safe off-gas filtering systems, the effect is small relative to Cs. In the can-
in-can alternative the problem is avoided entirely with Pu being vitrified without Cs first,
allowing for potentially higher temperature glasses to be pursued.
4.2.2 Waste Loading - Phase Transformation
If the concentration of a certain element is too high for a particular glass design devitrifi-
cation may occur. The element itself may form a crystalline phase or, by disrupting the
network, cause other elements to precipitate. Devitrification is a concern as crystallized
regions of the glass can be depleted in amorphous silica and become less durable. Glasses
may also phase separate into two distinct glasses of different compositions. This too may
be detrimental to durability.
It should also be noted that process parameters such as the time/temperature profile of the
glass during cooling can be as important as composition. If the glass is too fluid or cool-
ing times are too long, diffusion of cations in the melt may produce nucleated crystalline
regions. As glass is inherently a thermodynamically unstable phase, if viscous forces do
not prevent it from doing so, glass will crystallize.
In HLW glasses, elements such as Mg and Ca are added to reduce devitrification or crys-
tallization. These +2 cations aid vitrification by increasing the viscosity of glass at low
temperatures (while allowing fluidity at melt temperatures) thereby reducing the potential
for either phase transformation.
While borosilicate glasses have been used around the world for HLW vitrification there is
virtually no experience with Pu vitrification. The solubility of Pu in borosilicate glass is
somewhat unknown. The solubility of control elements in HLW glass is also uncertain but
is expected to be fairly high.29 This information is relevant from a cost and schedule per-
spective as well as environmental durability. It would appear that higher Pu loadings
would reduce total costs as fewer additional logs would necessarily be produced and sent
to a repository. Higher loadings would also lead to faster disposition rates.
For the can-in-can variant the relevance of Pu solubility is debatable. As PuO 2 is rela-
tively insoluble in most groundwaters and other radionuclides are not present, devitrifica-
tion in this glass may not be significant. To the extent that phase transformation affects
rare earth release, solubility in glass may be important. The intimate mixing of fissile Pu
with neutron absorbers is also important for stable, safe storage of Pu prior to disposal.
In any regard the behavior of Pu and rare earths in borosilicate glasses is of interest.
Examining the field strength of these elements can give some indication of their behavior
in glass. Plutonium atoms in the +3 and +4 state have ionic radii of 1.00 A and 0.90 A
respectively (Cleveland 1979: 6). If the ionic radii of 0-2 is taken to be 1.40 A the dis-
tance between Pu and O in PuO 2 is 2.40 A for Pu3 + and 2.3 A for Pu4 +.30 This produces
field strengths of 0.52 1/A2 for Pu3 + and 0.76 1/A2 for Pu4+
It is not clear what valence Pu will exist. Although increasing alkali content and process-
ing temperature results in increased oxidation, it is not expected to be sufficient to pro-
duce these high states (Paul 1990: 230). The reduction of Pu is a possible redox effect.
One study had Pu competing with +3 cations in a waste glass (Plodenic 1995). However,
in the present work Pu was assumed to exist in the +4 state in glass.
29.Mixtures of alkaline and rare earth oxides formed homogeneous glass at loadings of 20 wt% in borosili-
cate glasses with Na 20>7.5 wt% (Lutze 1988: 35).
30.The field strength calculation should actually be based on experimental measurements of Pu-O bonds in
glass rather than using the ionic data.
Referring to Table 2, the field strength data indicates that Pu would act as an intermediate
in glass. However, coordination is also important. As an empirical rule, Goldschmidt
used the ratio of the radius of the cation to that of the anion to determine if an element's
coordination could be sufficiently low to allow glass formation (less than or equal to 4)
(Vogel 1994: 40).31 In order for an element to posses the appropriate coordination in glass
Goldschmidt suggested a range of 0.2 to 0.4 for this ratio.
If oxygen is assumed to have an ionic radius of 1.4 A this means that cations greater than
0.56 A cannot be network-formers or intermediates. All oxidation states of Pu have ionic
radii greater than this value. Plutonium oxides also possess a cubic structure. 32 Therefore
Pu is likely to exist in glass as a network modifier.
The solubility of rare earths in HLW glass is also unknown. Rare earths are expected to
comprise >30 wt% of fission products in HLW (Lutze 1988: 438). However, the DWPF
glass will contain less than 0.5 wt% of the rare earth elements (Baxter 1983: 28). For this
reason the solubility limit for rare earths in borosilicate HLW glass has not been estab-
lished.
An application of the glass metrics described above would imply that rare earth elements
are likely to be network-modifiers. They all have ionic radii greater than the 0.56 A limit
set by Goldschmidt. As most exist in the +3 state their field strengths are lower than that
of Pu. They are polymorphic, forming hexagonal, monoclinic, and body-centered cubic
structures. The elements Gd, Sm and Eu exist in monoclinic structures at melting temper-
atures and tend to form BCC structures upon cooling (Gschneidner 1979: 341).
However in the +3 state they may exhibit intermediate behavior similar to that of alumina
as described in the following section. Alumina is an important compound in borosilicate
31. Paul (1990: 10) shows this ratio can be correlated to various polyhedra based on geometrical consider-
ations.
32.Crystallographic data taken from Cleveland (1979: 296) and ionic radii from Cleveland (1979: 6).
glass fabrication. It transfers durability to the glass. The following section describes the
role of Al in glass making.
4.2.3 Durability
In order to counter the weakening effects of Na, alumina (A120 3) is typically included in
waste glass formulations. Alumina's behavior in glass is complex. Alumina can work in
concert with Na in glass to act as a network-former (forming the tetrahedron A10 4) and
increase glass durability. Soda donates oxygen, and Na increases the valence of the com-
plex from -5 to -4 to mimic Si0 4 tetrahedra. However, in higher concentrations it tends to
react more strongly, forming a separate crystalline phase (e.g. NaAlSiO4 ) (Lutze 1988:
27).
Rare earth elements (REE) in borosilicate glass could exhibit behavior similar to that of
aluminum. As with Al, excess network-modifiers (Na) could allow the rare earths to par-
ticipate in the glass network. For Pu in the +4 state, excess network-modifiers could stabi-
lize a soluble complex of the type described in Section 4.1. As both Pu and the REs' field
strength are lower than Al, the prospect for devitrification should be lower. However, it is
not clear. As with any multicomponent glass, elemental behavior must be experimentally
tested and verified.
4.2.4 Experience with Pu, REE and Analogs in Glass
Walker and Riege observed a PuO 2 loading limit of 4.5 wt% in a particular German boro-
silicate glass. 33 This limit was reportedly not affected by the addition of 20 wt% loading
of FP oxides. Plodinec (1995) found a similar loading limit of 4 wt% PuO2 in a HLW
glass but found solubility to be strongly affected by waste loading. Plodinec also noted
that Pu solubility increased with increasing alkali content which would suggest the pres-
33.From Lutze (1988: 48) referring to: Walker, C., and U.Riege, Ceramics in Nuclear Waste Management,
Cincinnati, CONF-790420, p. 19 8 1979
ence of a stable M4Pu(SiO4)2 compound of the type described in Section 4.1. The vari-
ability in these results displays the potential complexity of elemental solubility.
As Pu is a controlled and somewhat difficult radionuclide to work with, material analogs
are often used. Given Pu's field strength and expected coordination it would appear that
cerium would be a good analog for glass solubility. However Ce could exist in the +3
state in glass which would make its field strength much lower than Pu. Thorium, while a
slightly larger ion, possess only the +4 valence. As it also possesses a face-centered cubic
structure it seems a reasonable analog if we believe Pu to exist in the +4 state. Zirconium
appears to be a promising analog as well with a nearly identical field strength. However,
ZrO2 is monoclinic in the expected temperature range (Benedict 1981: 325).
In previous work the author used thorium as a Pu analog in a borosilicate glass and tested
the solubility of several rare earth elements as well (Sylvester 1994). Thorium was chosen
not only for its approximation to Pu in glass but also for its ability to mimic Pu behavior in
the primary decontamination stage of a PUREX type process. The glass formulation was
also used in research designed to gauge the difficulty of re-extracting Pu from borosilicate
glass in a solvent extraction process (Cerefice 1996).
The frit used in this study was the borosilicate glass Advanced Reference Material 1
(ARMI), distributed by the Materials Characterization Center at Pacific Northwest Labo-
ratory. The glass was crushed and Th along with the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were
added and melted to form glass. A loading of 2 wt% of each of these oxides did not cause
gross devitrification. However, visual indications and scanning electron micrographs
showed that devitrification had occurred in a glass loaded with 10 wt% ThO2 . These
results were in agreement with other studies involving Pu in glass (Plodinec 1995). The
issue of solubility was not explored further in this work.
Examples of rare earths and thorium forming glass do exist. Various commercial optical
glasses were designed to include La for its effect on optical properties of the glass. Some
contain rare earth concentrations as high as 60 wt%. 34 ThO2 has been added at concentra-
tions as high as 22 wt% in a similar formulation. These glasses typically contain no Si.
The initial frit uses TiO 4 and other compounds such as B20 3 to form the network. Lantha-
num behaves in a manner similar to Al, complexing with soda to form stable tetrahedra.
A somewhat similar, lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass is under evaluation for Pu dis-
position. Its composition is given in Table 14 in Appendix A. This glass is high in alumi-
num and contains no sodium. The result should be a more durable glass product. To
reduce melting temperatures boron, barium and lead are added. At high molar ratios to
Si, lead can act as an intermediate and reduce melt temperatures. Plutonium has been
completely dissolved at concentrations of 15 wt% in this LaBS glass. This glass may have
a higher softening temperature but it is not important as this glass is to be used in the first
step of the can-in-can variant, without volatile Cs.
A low-temperature glass capable of dissolving Cs and Pu together is also under develop-
ment. The glass is a B-Si-Na formulation with a composition also shown in Table 15 in
Appendix A. The glass must maintain a low temperature, therefore soda and B20 3 are
present in large concentrations. Rather than adding Al for durability, Sn, Ti, and Zr are
used. Alumina was avoided because during glass reaction with groundwater, Al will pre-
cipitate Si in the form of various clays. As Si concentration in solution is the driving force
behind glass dissolution, its precipitation will allow glass to react at a higher rate. This so-
called ATS glass (for its alkali-tin-silica components) has been shown to dissolve 1 wt%
CsO and 7 wt% PuO2.
4.3 Actinide and Rare Earth Leaching Behavior
Relatively little Pu has been dissolved in glass, so there is little experience with its leach-
ing characteristics. A French study investigated actinide leaching from the borosilicate
glass R7T7 (Vernaz 1992). Actinides were loaded at 0.85 wt% and leached for one year
in DI water at 90 0 C. After ultrafiltration the study determined that 90% of the Pu-239
34.See Vogel (1994: 16, 157, and 195).
leached from the glass was in colloid or particle form. However, 98% of Pu in the reacted
glass remained in the alteration layer. The study also determined that release kinetics
were controlled by the solubility of an actinide compound at the surface of the glass.
Colloids are suspended solids in a solution, ranging from a nanometer to one micron in
diameter. Species may form (pure) colloids themselves or may adsorb onto other col-
loids (pseudo). Actinides have been shown to form both pure and pseudo colloids. The
oxidation state of the actinide is important to the formation of pure colloids. The follow-
ing order of colloid tendency is observed: M4+>MO22+>M3+>MO 2+(Kim 1991). The
trend follows the decreasing charge on the central ion. Plutonium +4 has been shown to
form oxide and hydroxide colloids but could form others (e.g. carbonates) in natural sys-
tems (Silva 1995: 390). Uranium +4 is expected to form similar colloids. Less informa-
tion exists in the literature regarding the nature of uranium colloids.
Colloid formation appears to be path dependent. The process of colloid formation is
thought to behave in a manner similar to precipitation which requires a solution to be
supersaturated with respect to a solid phase prior to nucleation. In this case, rather than
precipitate out of solution as the saturated phase, a portion is retained in colloid form.
This increases the amount of an element available for transport.
In addition the nature of colloids affects their movement through porous media (Silva
1995). The flow velocity distribution across a channel in such a media can be taken to be
parabolic with the velocity in the center being two times the average. Neutral colloids of
sufficient size will not reach the walls where the velocity is slower and are therefore
pushed to the middle. This serves to increase their velocity relative to the average velocity
of the groundwater and reduce adsorption. Conversely, colloids possessing a charge oppo-
site that of the media will move slower than average due to adsorption.
Uranium was also investigated in the French study. Uranium behavior is relevant to Pu
disposition as Pu decays to U-235. Larger amounts of U were found in solution yet more
than 80% remained either as part of the reacted glass or in colloid form. No information
on the colloidal fraction was given for uranium. 35
Another study of Pu release behavior by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) found simi-
lar results (Apted 1986). The plutonium was also loaded into a borosilicate glass but at a
much lower loading, 0.03 wt% PuO 2. During static leach tests in 90'C DI water, 90% of
the Pu released was found in colloids greater than 1.8 nm in diameter. An acid strip of the
leachate container showed that roughly 10% of the dissolved Pu had adsorbed to its walls.
The study also showed that the filtered concentrations of Pu in solution matched equilib-
rium with the amorphous phase PuO2*xH20.
In the PNL study, the colloidal fraction of uranium was determined but for leach tests in
brine and basalt waters. Uranium colloids were found in both solutions when Fe was
added. Without Fe uranium was found entirely in solution in the case of basalt and nearly
entirely sorbed on the vessel surface for the brine case. Normalized release data were not
given.
While a durable glass is desired, Pu release is not likely to be a major concern from an
EH&S perspective. Pu is relatively insoluble in groundwater and is not likely to migrate
to the biosphere (unless perhaps in colloid form). However, the release of non-radioactive
boron may be more important. Boron's inherent properties are a benefit to glass design,
however its aqueous solubility may allow for a criticality event as the glass dissolves in a
repository as it is the primary neutron absorber in borosilicate glass.
As noted in prior sections, the addition of insoluble rare earth elements is a potential strat-
egy for addressing this criticality concern. Several rare earth elements possess strong
neutron absorption characteristics. A list of relevant neutronic properties for boron and
several REE is contained in Table 3.
35.Uranium leaching from glass was not experimentally investigated in this work. However, its potential
effect on near- field criticality was explored inSection 4.9.
TABLE 3. Neutronic Poison DataI
thermal neutron resonance
atom% capture cross integral,
Element Isotope abundance section, barns barns
B 10 19.9 3,838 1722
Sm 149 13.8 5,900 4000
152 26.7 208 3000
Eu 151 47.8 5,900 4000
153 52.2 530 1500
Gd 155 14.8 61,000 1540
157 15.65 255,000 800
1. "Nuclihdes and Isotopes," 14th edition, General Electric Company 1989
Rare earth elemental release from glass is expected to be low as these elements are insolu-
ble in groundwater. However, REE colloids are known to form in glass dissolution tests as
well (Bates 1995: 377). Further investigation of Pu, U and REE leaching behavior is
needed.
In order to assess the durability of a Pu glass, a borosilicate glass loaded with a Pu analog
and several rare earths was leach tested. The release of neutronically relevant species was
of particular interest. The following section describes the experimental approach and the
results obtained.
4.4 Experimental Setup
As in the solubility study, the borosilicate glass ARM1 was used for durability testing. As
the ARM1 frit contains simulated fission products this would be analogous to vitrifying
Pu directly with HLW waste. The DOE's Record Of Decision suggests that the can-in-can
variant is more likely to be utilized. However, if intimate commingling of Pu and fission
products is required for nonproliferation purposes the ARM1 tests would be applicable for
a borosilicate glass used for this purpose. The ARM1 glass contains nonradioactive Cs
and possesses an Al concentration in between that of the ATS glass and the LaBS glass.
In this respect it is roughly analogous to the two glass formulations under review.
An additional borosilicate glass frit SRL165 was also investigated. This is an actual frit
designed to vitrify aqueous HLW at the defense waste processing facility (DWPF). The
SRL frit without waste is not very durable. As Al is found in the waste stream, no alumina
is present in the glass frit. This frit was used without additional alumina in order to exam-
ine the behavior of Pu and rare earth elements in a poor durability glass. The composition
of the ARM 1 glass is in Table 16 in Appendix A. The composition of the SRL 165 frit is in
Table 17 in Appendix A.
The performance of the ARM1 glass as well as the SRL165 provided a baseline for assess-
ing the effect of Th and RE elements on glass durability. Their widespread use in experi-
mental testing allowed the incremental effect of these elements to be more selectively
evaluated. These glasses were not optimized for Pu disposition.
The glasses to be tested were prepared in the following manner. The ARM1 glass was
crushed and weighed into fused silica crucibles. Nitrates of Th, Eu, Gd, and Sm were
then weighed and added to produce glass frits with the desired loading. The SRL165
glasses were prepared in a similar manner although no crushing was necessary as a pow-
dered frit was used.
The frits were then melted at 1150 'C and held at temperature for approximately one hour.
The liquid was then poured into a preheated graphite mold in the shape of a bar and placed
in a firebrick enclosure to cool. The mold was then annealed at 500 oC for periods ranging
from several hours to overnight and allowed to oven cool.
After cooling the glass bars were sectioned and prepared for leach testing using the MCC-
1P protocol. The samples were sanded, weighed and surface area measurements were
made. They were then placed in a Teflon® container with a measured volume of deion-
ized water such that a glass surface area to volume ratio of 0.01 1/mm was obtained. The
containers were labeled and placed under controlled temperature for an extended period of
time.
Upon completion of the tests, glass samples were removed from solution, rinsed and then
dried. The pH of the leachate was taken immediately. The leachate was then filtered
using 0.45 [tm PTFE filters and acidified with nitric acid. This was done to remove sus-
pended solids from solution that could clog analytical equipment. An acid strip test for
colloid analyses was not performed.
The solutions were analyzed for elemental concentrations using inductively coupled
plasma - atomic emission spectroscopy (ICP-AES). In this method a peristaltic pump gen-
erates a flow of leachant which is injected with argon gas to create a liquid-vapor mist.
This mist is passed through an RF-induced argon plasma. The plasma excites elements in
the passing mist. The de-excitation of these elements create photons of characteristic
wavelengths. The intensity of the emitted photons varies linearly with the concentration
of elements in the plasma. Standard solutions were prepared to provide three point cali-
bration curves. When properly calibrated, solution concentrations can be determined.
The following elements were analyzed in solution: Si, Na, B, Th, Gd, Sm, Eu. The first
three are major glass components and give an indication of overall glass durability. Sili-
con is likely to be partially held in what is termed the "alteration layer." This is a layer
that forms on the surface of glass as is dissolves and is described in detail in Section 4.10.
Sodium and boron are more soluble and are likely to be found entirely in solution. Tho-
rium and the rare earth elements are the focus of the criticality study. The ICP-AES limit
of detection for these elements are found in Table 4.
TABLE 4. ICP-AES Limits of Detection 1
Limit of
Element Detection
Si 6.3 ppb
Na 16 ppb
B 1.5 ppb
Th 10.9 ppb
Eu 0.6 ppb
1. Limits taken from
Spectro@ (Gd and
Sm limits not listed
but expected to be
similar to Eu)
The concentration of these elements in solution were combined with data related to the
individual samples themselves to provide an estimation of a Pu-loaded glasses' inherent
durability. The following section presents the results from the leach testing.
4.5 Leach Test Results
Knowing the concentration of the element in the leachant, the total mass of the leachant
and the surface area of the glass allowed key parameters related to glass durability to be
calculated. Elemental releases from glass are typically reported in units of normalized
grams of element i per meter squared of glass. The mass of released element i is normal-
ized by its concentration in the unreacted glass. The figures in this section display the nor-
malized release data for the specific elements of interest.36
Leaching of the ARMI glass at 90'C in deionized water agreed reasonably well with HLW
glasses in the literature and accurately reflected trends in elemental leaching. 37 Figure 4
displays the normalized release behavior over a leaching period of one year. The glass
reacts at a maximum initial rate, termed the forward rate. As glass components begin to
enter into solution, glass reaction affinity begins to drop and the leach rate slows. During
flow-through type tests borosilicate glasses will continue to react at the forward rate.
The ,ft release behavior displayed in Figure 4 has led many to characterize glass dissolu-
tion as a diffusion controlled process. Indeed, diffusion models and models based on reac-
tion affinity produce similar leach curves (Cunnane 1993). However, experiments have
shown the affinity control hypothesis to be more plausible (Chick 1984). This issue as
36.A compilation of all leach data, including pH measurements, can be found in the Leach Test Record Book
1992-97 in the Radioactive Waste Management Laboratory in the Nuclear Engineering Department at
MIT.
37.See for example Lutze (1988: 105 and 122).
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FIGURE 4. Silicon, Boron, and Sodium Release From Pure
ARM1 Glass Leached in DI Water at 900 C
well as a more comprehensive discussion of glass reaction mechanics is contained in Sec-
tion 4.8.
If every glass element entered into solution, their normalized release curves would be
identical. The boron and Na release curves are nearly identical. Both elements are quite
soluble in DI water. As shown in Figure 4, a portion of the Si (roughly 20 wt%) does not
enter solution but remains, most likely as a constituent of the reacted glass. Boron and Na
were assumed to represent the bulk reaction rate of the glass.
As expected the SRL165 frit had poor durability. As shown in Figure 5, elemental release
was more than two orders of magnitude higher than that of the ARM 1 glass at 900 C. After
364d, the pH values of the SRL165 samples were >11 while those of the ARM 1 samples
were <9. This demonstrates the greater Na+ ion exchange with H+ in solution for the
SRL165 glass. Without alumina, borosilicate glass can have extremely poor environmen-
tal durability.
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FIGURE 5. Silicon, Boron, and Sodium Release From Pure
SRL165 Leached in DI Water at 90 0C
Moreover, the release trends in the SRL165 glass do not follow the decreasing behavior
demonstrated in the ARM1 tests. A potential explanation is that Si is forming a chemical
complex or colloid in solution. This "removal" of Si activity keeps the SRL glass reacting
at near the forward rate.
The nature of the colloid was not explored in detail. However, it is likely to be smaller
than 45 gm as it was not affected by filtration at that level. When the leachate was acidi-
fied for analysis, the Si likely returned to solution. Pure SRL leachate that was not acidi-
fied formed a gelatinous cap on its surface upon cooling. Clearly Si had exceeded its
solubility limit at room temperature.
^
A closer examination showed the two glasses initially reacting at nearly identical reaction
rates. Figure 6 shows the elemental release of boron from the two glasses. While the
ARM1 glass reaction rate diminishes shortly after 10 days, the SRL165 does not. This
graph shows the potential importance of colloid formation in glass dissolution rates.
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FIGURE 6. Initial Reaction Rates for ARM1 and
SRL165 Glasses
The addition of Th and the rare earth elements to the ARM glass resulted in a product
with roughly equivalent durability as pure ARM 1. The release curves for Si, B, and Na
are shown in Figure 7. While three of the samples had releases slightly higher than those
for pure ARM 1, two were lower. All releases were within a factor of two.
The ARM1 glass was effective at retaining the additional elements. The concentrations of
Th, Eu, Gd, and Sm were below detection limits in three samples and within 1 ppb of the
limits in the other two. (As the values were not corrected for elemental interference these
value may actually be below detection limits as well.) Figure 8 shows the release data for
the samples in which these elements were barely detectable. It is interesting to note the
30
(1I
E 25
m 20
15
N
tE
E 10
o
z
5
n
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
time, days
FIGURE 7. Silicon, Boron, and Sodium Release from ARM1
Glass Loaded with 2 wt% ThO2 , Eu20 3, Gd 203, and Sm 2 0 3
Leached in DI Water at 90 0C
general order of elemental concentrations found either in solution or colloidal form. Tho-
rium and Sm were the most soluble and Gd and Eu were the least. However, these con-
centrations are very near detection limits and should be viewed carefully.
In comparison with boron all the rare earth poisons exhibited superior performance. Fig-
ure 9 shows that while boron entered solution as the glass reacted, europium was much
more resistant. This was the desired behavior for the added reactivity control. It is not
known whether the rare earths remained in the alteration layer or were sorbed on container
walls as strip tests were not performed. In the ARM 1 glass the rare earths did not form
colloids smaller than 0.45 gm. If they did form they would have been redissolved upon
acidification and appeared in ICP analyses.
Figure 10 shows that the modified SRL frit did exhibit somewhat improved performance
with the addition of Th, Eu, Gd, and Sm. The release trends of Si, B, and Na are lower and
have less variability than those of pure SRL165. This may support the hypothesis that the
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FIGURE 9. Reactivity Control Release in Modified
ARM1 Glass at 90 0 C
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RE elements act as Al does in the glass. As the rare earth elements are heavier, their molar
concentrations in the SRL glass are below that of Al in the ARM1 glass (-1/4). Higher
concentrations may have a more demonstrable affect on durability.
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FIGURE 10. Silicon, Boron, and Sodium Release from SRL165
Glass Loaded with 2 wt% ThO2, Eu20 3, Gd2 03 , and Sm 20 3
Leached in DI Water at 90 0 C
Regarding the release of Th and rare earths the results were mixed. These elements were
below detection limits for three of the five SRL165 modified glasses. However the
remaining two samples had 1-2 ppm of each element in its leachate. The Th and REE
release behavior for these two samples is shown in Figure 11. These concentrations are
much higher than the expected solubility limits of these elements in DI water.
This is an indication that as with the pure SRL165, colloids were formed in these two sam-
ples. However, only approximately 1 wt% of these elements actually went into solution.
The rare earths had normalized releases on the order of 10 g/m 2 at 364 days. The normal-
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FIGURE 11. Detectable Thorium and Rare Earth Release
From Modified SRL165 Glass at 90 0 C
ized releases from boron were two orders of magnitude higher. The REE and Th appar-
ently both formed colloids. The Th did not separate from the REE.
The fact that boron releases in the glasses that did not form Th and RE colloids were lower
than those for pure SRL implies that these elements increased the durability of the glass.
The normalized boron release in these samples (where Th and RE releases were not
detectable) ranged from 170 g/m 2 to more than 3200 g/m 2 lower than the pure SRL boron
releases. The two samples that formed RE colloids had boron releases similar to pure
SRL. All of these samples were more durable than the others. The difference between
thorium loaded glasses could be a processing related effect.
For completeness, the Eu release relative to boron is displayed in Figure 12. Even in the
relatively poor SRL glass, Eu release was much lower than boron over the time period
investigated.
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4.6 Conclusions
The addition of Th and the REE does not harm glass durability and the potential exists for
positive contributions. Further investigation is needed, but it appears that these elements
were dissolved in the glass network and did not promote the formation of a less durable
phase.
For glasses of reasonable durability it appears that Th will not enter solution. In this case
Th is likely to be sorbed on surfaces or retained in reacted glass products. However, for a
poor durability glass, dissolved species, high pH, or other factors allow Th to exist in col-
loid form. The Th could have formed a true colloid or sorbed on a Si or other colloid.
The rare earth elements had release characteristics virtually identical to that of Th in the
tests performed. Regarding criticality control, the REE were always much more insoluble
than boron. The formation of a colloid in the low durability glass is of concern as it may
provide a release pathway for these elements. However, the data showed that -99% of the
Th and REE remained either sorbed on the container wall or in the reacted layer. When
colloids were formed in the poor durability glass, both Th and the REE appeared to partic-
ipate. This is significant as even in this case the neutronic poisons were demonstrated to
mimic Th behavior.
4.7 Future Work
Further glass reaction testing should be performed on actual Pu loaded glasses in various
concentrations. Upon selection of a glass formulation for Pu dispositioning, glasses with
various ratios of Pu and REE should be fabricated to determine how these elements partic-
ipate in the glass network. Any ternary compounds or stable complexes that form should
be identified.
Devitrified products should also be produced and characterized. Devitrification may not
be an important issue in glasses that do not contain HLW or Cs. However, the potential
impact on neutronic control should be assessed. An attempt should be made to determine
any differential behavior of the individual REE in glass formation. The suitability of Th
as an analog should also be assessed.
Additional glass reaction experiments should be performed under a variety of aqueous
conditions (e.g. flow-through tests) and include uranium. In particular regimes that gener-
ate colloids should be carefully examined. The nature and mechanisms for formation of
the colloid produced during the SRL165 experiments should be determined. Their stabil-
ity over a range of bulk environmental parameters (e.g. pH) and time should be character-
ized. Colloids that may be present in a geologic repository should also be assessed for
their impact on actinide and rare-earth transport.
A variety of dissolved species should also be included in the leachate. The tests per-
formed here utilized deionized water. Species in solution may be capable of forming com-
plexes with the REE and thereby increase their concentration in solution. As this may
provide a mechanism for REE and Pu separation, the conditions under which this might
occur should be understood.
If credible scenarios for colloid formation are identified and it is shown that REE can be
separated from Pu or U, alternate host phases for the control elements may be needed.
Alternate glass or ceramic formulations should be assessed for their potential benefits in
regard to colloid formation.
A mixed ceramic/glass form may have preferable characteristics. In these matrices, con-
trolled devitrification is allowed as the glass formulation is tailored to provide durable
host phases. Fabricated glass is reheated to encourage devitrification for this matrix.
Glass ceramics have been shown to incorporate various REE in a durable sphene phase
(CaTiSiO5) (Lutze 1988: 427-469). Attention to Pu devitrification may not be necessary
if it forms crystals of PuO 2 as this oxide is extremely insoluble.
Such a formulation may be especially useful in a can-in-can process where heat from the
second stage vitrification may promote the uncontrolled devitrification of the present
glasses under consideration. The LaBS glass is not a glass-ceramic formulation.
4.8 Glass Dissolution Model
In order to perform a near-field criticality assessment it was necessary to understand and
model the physical mechanisms and spatial changes of an environmentally altered waste
form. A model of this behavior was constructed and used to produce "snapshots" of sys-
tem configuration during the reaction progress. This information was used to calculate the
effective multiplication factor (keff) of the system as a function of time. This section
describes glass reaction progress in aqueous environments and the assumptions used in
this work.
4.8.1 Glass Reaction with Groundwater
Glass reaction is a complex process dependent on both glass and solution properties. In
general, glass will react with water to release its soluble species and form more stable
amorphous and crystalline phases. It is the redistribution of neutronically relevant
nuclides during this process that is of primary interest in the work presented here.
Extensive research has been performed on glass reaction with water, the results of which
have led to various descriptions of glass dissolution. One theory is that H+ diffuses into
the glass matrix and undergoes ion exchange, typically with alkali metals such as sodium
(prevalently at the non-bridging oxygen sites). The alteration of the glass also allows sol-
uble species (such as boron) to enter into solution. This produces a reacted layer that
retains the amorphous silica structure of glass but with concentration gradients of alkali
and soluble species. This layer has been termed the "diffusion layer."
Over time, the most depleted portion of the diffusion layer (its outer fringe) begins to
hydrolyze. This results in a restructuring or repolymerization of the Si matrix into a more
stable, hydrous "gel layer." This may or may not release Si into solution. The process
apparently "kicks out" metals incapable of entering into a new amorphous phase (Bourc-
ier 1991: 6). Eventually, the gel layer further reacts with water and is dissolved com-
pletely, releasing silica into solution. This reaction is termed "network dissolution."
This surface layer (the diffusion layer and gel layer combined) is typically less than a
micron in thickness and moves into the glass as the bulk reaction proceeds. Following
behind it is a layered region of amorphous and crystalline phases termed alteration lay-
ers. 38 This region has a complex elemental composition. Many of the metals that were
either "kicked out" during gel layer formation or released as a result of network dissolu-
tion, quickly precipitate to form the alteration layers. These layers can be either amor-
phous or crystalline in nature. The retention of fissile nuclides in these layers is of interest
here. Figure 13 provides a graphic description of the dissolution process.
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FIGURE 13. Dissolving Glass
Some experimental results have brought into question the importance of diffusion in glass
reaction. Bunker et al demonstrated that there was no correlation between the solid-state
diffusion coefficients for alkali elements and observed glass reaction rates (Strachan 1994:
130). The required interdiffusion coefficient (to support the assumption of a diffusion pro-
cess) was several orders of magnitude higher than those measured for Na+ and K+. These
results bring into question whether diffusion is occurring at all.
Results from experiments performed by Chick and Pederson demonstrate that if it is
occurring, it is not a rate limiting reaction (Chick 1984). In one test a leached test sample
was removed from its near saturation solution and placed (with alteration layers intact)
into fresh leachate. If the layers (surface and alteration) were a diffusion barrier, the glass
38.There is inconsistent terminology in the literature as this region of alteration phases is often termed the
gel layer.
reaction would continue at its slow pace. However, the sample exhibited dissolution
behavior similar to its initial exposure to fresh leachate. The presence of layers apparently
had no effect on glass reaction.
In any regard, it is the general consensus that the bulk dissolution rate of glass is primarily
controlled by silica concentration in the leachate (Bourcier 1994: 8). Numerous glass
reaction rate models use an affinity relationship of the form shown in Equation 2 to
explain this behavior. This relationship is a simplified version of the general rate equation
proposed by Aagaard and Helgeson (Strachan 1994: 136).
k= (1- Q  (EQ 2)
where, = dissolution rate[mol/(m2 *sec)];
k = rate constant (which actually depends on species activity)
[mol/(m2 *sec)]
Q = reaction quotient (product of species formed raised to a power
equal to their stoichiometric participation in the reaction)
K = equilibrium constant
The equation describes the reaction rate as a function of a constant material property, k,
and the reaction affinity for some limiting glass dissolution reaction. The reaction quo-
tient Q is related to chemical affinity in the following way:
affinity = AGrxn = RTln
rxn K
or
A Gr,
Q RT
K - e (EQ 3)
where, R = the gas constant(J/oK/mole)
T = temperature (oK)
As the glass reaction proceeds, Si species build up in solution and the Gibbs free energy of
the system approaches its minimum (equilibrium) value. This "saturation" effect slows
glass reaction rates. Other modeling approaches have included dependencies on solution
species other than silicon, but the general approach is the same.
The adoption of an affinity model suggests an alternate role for the alteration layers. The
alteration layers may control the concentration of the rate-limiting species in solution,
which again is taken to be silica. Indeed, various silica phases have been assumed as con-
trolling phases and used in reaction-rate modeling with relative success (Bourcier 1994:
18). In addition, the formation and dissolution of the alteration layer is reversible, there-
fore applying the rate law to the alteration layer is theoretically appropriate.3 9 It is
through this mechanism (rather than a transport barrier) that alteration layers could impact
the long term dissolution rate.
The presence of alteration layers may explain why in closed system leach tests saturation
is not reached. A "residual affinity" is observed that keeps the glass reacting, albeit at a
relatively slow rate. It may be the case that the formation of the alteration layers and/or
the nucleation and precipitation of a particular phase reduces solution concentration and
maintains the residual affinity. In this case, as long as the phase can precipitate, the solu-
tion will never reach saturation with respect to the alteration layer.
4.8.2 Current Dissolution Models
A rate law associated with affinity control has been used in conjunction with a reaction
path calculation to successfully model short-term glass performance (Bourcier 1994: 19).
As the database of alteration phases is limited (making phase prediction difficult), analyti-
cal measurements of alteration layer composition on reacted glass are used . The solubil-
ity of a solid solution of phases chosen to reflect layer composition is then used in an
affinity calculation. The rate constant is also determined experimentally. In this way the
effect of rate-limiting reactions and alteration layer formation are accounted for in the
models.
39.The irreversible glass dissolution reaction cannot possess an equilibrium constant.
While this approach has been successful at modeling glass reaction in the short-term,
extending it to the long-term is difficult. The composition of alteration layers over time
must be known in order to model the glass reaction rate. Short-term tests avoid this prob-
lem through direct measurement. This cannot be done over the long period of interest.
Yet formation of these phases can dramatically affect dissolution behavior. There is evi-
dence that the eventual nucleation and precipitation of secondary phases rich in Si can dra-
matically increase glass reaction rate (Ebert 199 l1a). As with the alteration layers, the
nucleation and precipitation kinetics of a rate limiting phase could control silica concen-
tration, and thereby the long-term reaction rate. Accelerated leach tests have been per-
formed in an effort to produce and thermodynamically characterize these Si phases (Ebert
199 ib). However, predicting which phases form and when, requires assumptions about the
evolution of repository chemistry over time.
The uncertainty concerning long-term rate control for glass reaction makes detailed mod-
eling problematic if not impossible. Therefore the intent here was to utilize what is pres-
ently known about glass reaction mechanisms in aqueous environments to make both
reasonable and bounding predictions of glass behavior over time. The following section
describes the model used in this analysis.
4.8.3 A Glass Reaction Model
A simple model describing the composition and configuration of a single glass log in a
repository was constructed. Available data on glass/groundwater chemistry were used to
determine reacted glass and solution composition over time. System parameters were then
varied to determine their effect on subsequent criticality calculations.
The following physical situation was modeled. The model assumes a glass log with the
dimensions of a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) log (3m long x 60 cm diame-
ter) and a nominal plutonium loading. The composition of the glass was the borosilicate
glass used for HLW at the DWPF. This would represent the alternative of vitrifying Pu
directly with HLW.
The canister was assumed to be emplaced in a horizontal drift at a repository with condi-
tions similar to those expected to be found at Yucca Mountain in the state of Nevada. The
mountain is under investigation as a potential high-level waste repository. A particular
geologic formation known as "tuff" is taken to be the reference composition of the host
rock.
As water infiltrates the region surrounding the glass, it reacts producing an annular region
of alteration layers. This layer moves into the glass as reaction proceeds. The depletion of
soluble poisons in this region may lead to a criticality event. Figure 14 is a graphical rep-
resentation of the system as it evolves.
Surrounding Rock (Tuff)
H20I
growing volume of
k reacted glass
shrinking volume of
unreacted glass
FIGURE 14. Hortizontal Drift Emplacement
Figure 14 shows the unreacted glass suspended concentrically within the alteration layers.
This is not the most probable configuration. As the reacted glass will not provide mechan-
ical support, the unreacted glass will more likely settle to the bottom of the drift. Uniform,
cylindrical dissolution is also unlikely. Cracks in the glass, formed during cooling, could
allow more homogeneous glass reaction. The configuration above was chosen for its low
neutron leakage aspects. To perform a conservative criticality assessment, this was
deemed to be appropriate.
Glass reaction was assumed to proceed in the following manner. As the glass reacts its
constituents are released into the groundwater. The aqueous species react and insoluble
phases are formed which make up the alteration layer. The composition of these phases
was assumed to be those predicted using the speciation/solubility code EQ3/6, described
in the next section.
The alteration layer is produced at an average bulk dissolution rate (BDR). The BDR was
not calculated using an affinity model. As noted previously, the long-term reaction rate
may be controlled by an unknown silica phase. The BDR was therefore taken as an exog-
enous input and varied to gauge its effect.
As reaction equilibrium is assumed, the predicted phases also determine the concentration
of glass elements in solution. This concentration combined with the infiltration rate of
water in the repository determines the removal rate of elements from the layer.
It is now possible to develop a set of mass balance equations for elements in the alteration
layer. The radius of the unreacted log fixes the rate at which elements are added to the
alteration layer, while decay and volumetric flow set the removal rate. Knowing the pro-
duction rate and removal rate of elements in the layer, the following rate equation was
constructed:
dN.
= BDR (2nR (t) L)f i (t) -IAC,so - iNi (EQ 4)
where: Ni = the mass of nuclide i in the alteration layer
BDR = bulk dissolution rate of the glass (gm/cm2/yr)
R(t) = radius (cm) of the unreacted log at time t
L = the length of the log (cm)
fi(t) = the mass fraction of i in the log at time t
I = water infiltration rate (cm 3/cm 2/yr)
A = effective cross-sectional area of the region (cm 2)
Csoli = solubility limit of i (gm/cm3)
kiNi = decay rate of i (gm/yr)
This general equation can be written for each glass component. For U-235, an additional
buildup term due to the decay of Pu-239 is needed. The resulting set of equations can be
solved using the elemental composition of fabricated glass as the initial condition to give a
relationship for the mass of each nuclide in the alteration layer over time. The differential
equations were solved numerically using a Runge-Kutta method. The details of this calcu-
lation are presented in Appendix B.
Equation 4 contains several variables that have yet to be discussed. The cross-sectional
area is needed to determine the volumetric flow rate through the emplacement. An "inter-
action" thickness of 5 cm was added to the initial radius of the log for calculating this area.
As the radius shrinks, a larger portion of water will "miss" the unreacted glass as it repre-
sents a smaller target. However, it is assumed that the initial "effective" borehole will pro-
vide a constant reaction volume for the glass/water mixture. This is conservative as a
smaller volume of water would reduce neutron control removal rates. In addition, we are
interested in removal of elements in the entire reacted region, not just the layers near the
log.
The radius of the glass as a function of time is also needed. For simplicity, glass dissolu-
tion was assumed to occur only in the radial direction. With a constant BDR this gives the
following function:
BDRt
Rlog = Ro- Ps (EQ 5)
where Rlog= radius of the unreacted log
Ro = initial radius
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BDR = bulk dissolution rate
ps = density of the glass
The bulk dissolution rate, water infiltration rate and elemental loading can be varied to
determine their effect on criticality. The remaining information needed is the solubility
data. The following section describes how this information was attained.
4.8.4 Solubility/Phase Calculation
As the glass reacts, its components enter into solution. Whether elements remain in solu-
tion or precipitate is determined by the contacting groundwater conditions. 40 Over time,
the glass reaction itself will alter solution chemistry. Available thermodynamic data were
used to investigate the evolution of solution concentrations during glass reaction and the
formation of precipitate phases. The composition of the phases over time will be used to
determine if the near-field system approaches a critical condition.
Of primary interest for the criticality assessment were the neutronically relevant species in
the glass and alteration layers. These included fissile, poison and moderating elements.
While all major glass elements were used to determine the alteration layer phases, only the
elements with significant neutron cross-sections were used to represent the layer in the
criticality calculation. The remaining mass of alteration layer was assumed to be silica
based. This procedure is discussed further in Section 4.9.1.
The behavior of the following elements was examined: Pu, U, B, Li and Eu. Plutonium
and uranium are fissile elements. While no uranium is found initially in the glass, Pu-239
decays to produce fissile U-235 (half-life=24,100 yrs). Boron and lithium are neutron
control elements that are normal components of the glass. It is the higher solubility of
boron and lithium relative to Pu and uranium in solution that could lead to a criticality
event.
40.Sorption or colloid formation may also occur.
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Europium is a neutron absorber not used in the current DWPF glass frit that was evaluated
for its neutronic control capabilities and its expected insolubility. Europium was identi-
fied in prior work by the author as being particularly detrimental to a Pu explosive device
if not removed (Sylvester 1994). Lanthanide elements exhibit very negative equilibrium
potentials and therefore act as reducing agents and in basic solutions form insoluble
hydroxides (Pourbaix 1974: 192). Actinide elements behave similarly. It is hoped that
their similar aquatic chemistry, as demonstrated in Section 4.5, will keep them commin-
gled and thereby keep the near-field waste emplacement subcritical.
Actinide/Lanthanide Aqueous Chemistry
In aqueous solutions actinide ions exist in the trivalent and tetravalent states as simple
hydrated ions An 3+ and An4+(Silva 1995). At higher oxidation states the actinides form
oxygenated species called actinyl ions. For plutonium these ions are PuO2+ and PuO 2++
Redox reactions between either of the two lower states and the two higher states will be
pH dependent due to the formation of the actinyl ions. These pH dependent reactions also
tend to be slower. The higher oxidation states are increasingly favored with increasing
pH.
Oxygenation of the higher states reduces the charge on the central actinide to +3.2 or +2.2
and leads to a lower ionic potential. This explains why the +4 state is the most readily
hydrolyzed and complexed of the oxidation states. Hydrolysis results in an insoluble
hydroxide but if a ligand concentration is high enough (including OH-), complexation will
dominate and the actinide will be more soluble.
Actinides will form hydroxide, carbonate, fluoride, phosphate, and sulfate complexes.
Chlorine and nitrate complexes can also be formed but are less favored (Silva 1995: 384).
Other complexes (bromide, peroxide, oxalate, etc...) are known to form but are not con-
centrated in the glass or the groundwater (Cleveland 1979: 81 and 92). The actinide oxi-
dation state is important for complexation. The following strength of complexation trend
has been observed: 4+ > 3+ = 6+ > 5+.
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Lanthanides have similar chemical behavior but differ from actinides in certain respects.
Under environmental conditions, lanthanides exist in the +3 state and behave chemically
as the +3 actinides of similar ionic size (Gschneidner 1979: 554). Lanthanides do not
exhibit the same robust redox behavior of the actinides. The hydration energy gain for +3
lanthanides is not sufficiently greater than the ionization energy for the 4f electrons to pro-
mote higher oxidation. The 5f electrons of the actinides are more shielded and therefore a
wider range of oxidation states can be attained.
The oxidation state and the degree of complexation will depend on solution composition.
As the assumed repository is Yucca Mountain, water from a well located at the site (J13)
was taken as the reference solution. The composition of J 13 well water is shown in Table
5.
TABLE 5. J13 Well Waterl
Concentration
Species ppm
Na+ 45.800
SiO2(aq) 60.970
Ca++ 13.000
K+ 5.0400
Mg++ 2.0100
Li+ 0.0480
H+ 4.013e-5
(pH=7.41)
HCO3- 140.40
02(aq) 5.6000
F- 2.1800
C1- 7.1400
N03- 8.7800
S04-- 18.400
B(OH)3(aq) 0.7660
Al+++ 0.0080
Mn++ 0.0120
Fe++ 0.0400
Sr++ 0.0400
HPO4-- 0.1200
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1. taken from EQ6 library
The J 13 water is neutral pH and slightly oxidizing. It is a carbonate water with significant
amounts of silica, sodium and calcium. Notably it also contains sulfate and fluoride spe-
cies. These species were noted earlier for their ability to form complexes with actinides.
As glass dissolves, its constituents will alter solution chemistry, possibly hampering the
formation of certain phases or promoting others. The relevance of glass composition has
been noted in the literature. A study of particular interest performed a geochemical simu-
lation of two types of dissolving glasses (Bruton 1987). In the glass used at West Valley,
uranium complexed with the glass element phosphorus and remained at a relatively high
concentration in solution. The DWPF glass contains no phosphorus and the uranium was
predicted to precipitate as it could not form the soluble complex. Solution Eh and pH
changes during glass reaction as well. All these factors influence elemental solubility and
demonstrate the need for this type of analysis.
The reference glass used in the analysis was the DWPF glass (Savannah River frit 131).
This represented the option of blending Pu directly with the sludge-supernate waste at
Savannah River. This glass has a much higher soda loading than the ARM1 glass but is
roughly comparable. Its composition is shown in Table 6 (Baxter 1995: 36).
Two scenarios were assumed to evaluate solution chemistry. First, reaction path issues
were ignored and elemental solubility was calculated based on saturation in the J13 water
alone. This was deemed to represent solution control dominated by simulated Yucca
Mountain environmental conditions. Second, a calculation was performed to evaluate the
effects of glass components. This combination of calculations was assumed to span the
range of water chemistry that may contact the glass.
The speciation/solubility code EQ3/6 was used with its associated thermodynamic data-
bases for both scenarios (LLNL 1992).41 EQ3 uses mass action and redox relationships to
41.The composite data file 'dataO.com' compiled and maintained by Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory was used for all solubility/speciation calculations.
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TABLE 6. DWPF Sludge-Supernate Glass
Component wt% Component wt%
Ag20 0.75e-02 MnO 1.73
A120 3  3.35 Na2B40 7  0.21e-03
B20 3  10.59 Na20O 17.59
BaO 0.039 NiO 0.62
Ca3(PO4)2  0.15 PbO 0.041
CaO 1.07 PuO 2  0.015
CoO 0.016 RhO 2  0.56e-02
Cr 20 3  0.11 RuO 2  0.025
Cs20 0.073 SiO 2  45.09
CuO 0.036 SrO 0.029
Fe2 0 3  6.09 ThO2  0.23
FeO 2.70 TiO 2  0.72
Group Al 0.11 U0 2  1.2
Broup B2 0.36 Y20 3  0.017
K20 0.19e-03 Zeolite 1.47
La 20 3  0.36 ZnO 0.095
Li20 4.13 ZnO 2  0.36
MgO 1.59
(iroun, A: Kadionuclildes ot Mo. Rb. Se. Ilc. 'l~e
2. Group B: Radionuclides of Ag, Am, Cd, Ce,
Cm, Co, Cr, Eu, La, Na, Nd, Np, Pd, Pm, Pr, Sb,
Sn, Tb, TI, Zr
solve for the thermodynamic equilibrium state of a specified ground water, identifying
species concentrations and supersaturated phases. The order of phase precipitation, which
may allow initially supersaturated species to remain in solution, is not addressed. EQ3
was used to determine elemental concentrations for the environmental control scenario.
EQ6 models the addition of reactants to a solution allowing supersaturated phases to pre-
cipitate as reaction proceeds. The order of precipitation is determined by the degree of
disequilibrium of the saturated phases. After the phases are removed, additional reactants
are added and the process repeats. The onset of saturation can be observed in this way.
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EQ6 was run in titration mode to model the effect of dissolving glass. 42 In the titration
calculation glass components are stoichiometrically added to a constant volume of water
where they are completely dissolved and new phases are allowed to precipitate. The cal-
culation results in a description of the aqueous species and insoluble phases that form dur-
ing reaction progress. Points along this reaction pathway were taken to represent
alteration layer composition for various degrees of glass reaction. The associated phases
and solution concentrations were then used in the analysis.
The major glass components (>1% by weight of the oxide) were used to determine the
phases formed during reaction with simulated J13 groundwater. The remaining compo-
nents were judged too small to impact phase formation. These trace elements (which
include all the actinides and fission products) were ignored in the criticality assessment as
well. They could provide additional neutron absorption, therefore eliminating them is
conservative. This assumption also allows the results to be applied to a borosilicate glass
without fission products.
The crystalline silica polymorphs (chalcedony, coesite, cristobalite(alpha), cristo-
balite(beta), quartz, and tridymite) were also suppressed in EQ6. This is a common proce-
dure in reaction path modeling to prevent the formation of thermodynamically favored
phases that are known through experiment not to form.
4.8.5 Solubility Results
Environmental Control
Under tuff control, EQ3 found boron to be soluble at concentrations greater than 5000
ppm. This confirmed that boron would not likely be present in the alteration layers.
42.There are three alternate methods for reaction path modeling in EQ6 : titration, closed system or fluid-
centered flow-through system. The closed system differs in the way it treats saturation. At saturation in
the closed system the reactant is reclassified as a secondary mineral with which equilibrium is reached.
As the available reactant is now "gone," reaction stops. The titration model forces dissolution while the
closed system reaction halts the reaction upon saturating.
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Lithium however was predicted to precipitate in the petalite phase LiA1Si40 10 . Equilib-
rium with this phase gave a concentration of 8.3E-9 M (moles/liter) in the J13 water. The
groundwater was initially supersaturated. This Li concentration is therefore lower than
the initial concentration. Europium formed the solid precipitate Eu2(CO3)3 :3H 20. This
gave a concentration of 4.5E-7 M. The insolubility of these phases would assist in criti-
cality control.
The fissile elements plutonium and uranium were also predicted to precipitate. Plutonium
in equilibrium with PuO2 gave a concentration of 1.2E-15 M. Uranium precipitated as
haiweeite, giving an equilibrium concentration of 8.6E-10 M.
Glass Control
Under DWPF glass control chemistry, elemental solubilities were calculated based on
equilibrium with phases formed during various stages of glass reaction. The elements of
10 grams of DWPF glass were added stoichiometrically via a titration process into one
kilogram of J13 water. The glass contained 8 wt% PuO 2 and one mole of Eu 20 3 per mole
of Pu.
EQ6 produced a history of phase production and solution chemistry during glass reaction.
Figure 15 shows how the concentration of relevant elements changed over time. During
the criticality analysis, points along the reaction pathway were chosen as the steady-state
composition of the layer.
At no time during the reaction was boron predicted in the alteration layers. This confirms
the EQ3 predictions.43 However, the EQ6 results show Li follows B and is not insoluble
as predicted by EQ3. During reaction, Li existed in solution as Li+, not a complex. Its
solubility therefore cannot be attributed to complexation with a glass component. Instead,
as the glass reacts, aqueous Al is consumed (in stilbite and smectite) and pH rises as
43. The Bruton simulation of West Valley glass did predict the precipitation of B20 3 at the 10g glass/i kg
water mark.
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shown in Figure 16. Both have the effect of hampering petalite formation. Therefore after
an initial precipitation (_ 10-2.5 moles) additional Li releases remain in solution.
The Li results demonstrate the potential importance of reaction kinetics. If the order of
phase precipitation diverges from that predicted in the calculation, significant differences
in solution concentration could be observed for elements such as Li. In this case this
"common ion" determined whether Li would remain near the waste package or be solubi-
lized. Kinetic issues were not addressed in this research but should be carefully investi-
gated in future work.
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Mountain
The remaining elements of interest evolved in the following way. Europium enters into
solution as the carbonate species EuOHCO 3. It then precipitates as Eu2(CO 3)3:3H 20,
reaching the initial concentration predicted by EQ3. While the carbonate species appears
important, at a pH of 7, Eu would have precipitated out at a slightly higher concentration
due to solid Eu(OH) 3 formation. When HC0 3- starts to drop, Eu(OH) 3 begins to form.
Competition ensues between the formation of several carbonate complexes and precipita-
tion. Ultimately Eu reaches a maximum concentration of 1.5E-5 M. Europium concentra-
tion is reduced with increasing pH. Eu remains in the +3 oxidation state throughout
reaction.
Plutonium from the glass is immediately precipitated as PuO 2 (log Ksp=-7.36). The small
amount remaining in solution exists in the +5 and +6 state (PuO 2+ and PuO 2F3-). This is a
slightly higher concentration than predicted by EQ3. As glass reaction continues, Pu con-
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centration dips due to HCO 3- reduction to a concentration of 5.8E-15 M. Eventually Pu is
reduced to +4 and hydrolyzes (complexes with OH-) causing the solubility of Pu to
increase. This complexation allows the Pu to be more soluble under reducing conditions
than earlier oxidizing conditions. Pu solubility is then controlled by pH.
Figure 17 shows the reaction path for the same glass but with uranium replacing Pu in
equal molar quantities. As the glass reacts, the uranium concentration rises until haiweeite
forms (Ca(U02)2(Si 2 05)3 :5H 20) producing the uranium concentration predicted by EQ3.
The carbonate complex U0 2(CO 3)34- keeps the U concentration initially at approximately
1E-9 M, otherwise the concentration would have been much lower. As pH drops and
HCO 3- is reduced, uranium concentration drops to a minimum value of 2.6E-10 M. As the
glass continues to react, uranium is reduced to the +4 state and forms aqueous U(OH) 4,
causing uranium concentration to rise. Eventually no carbonate complexes exist and ura-
nium is in equilibrium with uraninite. Uranium concentration stabilizes as solution pH
stabilizes. For determining U solubility, the initial U loading was not important.
4.8.6 Conclusions
Carbonate and hydroxide appear to be the most significant complexing agents in the sys-
tem studied. While chloride and nitrates are present in J13 water, at no time do Pu or U
form their complexes. This is consistent with the observed trend in complexation
strength. It is the 'over' complexation of the actinides (hydroxide and carbonate) to pro-
duce negatively charged species that could increase solubility in the J 13 water.
Glass components can have complex effects on elemental release. The consumption of
dissolved oxygen due to Eu and Pu reactions produces species of lower oxidation states.
Reduced species tend to be more insoluble. (While Pu3+ is soluble it was not formed
here.) However the simultaneous increase in pH during glass reaction more than offsets
the effect causing Pu solution concentrations to rise.
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The oxidation potential appears to be sensitive to the combined Eu and Pu loading. With-
out these elements the eH drops roughly 0.2 mV during glass reaction. With these ele-
ments it drops 1.2 mV. This reflects the strong reducing properties of rare earths and
actinides. In contrast the loading of these elements does not affect pH.
The worst regime from a criticality perspective appears to occur when pH is around 9.
This produces the greatest difference between Eu and Pu solubility. Uranium concentra-
tion is relatively constant throughout glass reaction. At higher pH Eu becomes less solu-
ble, reducing this difference and the criticality concern. Due to the ion exchange reactions
of dissolving glass, the groundwater closest to the surface is likely to be basic. However,
the potential effect of radiolysis on pH due to actinide decay was not assessed.
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This work based element solubility on precipitation and complex formation using avail-
able thermodynamic data. However, this data does not span all possible environmental
conditions. Indeed thermodynamic data for all possible oxidation states does not exist for
these elements (Silva 1995: 9). Other complexation (e.g. humic acids) may also affect sol-
ubility. In addition colloid formation (both true and pseudo) may provide an additional
mechanism for neutron control removal. Radiation effects may be important but were not
examined here. Sorption was also not considered but would tend to help matters in terms
of near-field criticality.
Results from both the environmental and glass control scenarios will be used in the criti-
cality calculations. For the glass control case the lowest solubility achieved by the fissile
elements will be used with the highest calculated solubility for the control element. This
was done to represent a worst case or highest degree of fissile/control separation. The
details of this calculation are expressed in the following section.
4.9 Criticality Assessment
The result of the dissolution model was a description of the composition and thickness of
the alteration layer as it replaced the dissolving glass. A description of how this data were
used in the criticality calculation and a discussion of the additional assumptions made are
presented in this section.
4.9.1 Problem Setup
The issue of WGPu disposal has sparked several repository criticality studies. These
included an assertion by Dr. Charles Bowman et al of Los Alamos National Laboratory
that the emplacement of large quantities of WGPu could result in underground nuclear
explosions (Bowman 1995). Additional research on this issue claimed that such an explo-
sion is impossible but that an underground criticality could occur (Sanchez 1996). Hence
such explosions were not investigated in this work.
The Nuclear Engineering Department at U.C. Berkley has been investigating the possibil-
ity of a far-field criticality event (Kastenberg 1996a). Their work modeled the transport
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and eventual deposition of Pu and U-235. Scenarios were postulated for approach to criti-
cality and a performance assessment was used to assess the risk of an auto-criticality
event.
In this work, the potential for criticality to occur in the near-field was investigated. The
system was modeled as three regions, the unreacted glass, the surrounding tuff, and the
alteration layer. The unreacted glass was assumed to be comprised of the major compo-
nents (>1 wt %) of the glass composition listed in Table 6. Various amounts of Pu and
REE were added to this composition. The neglected components could contain neutron
absorbers so their exclusion was deemed conservative. The density of the glass was taken
to be 2.75 g/cc (Baxter: 1983).
The surrounding tuff was assumed to be of the composition given in Table 7. Its density
was taken to be 2.2 g/cc (Kastenberg 1996b: 302). The porosity of the tuff was taken to be
0.3 While unfractured tuff is likely to posses a lower porosity, the tuff backfill would not
due to disruption during emplacement. This value provided a upper bound on the amount
of water that could be found in the tuff.
TABLE 7. Tuff Composition1
Element wt%
Ti 0.06
Al 6.721
Fe 0.661
Mn 0.046
Mg 0.096
Ca 0.379
Si 35.99
0 49.2
K 4.126
P 0.00436
Na 2.7
1. (Kastenberg 1996b:
302)
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The uncertainty surrounding future phase nucleation, described in Section 4.8.1, added
uncertainty regarding the exact elemental composition of the alteration layer. Without
knowing the characteristics of each phase that nucleates, it is impossible to predict the
exact makeup of the alteration layer. This unavoidable uncertainty provided another justi-
fication for tracking only neutronically important nuclides as the glass dissolves.
After determining the concentration of the relevant nuclides in the alteration layers (as
described in Section 4.8.4), the remaining mass of alteration layer was assumed to be
amorphous Si0 2. The total mass of the alteration layer was assumed to be 25% of the
original glass. This also fixed the porosity of the alteration layers at 0.75.
Porosity was expected to be important as it determines the water concentration and
thereby the degree of moderation under saturation conditions. The effective porosity could
be increased if the specific densities of the alteration phases were higher than the density
of the glass. However, in this analysis the densities of these phases were assumed to be
equal to the bulk density of the glass.
After fully characterizing the system, the compositional information was used in the criti-
cality code system SCALE-PC. The following section describes this code.
4.9.2 SCALE-PC
SCALE-PC is a modular code system for performing criticality safety analysis (ORNL
1992). It is comprised of various functional modules for cross section processing, criti-
cality and shielding calculations. SCALE-PC uses a subset of the modules depending on
the user specified sequence. For all the results presented below, the SCALE sequence
CSAS 1X was utilized. This control module used the functional modules BONAMI-S,
NITAWL-S and XSDRNPM-S. These modules are described below.
A repository containing dissolving glass logs was modelled as a lattice of infinitely long,
annular 'fuel' cells. However, the pitch was chosen large enough so that neighboring logs
would not contribute to the neutron economy. The alteration layer, depleted of boron, was
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assumed to be analogous to the fuel region of a large annular fuel pin. The interior region
contained the unreacted glass and the tuff represented the moderator portion of the unit
cell.
Using the compositions specified, CSAS 1X began by calling the BONAMI-S module.
BONAMI assumes a simple expression for flux in an infinite homogeneous medium and
applies the available Bondarenko factors to produce resonance corrected group cross sec-
tions for use in other modules. These factors are selected based on nuclide concentrations
and temperature and used to modify infinitely dilute group cross sections. Dancoff factors
are used to account for the additional self-shielding as a result of a heterogeneous lattice.
Cross sections were taken from the Hansen-Roach library. This database contains 16
energy group data for the radionuclides used in the analysis.
Further self-shielding treatment is performed by the module NITAWL-S. The Nordheim
Integral Treatment is a two-region (fuel and moderator) integral transport theory method
for determining resonance corrected group constants. Energy variations of the flux are
assumed and first-flight escape probabilities are used to account for coupling between the
two regions.
NITAWL performs calculations for each resonance but does not include resonance over-
lap. As U-235 and Pu-239 have overlapping resonance there was some concern as to
applicability.44 In addition, thermal upscatter into the resonance region is not accounted
for. This may lead to an over-statement of the resonance shielding and an underestimation
of keff. While this effect is most notable at higher temperatures (such as in operating reac-
tors) and may not be important, MCNP4A was used to gauge any impact. The results of
this MCNP 'benchmarking' are discussed later.
Having generated the resonance-corrected cross-sections XSDRN-PM was used to calcu-
late keff values. XSDRN-PM provides a 1-D, discrete ordinates, solution to the neutron
transport equation. The discrete ordinates method represents the spectral dependence of
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44.ORNL (1992: Part2 p.M7.2.6)
the neutron flux via Legendre polynomials. Due to the large, simple geometries of this
problem, scattering order was taken to be 1. The angular quadrature used in the difference
equations (Sn equations) in XSDRN-PM was of order eight. The unit cell had a reflected
boundary condition on the left-hand side (center of the glass log) and a white boundary
condition (isotropic return) on the right-hand side representing the tuff region.
4.9.3 Cases Investigated
For both environmental and glass control scenarios, model parameters were set at values
most favorable for control removal and fissile element precipitation. The model parame-
ters bulk dissolution rate and volumetric flow were set at high values in order to bound the
concentration of Eu needed in the glass to maintain subcriticality. All together, these
assumptions were assumed to represent a "worst case" scenario. These parameters as well
as Pu loading were then varied to determine their relative importance in the model.
Initially, a glass loaded with 8 wt% PuO 2 was modeled. As 10 wt% ThO 2 was shown to
devitrify this was assumed to limit the solubility of Pu in the glass. Europium was
assumed to be dissolved in the glass at various concentrations. Europium was chosen for
its high thermal cross section (and resonance integral) and, as noted in Section 4.8.4, its
ability to complicate weapon design. The ratio of Eu/Pu was examined for its effect on
repository criticality.
The bulk dissolution rate is the fundamental measure of glass performance and sets the
growth rate of the alteration layer. It also determines whether the plutonium or uranium
chemistry is relevant. A high BDR means the analysis will be concerned with both Pu and
Uranium chemistry. For very low BDR, the problem is dominated by uranium chemistry.
As uranium was predicted to be more soluble, thereby leaving the near-field more quickly,
the case for a high BDR seemed to be of most concern. An initial value of 0.1 g/m2/yr for
BDR was taken and then reduced to evaluate both Pu and U dominated scenarios.
It would appear that a high bulk dissolution rate would require a minimum water infiltra-
tion rate. This would continually expose the surface of the glass to fresh water, allowing
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the glass to react at its forward rate (i.e. a high BDR). However, under low flow condi-
tions the nucleation and precipitation of a Si rich phase could allow glass to also react at
the forward rate. This is the justification for independently varying the bulk dissolution
rate and the water infiltration rate to gauge their impact. The current infiltration rate at
Yucca Mountain is 0.001 m3/m2/yr.45 For the bounding calculation, the flow was taken to
be 0.01 m3/m2/yr, the highest expected rate under consideration at Yucca Mountain. 46
Moderation effects were investigated by changing the degree of saturation in the alteration
layers and the tuff regions.
4.10 Results
The results using solubilities from the glass control chemistry are presented first. In all the
figures in this section, solubilities for fissile elements were set at their lowest observed
values during glass reaction and control elements at their highest. The evolution of keff is
presented for the case of highest glass dissolution rate and volumetric flow (termed "worst
case" conditions) for several Eu/Pu loadings. The results of modifying glass durability
and groundwater flow are then presented.
4.10.1 Glass Control
"Worst Case" Conditions
Figure 18 shows the effect of control element removal for a glass log loaded with 8 wt%
PuO2. Even at the assumed maximum Pu loading, only a relatively small concentration of
Eu is needed to hold down reactivity. Both the thermal neutron cross section and reso-
nance integral of Eu-151 are an order of magnitude higher than those of Pu-239. A mole
ratio of 1/2 Eu to Pu kept the system subcritical for more than 800 thousand years. Due to
the atomic mass differences between Pu and Eu, this corresponded to a loading of less
than 3 wt% Eu 20 3 (2.6 wt%).
45.Berkley paper
46.Yucca Mt performance assessment.
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FIGURE 18. Europium Loading Effect (8 wt% PuO2)
As the Figure shows, while Eu was able to control criticality for hundreds of thousands of
years, the critical state was ultimately reached. Europium eventually exited the near field
entirely while sufficient U-235 remained. The system required only 0.014 g/cc U-235 to
be present in the alteration layer to go critical. After 1 million years the U-235 concentra-
tion was 0.18 g/cc. Uranium's insolubility and 704 million year half-life assured that it
would remain over the time period examined.
Europium loading can be thought of as an effective method for extending the time to criti-
cality. However, if criticality at any time is viewed as unacceptable, this strategy may not
be sufficient. If an absolute loading limit of 30 wt% Eu is assumed (i.e. a waste glass
loaded only with Eu), for the worst case conditions, Eu will be gone after 13 M years.
The concentration of U-235 will remain well above 0.014 g/cc at this time. If subcritical-
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ity must be assured over this time period, relying solely on dissolved Eu in the glass may
not be sufficient.
The physical mechanisms affecting keff can be elucidated through a detailed examination
of system behavior over time. Figure 19 shows the behavior of keff for a glass with a 1/4
mole ratio Eu/Pu and 8 wt% PuO 2 during glass reaction. Initial glass dissolution and
removal of soluble poison increased the neutron multiplication of the system. After
23,000 years the entire glass had reacted and keff began to drop as Pu-239 decayed to U-
235. This reduction was countered by the removal of Eu. Eventually, Pu-239 completed
decayed and additional Eu losses caused keff to rise to its limiting level, slightly above 1.6.
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FIGURE 19. System Behavior (8 wt% PuO2 with an Eu/
Pu Mole Ratio of 1/4)
400
Reduced plutonium loading can also limit the keff of the system. Figure 20 displays the
keff behavior of the glass at several PuO 2 loadings and 0.65 wt% Eu 20 3 (1/8 mole Pu/Eu
for 8% PuO2 case). Reducing the Pu loading was effective in lowering keff throughout the
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reaction. It was the removal of Eu that allowed keff to rise and criticality to occur in each
case.
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FIGURE 20. Pu Loading Effects( 0.65 wt% Eu20 3)
While reducing the Pu concentration from 8 to 2 wt% pushed the time to criticality to
roughly 225 thousand years, increasing the Eu concentration from 0.65 to 2.6 wt% pushed
the time to criticality to approximately 900 thousand years. While Pu loading was effec-
tive at limiting the maximum reactivity possible, it was the Eu concentration that had the
larger impact on when criticality occurred.
Nonetheless, the potential exists for diluting Pu to a level below which criticality cannot
occur under the worst case conditions. If a radiation barrier were not required, a dilute
waste form could be produced. It was determined that a loading of 0.45 wt% PuO 2 would
keep the initial peak in keff below 1.0 without added reactivity control.47 The benefits of
this approach would have to be weighed against the increase in disposal costs as more than
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6600 additional DWPF size canisters would be produced. The DWPF facility will pro-
duce 6105 canisters of vitrified HLW waste over 20 years of operation (McKibben 1993:
21).
Although not presently under consideration, Pu could be diluted directly with HLW from
the Savannah River Site in order to reduce the total number of canisters produced. The
quantity of Pu that could be diluted below 0.45 wt% would depend on when processing
was begun, as well as the DWPF processing schedule. If DWPF processing were halted in
1997, roughly 5800 canisters would remain unprocessed. In this scenario 43 MT of
WGPu could be diluted below the criticality limit in the remaining HLW and only 26 extra
canisters would be needed.
This would exceed the 8 MT of Pu scheduled to be vitrified but not the 52.7 MT Pu
declared excess. If the DWPF continued to operate, in 5 yrs approximately 4700 canisters
would remain and roughly 35 MT of WGPu could be diluted. Rather than delay DWPF
operations, which may be quite costly and undesirable for safety reasons, the future opera-
tion of a vitrification facility at Hanford, would provide additional HLW for dilution pur-
poses.
In an effort to determine the boron contribution to control, keff was calculated with and
without boron. Figure 21 shows the results for the 8% PuO2 case with no Eu. Under the
bounding conditions the glass went critical with only a fraction of the glass reacted. The
boron in the unreacted glass did not provide significant criticality control. The hydrous
alteration layer loaded with fissile elements was too reactive. It appears that the relevance
of boron in the glass is low for criticality control purposes and additional control is
needed.
47.The U-235 limit in the layer (- 0.014 g/cc U-235) would produce a loading limit of 0.5 wt% U-235 in the
glass. The Pu loading limit is lower as Pu-239 has a higher fission cross section and emits more neutrons
per fission than U-235.
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FIGURE 21. Boron Control (8 wt% PuO2)
In contrast the presence of a moderator had a greater impact on criticality. Figure 22 dis-
plays the keff evolution for the 8% Pu 1/8 Eu/Pu glass at several stages of saturation. This
low Eu glass was chosen purely for illustrative purposes. The observed trend in keff
showed the system to be undermoderated at all times. The spectrum benefits of added
water outweighed the additional hydrogen absorption.
For spheres of Pu-239 and water, it has been shown that undermoderated conditions exist
at concentrations between 0.03 g/cc and 5 g/cc (Knief 1992: 111). For the 8% PuO2 case
the alteration layer concentration was 0.18 g/cc Pu-239. By analogy to the sphere data, the
PuO 2 would have to be reduced to less than 2 wt% for the macroscopic hydrogen absorp-
tion cross section to exceed that for fission.48 The DOE estimated that the bulk loading in
48.Eta (the number of neutrons produced per fission) is also affected by neutron energy and impacts keff.
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FIGURE 22. Saturation Effects on 8 wt% PuO2 with an Eu/Pu
Mole Ratio of 1/8
the glass will be 5 wt % (DOE 1997: 108). Therefore, it is likely that the system will
always be undermoderated.
Figure 22 shows that the alteration layers need not be fully saturated for criticality to
occur. The additional of water produced a more thermal flux through hydrogen scattering.
This spectrum effect is displayed in Figure 23. In the Figure, the group fluxes for the 16
energy groups were plotted. The lowest three groups are in the thermal region (0.003 - 3
eV). Virtually all of the fission occur in these groups. The addition of water sufficiently
increased the thermal neutron flux, thereby causing the system to go critical.
The saturation results also highlighted the significance of bulk alteration layer compo-
nents. As the effective porosity of the gel layer was calculated from the mass remaining
after reaction (the alteration layer), the solubility of other glass components is significant.
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FIGURE 23. Neutron Spectrum at 300 thousand yrs (8 wt%
PuO2 with an Eu/Pu Mole Ratio of 1/8)
The more glass components that are removed, the greater the effective porosity and poten-
tial degree of saturation.
The effect of reducing the bulk dissolution rate was also evaluated. This corresponded to
the scenarios of improved glass performance. As shown in Figure 24, the better perform-
ing glass effectively eliminated the local keff maximum observed during the early stages of
less durable glasses. The effect of Pu-239 decay to U-235 is also masked by the longer-
lived glass. However, as shown in the Figure, even the best glasses of today can not guar-
antee subcriticality indefinitely.49
For the two less durable glasses Eu removal again dictates keff behavior. Figure 25 shows
that as BDR was decreased, the formation of the alteration layers was slowed. As this
increased the layer's exposure to flow, the concentration of Eu drops. For the most dura-
49.Typical values for long-term reaction rates at 900 C are between 0.01 and 0.001 g/m2/d (Lutze 1988: 143).
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FIGURE 24. Durability Effects (8 wt% PuO2 with an Eu/Pu Mole
Ratio of 1/8)
ble case (roughly the expected limit of today's glasses) Eu was completely eliminated
from the layer. In this case it was the rate of reaction itself that limited the time to critical-
ity.
Reducing the volumetric flow rate also had the effect of delaying the time to criticality.
Figure 26 shows that Eu removal was slowed and a more dramatic dip in keff was
observed. As Eu was more soluble than U or Pu, its concentration in the layer was most
affected. As with the bulk dissolution rate, an increase in the time to criticality was
observed with a decrease in this variable. If the volumetric flow is low enough, sufficient
Eu will remain to ensure subcriticality until U-235 has decayed away. However, flow
rates lower that those observed today would be required.
"Expected" Conditions
Having explored system behavior with boundary conditions, calculations based on
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FIGURE 25. Europium Removal From Glasses With Different
Durabilities (Initial Eu Loading of 0.65 wt% Eu 20 3 )
"expected" parameters were performed. The bulk dissolution rate was set at a value of
0.001 g/m 2/d. Today's flow rate of 0.001 m/yr was also used. The assumed solubilities
were not changed. The reference loading for both the can-in-can alternative and homoge-
nous alternatives have been set at a nominal 5 wt % PuO2 . Figure 27 displays the results
from this Pu glass loaded with an equal molar quantity of Eu. While the time scale is
shifted into the tens of millions of years, the system does go critical at approximately 13
million years. An even higher loading of REE could be used or other, stronger control
elements utilized to push this time to criticality farther into the future.
As noted earlier other rare earth elements may be more suited for criticality control. Fig-
ure 28 shows the results from replacing Eu with equal molar amounts of Gd and Sm-
149.50 These isotopes are more effective at reducing keff. Europium was chosen as prior
work identified it as relatively superior at increasing the compressed critical mass of
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FIGURE 26. Flow Effects (8 wt% PuO2 with an Eu/Pu
Mole Ratio of 1/8)
WGPu in an implosion type weapon (Sylvester 1994: 43). However, some combination of
these rare-earths would most likely represent more a more robust solution for repository
criticality control (and may be cheaper that acquiring the purified elements individually).
In order to assure the adequate treatment of resonance absorbers, several calculations were
made using the Monte Carlo transport code MCNP4A. The Monte Carlo method traces
individual particle movements through a specified material composition and geometry.
Statistical distributions are used to predict interactions and thereby system behavior. As
resonance assumptions are not used, MCNP4A was assumed to provide more accurate
results (at a price of computational speed).
Figure 30 is a comparison between SCALE-PC and MCNP4A keff calculations for a dis-
solving glass loaded with 8 wt% PuO 2. The SCALE-PC results were consistently lower
50.Sm-149 is the largest thermal and resonance absorber of the natural Sm isotopes. It only represents 13.8
wt% of natural Sm.
127
1.
1.
1.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0 5 10 15 20
time in millions of years
FIGURE 27. System Behavior Under Expected Conditions
(5 wt% PuO2 with an Eu/Pu Mole Ratio of 1/1)
than those for MCNP4A, but did not deviate by more than 5%. The lower values for
SCALE-PC reflect the somewhat inadequate treatment of resonance absorption in Eu.
Bondarenko factors did not exist for isotopes of this element. As the concentration of Eu
decreased the SCALE-PC results converged to those from MCNP4A. The slight devia-
tions were assumed to be acceptable for the analysis performed here.
4.10.2 Environmental Control
"Worst Case" Conditions
As noted in Section 4.8.4, individual glass components could exist at concentrations other
than those predicted by EQ6 under glass control. Under the assumption of environmental
control, it is assumed that glass elements do not affect solubilities, and phase precipitation
effects on solution chemistry are ignored. This scenario predicted the added precipitation
of Li, which contains the neutron absorber Li-6. In fact, the lithium is so insoluble that it
remains in the alteration layer until U-235 decays.
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FIGURE 28. Gd and Sm-149 (8 wt% PuO2 with an RE/Pu
Mole Ratio of 1/8)
There is sufficient Li-6 in the glass to control long term criticality, but for a loading of 8%
PuO 2 it is not enough to hold down the keff peak 25,000 yrs on its own. Therefore addi-
tional control elements were needed to get over the first maxima in neutron multiplication.
Figure 30 shows the keff profile for a glass loaded with 8 wt% PuO 2and 1/8 mole ratio Eu,
under environmental control. The same curve for tuff control is included for comparison.
"Expected" Conditions
Under "expected" conditions, the bulk dissolution rate and volumetric flow rates were low
enough to avoid the early peak in keff. As Li-6 was taken to be insoluble in this scenario,
criticality was never approached. Therefore the keff behavior of this system under
"expected conditions" was not presented.
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4.11 Conclusions
The potential for a criticality event during borosilicate glass reaction in a repository envi-
ronment does exist. Criticality may occur while much of the glass remains intact or long
after the glass has completely reacted. However, several approaches for addressing criti-
cality concerns can be pursued.
The most obvious approach is to limit the Pu loading in the glass. It is possible, given the
quantity of HLW at Savannah River, to dilute a significant fraction of surplus WGPu to a
concentration below that required for criticality, 0.45 wt% PuO 2. The DOE's Hanford site
also contains quantities of HLW that could be used for this purpose. In this case, the addi-
tion of control elements to the glass would serve to provide added conservatism. Addi-
tional control elements may also be desirable for maintaining subcriticality in the case the
Pu or U should transport and precipitate in the far field. As demonstrated in Section 4.5,
the REE are capable of following actinide elements in such a scenario.
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FIGURE 30. Chemistry Control (8 wt% PuO2 with an Eu/
Pu Mole Ratio of 1/8)
If higher loadings of WGPu are desired, Eu or other rare earths can effectively delay the
onset of criticality. The model showed that relatively small amounts of an insoluble
absorber can delay criticality for hundreds of thousands of years. At a minium, REE
loading should be added in sufficient quantities to control reactivity through the early keff
peak that could result under worst case conditions.
Additional REE could be added to meet regulated time requirements for subcriticality.
While the time to criticality is an important glass design criteria there is no regulatory
guidance on the matter.
"There are no regulatory guides, DOE orders, or even any general agree-
ment on the length of time for which criticality prevention must be guaran-
teed in a geologic repository. For groundwater contamination by
radioactivity, EPA, and NRC regulations specify up to a 10,000-year period
of contamination-free performance, but are silent on the subject of a
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required criticality-free period. At the other extreme, 2,000,000 years has
been mentioned as a possible goal for criticality-free performance" (McK-
ibben 1993:9).
The analyses presented here shows that even with Eu added to the glass, subcritcal condi-
tions cannot be guaranteed indefinitely for the expected loading of Pu in glass. If multi-
million year assurances of subcriticality are needed under worst case conditions, alternate
strategies may be necessary. These strategies should incorporate what was demonstrated
to be important neutronic factors in this system.
Of utmost importance for subcriticality of the reacted glass is the aqueous chemistry. For
example, if the Li-6 already present in the glass were to form the insoluble phase petalite,
even the 8 wt% PuO 2 glass would remain subcritical forever. The petalite would remain
in sufficient quantities to control reactivity until the U-235 decays away - after approxi-
mately 7 billion years. Recognizing this, a high Al glass could be designed such that Li in
the glass and the groundwater would be precipitated. In any regard solution chemistry
will play a major role in the neutronic behavior of the system.
Other insoluble absorbers could be used in concert with or in place of Eu. Gadolinium and
Sm-149 were briefly explored here. However, as noted in Figure 28, the ultimate effec-
tiveness of all absorbers will be determined by their ability to remain commingled with the
fissile elements.
To improve their effectiveness, REE could be dissolved in high concentrations in the
glass. Alternatively, a mixed-phase ceramic of the type described in Section 4.7 could be
utilized. A glass tailored to produce a more durable, crystalline host phase for the REE
may be more desirable.
Complete reaction of the REE to form the crystalline phase in such a matrix may not be
needed or desired. As shown in the analyses only small amounts of an absorber are
needed to control reactivity in the near-field. Moreover, if colloids are shown to form as a
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result of glass reaction, an appropriate amount of REE may be needed in the amorphous
phase in order to transport with Pu or U colloids.
Porosity is of equal importance. At the Pu concentrations expected and without thermal
absorbers present, the system will be undermoderated. If the majority of the glass compo-
nents remained in the near-field and/or swelled, water could be excluded from the region.
This would reduce moderation and thereby keff.
This strikes upon another possible advantage of a non-HLW glass alternative of the type
proposed in Section 3.6. If a can-in-can design were utilized, the remaining voids could
be filled with a substance such as a monazite concentrate (from sand) which has high rare
earth concentrations, rather than HLW glass. This would add both criticality control and
weight to the container (added proliferation resistance). Monazite could also be used as a
backfill material. Monazite concentrates from Florida beach sand (produced via a caustic
soda process) contain about 70% monazite (Benedict 1981: 299). Of this 40% are REE
oxides.
Such a design would provide regulatory benefits as well. As noted in Section 3.3, the reg-
ulatory acceptance of a vitrified Pu form is unknown. The analysis hear has shown that it
could be dependent on the time frame of regulatory interest. The modular nature of a can-
in-can variant, without HLW, could be use to address changing regulatory time require-
ments. For example, the ratio of Pu cans to REE filler could be easily modified to suit reg-
ulatory requirements.
In sum, near-field subcriticality of a Pu loaded glass could be assured over extremely long
periods of geologic storage, but not indefinitely. High loadings of neutron absorbers
expected to be insoluble over the range of groundwater conditions expected in a repository
should be included in the glass or alternate host matrix. To complement such a strategy,
fabricated REE host phases (or monazite sand) of known insolubility could be used both
in the waste package and as backfill to address near-field criticality concerns. Implemen-
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tation strategies that would simplify design modification should regulatory requirements
change and/or new data becomes available, also appear valuable.
4.12 Future Work
The analysis presented here was an approach to model a complex system over extreme
time periods. Many model parameters are important but elemental solubilities and identi-
fication of associated phases appear to be the most significant. The thermodynamic data-
bases for each of the relevant radionuclides must be further developed to ensure
completeness. The robustness of control solubilities must be examined over all ranges of
pH, Eh and temperature. Additional complexation reactions as well as sorption and radi-
olysis effects should be investigated and included in the model. These processes and their
order of reaction may produce meaningful differences in elemental behavior.
Continued investigation of colloid formation and transport should also be pursued. As Pu,
U, and the REE have been shown to form colloids this could provide an important mecha-
nism for control separation. While criticality has been shown to be possible without the
presence of colloids, their formation could shorten the time to criticality. Of particular
interest would be the re-wetting behavior of colloids. During dry periods, colloids may be
sorbed on surfaces and their transport limited. This may reduce the impact of colloid for-
mation.
While short-term glass dissolution modeling would benefit from basic research on the rate
controlling reaction for glass dissolution, a more detailed assessment of alteration layer
phase formation, composition and stability would be more beneficial for the criticality
assessment. In the criticality assessment we are more interested in what remains in the
near field and the robustness of alteration phase stability.
Bulk properties of the alteration layers should also be assessed. It was shown that porosity
is an important criticality parameter. The void space in various glasses should be
assessed. The mechanical properties of the layer are also important as they will impact the
reacted glass geometry which will affect neutron leakage.
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Criticality issues may also affect the emplacement of the logs themselves. The analysis
performed here assumed a single log emplacement. If multiple logs are to be co-located
reactivity may be increased. Calculations should be performed to ensure adequate control
in such an array.
135
5.0 Financial Compensation for Russian Pu
The preceeding chapters have been devoted to the desirability and technical feasibility of
the vitrification alternative. To be applied in Russia, vitrification will have to address a
major political hurdle as well - the fuel value of WGPu.
Russia wishes to save her Pu for future use as reactor fuel. To burn the Pu, Russia will
have to make additional investments in its nuclear infrastructure. It currently lacks the
capital to do so. While the US favors processing the Pu into spent fuel, it is unwilling to
contribute billions of dollars for facilities that, when operated as designed, run counter to
the stated US policy of discouraging a Pu fuel cycle.
The vitrification alternative could be supported by the US but is flatly rejected by the Rus-
sian government as it treats the Pu as waste - ignoring its potential value as reactor fuel. It
would appear that for vitrificiton to be implemented in Russia, Russia must be compen-
sated for the fuel value of her WGPu. But what is WGPu worth? 5 1
Recent evaluations place the present value of WGPu at zero due to the low price of ura-
nium fuels and high price of plutonium fuel fabrication (Chow 1993: 75). It is simply
cheaper to use uranium fuels. However, this may not always be the case. Perhaps Russia
values Pu not for its current worth but for its potential value in the future. By adopting
this view they are in effect valuing Pu as a call option on nuclear fuel. An asset of this
type will produce a positive cash flow if the value of uranium fuel is above a certain price
on a specified date. Realizing this, we have found an alternative, market based mecha-
nism for valuing Pu that should be acceptable to Russia.
Assigning a derivative value to WGPu gives the US a reasoned mechanism to compensate
Russia and thereby promote Pu disposition. Compensation may be in the form of a cash
payment or a portfolio that replicates the potential cash flows from holding WGPu. The
51.Some might argue that a purchase of WGPu would not be an option as, unlike HEU, it cannot be dena-
tured prior to delivery. However Russia offered to send HEU to the US as HEU if it would speed pay-
ment (Allison 1996).
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latter allows Russia to retain her hedged position in the nuclear fuels market without
stockpiling Pu. The former could provide Russia with hard currency. The remainder of
this chapter focuses on the details of such a proposal and how it might fit into a surplus
plutonium disposition strategy.
5.1 Plutonium Value Relative to Uranium
Assigning a market value to plutonium is difficult. Not only because Pu is not traded, but
also because it can be used as fuel for nuclear weapons. This military value is virtually
incalculable. The valuation performed here is for WGPu that has been retired from mili-
tary service as a result of arms control agreements. It is assumed that these agreements
effectively eliminate the weapon value of this material. It is the remaining commodity
value of plutonium that is assessed in this work.
One approach could be to value Pu based on its ability to defer future reprocessing
charges. As such charges are significant ($540-$720/kg uranium in spent fuel), a sizable
value could be assigned to the Pu.52 However, such an approach is problematic. The tim-
ing of reprocessing and thereby a schedule for plutonium burning would be needed.
While the value of surplus Pu may indeed depend on such factors, agreeing on the valua-
tion terms seems precarious. Virtually any schedule could be promoted. A reasoned
approach that ties Pu value to market forces rather than a government's energy policy ini-
tiatives may be more attractive.
By relating the value of Pu to a traded commodity a market assessment can be made. If
plutonium fuel is assumed to be a close substitute for uranium fuel, its worth in the market
must be related to uranium.
To produce LEU fuel, uranium and a variety of services are needed. The cost components
of LEU fuel are:
52.Cost data taken from OECD(1994: 50).
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CLEU = LEU + CON + SWU + FAB
where ULE U is the cost of the required ore, CON the conversion cost (from U30 8 to UF 6 for
enrichment), swu the enrichment cost and FAB the fabrication cost. These factors are rep-
resented here in units of $/kg heavy metal of LEU. For 4% enriched fuel, enrichment ser-
vices presently represent 40% of the unit costs with ore purchases contributing roughly
30%.
Today, fabricated plutonium fuel is most often burned as low-enriched, mixed-oxide
(MOX) form. Equation 7 shows the cost of MOX fuel as a function of Pu production cost
(Pu), the cost of uranium ore diluent (uMox), and MOX fabrication costs (Mox).
CMOX = Pu + UMO x + MOX (EQ 7)
Assuming these commodities are close substitutes (i.e. 1 kg LEU is interchangeable with
1 kg of MOX fuel of the same fissile atom density), their price in the market place should
be equal. This gives:
ULEU+CON + SWU + FAB = Pu + UMO + MOX (EQ 8)
or, rearranging,
Pu = ULEU + CON + SWU + FAB - UMOX
- 
MOX (EQ 9)
Equation 9 gives the value of the Pu contained in 1 kg HM of MOX fuel based on its abil-
ity to avoid uranium fuel expenditures. Its actual market value may be much lower due to
supply and demand factors. This appears to be the case today as none of the world's plu-
tonium burners have offered to purchase Russia's plutonium. This is true even though (as
will be noted later) the equation assigns a present value to the plutonium.
A few notes should be made concerning the "interchangeable" assumption used to derive
Equation 9. There are two aspects of this assumption. The first is neutronic in nature.
Uranium 235 behaves differently in a reactor than does plutonium 239. Plutonium's
higher fission cross section and eta factor (fission neutrons produced per neutron
absorbed) may give it an initially higher reactivity worth. However, as the fuel is burned
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(EQ 6)
higher isotopes of Pu are produced. Buildup of parasitic Pu isotopes and the higher aver-
age cross section of Pu fission products combine to effectively eliminate any benefit (Cor-
rea 1979: 40-41 and 81-84). Therefore from a perspective of energy production in thermal
reactors, Pu-239 and U-235 are essentially equal.
The second assumption relates to the actual use of MOX fuel and uranium fuel in reactors.
It is assumed that reactors are available that can easily interchange Pu and U fuels. This is
not presently the case. Most reactors today are not licensed for MOX fuel. Added reactiv-
ity control would be needed and, for partial MOX cores, care must be taken to avoid
power peaking in the Pu rods caused by resonance absorption in Pu-239. The cost of these
activities is not included in this evaluation.
The lack of demand for Pu can be explained by the relatively low numbers of MOX reac-
tors and rising stocks of separated Pu. However, this situation could change. If MOX
capacity rises and Pu stocks are reduced, Pu value could rise. It is this scenario that a
strategy of holding Pu could produce revenues. While competition between future Pu pro-
ducers may constrain the market price, the maximum payoff will be limited by the price of
the substitute uranium fuel. If we can identify an asset that produces payoffs in exactly the
same way, it must have the same price. A call option on uranium is such an asset.
5.2 Plutonium as a Uranium Derivative
A European call option gives the holder the right to purchase something for at a fixed
price on a future date. (An American option may be executed any time prior to the 'strike'
date.) If the price at that time is higher than this 'strike' price, the holder of the option
receives the difference. Plutonium is equivalent to a call option on uranium fuel. Hold-
ing on to it pays off when the price of uranium fuel is above a certain level.
The future value of uranium fuel (and thereby Pu) will depend largely on the price of ura-
nium and SWU. These two components are and will continue to be the greatest contribu-
tors to the cost of LEU fuel. Other costs are service charges which may change over time,
but if Pu is to dramatically increase in value it will be due to increases in these two factors.
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In this thesis plutonium is valued as a derivative on uranium only. Including enrichment
costs would require valuing a "basket" option of uranium ore and enrichment services
(Nelken 1996: 161). This is beyond the present scope of this work and SWU was there-
fore assumed constant with time. The potential effect of SWU volatility on option price is
discussed qualitatively.
If SWU is held constant, the price of uranium ore alone will determine the future price of
uranium fuel. Plutonium can therefore be valued as a call option on uranium ore. To
price an option, the expected behavior of prices over time is needed. This information is
used to assess the likelihood that an option will pay off. This section describes the com-
mon assumptions used in derivative theory.
5.2.1 A Price Path for Uranium
In order to value a derivative security it is necessary to understand how the price of the
underlying asset moves (in this case uranium ore). One can then produce a distribution for
the expected price of the asset at some future time. By combining the probabilities the
asset will reach a certain price with information about how the market prices the risk asso-
ciated with the asset, it becomes possible to value the derivative.
The economists Black and Scholes derived the equation for pricing derivatives on assets
that follow geometric Brownian motions. Brownian motions possess three characteristics:
a future value dependent only on its present value (Markov property); a probability distri-
bution for the change in the process independent of any other separate period (indepen-
dent increments); and changes in value of the asset are normally distributed with a
variance that increases linearly with time (Dixit 1994: 63).
For stocks and other assets, this last aspect must be finessed as the price of a stock cannot
fall below zero (normally distributed changes would allow for negative stock prices). It is
therefore assumed that changes in price are lognormally distributed, or alternatively
stated, changes in the logarithm of price are normally distributed. This is done by model-
ling the logarithm of price as a Brownian motion, not the price itself.
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If we assume uranium ore follows a Brownian motion, we produce an equation for
changes in the price of uranium ore (u $/lb) of the following form:
dU = a(U, t) dt + b(U, t) dz (EQ 10)
The first term on the right hand side is the expected change in price over time and the sec-
ond is a stochastic factor. The dz is the Wiener process Feid, where E is a random drawing
from a standardized normal distribution. It is this random sampling that makes the future
price uncertain.
If we further assume that a (u, t) = cU and b (U, t) = a we produce the geometric Brown-
ian motion:
dU
U -gdt + odz (EQ 11)
where g is the expected return over dt, and a is the volatility.
Volatility represents the uncertainty we have about the asset's price movement. Sigma
squared is the variance 'rate' of the fractional change in price. The higher the volatility
the greater the spread of possible future prices.
It has been argued that a geometric Brownian motion is an inappropriate path for a deple-
table natural resource. Indeed theoretical arguments have been made stating that, under
realistic conditions, natural resources simply do not behave in such a manner (Lund 1993).
A mean-reverting process may be more justifiable. Nonetheless, geometric Brownian
motions are used in practice for pricing options on resources such as oil. 53 The objective
here is to demonstrate a derivative pricing methodology for WGPu disposition, not to con-
tribute to the debate on natural resource price paths.
53.Interview with Professor Vadeem Linetsky, University of Michigan Financial Engineering Program, June
6, 1996.
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5.2.2 Pricing a Uranium Derivative
Having fixed the mechanism for the price movement of an asset it becomes possible to
value a derivative asset. Black and Scholes were the first to derive and solve a pricing for-
mula for a derivative security (Black 1973). Their approach, now considered the standard
for option pricing, begins by expanding the instantaneous change in the value of a deriva-
tive using Ito's Lemma (the fundamental theorem of stochastic calculus). As the value of
the derivative depends only on the underlying asset (u) and time (t) this gives:
ac ac 1 C 2 2 aC
'C = (agu 2U+ + 2yU )dt+-j-oUd; (EQ 12)
where c is the value of the derivative. This formula can be derived by taking a first-order
Taylor's expansion of dc, inserting the geometric Brownian motion for dU, and rearrang-
ing terms.
The uncertainty in option value is reflected by the dz in the second term of Equation 12.
By noting that the underlying asset is dependent on the same uncertainty (see Eq. 11), a
portfolio of the derivative and the asset can be constructed such that this dz is eliminated.
As the return on the portfolio is then certain, it should equal the risk-free rate of return.
Equating the two produces a deterministic partial differential equation for the option
value. Solving this equation with the appropriate boundary conditions gives the desired
relationship. 54
The Black-Scholes equation for a European call option is:
C = UN(d1 ) -Xe-r(T-t) N(d 2 ) (EQ 13)
where
54.The most important boundary condition sets the value of the option at the strike date equal to (U(T) - X)
if U(T) is greater than or equal to X, or zero if U(T) is less than X. U(T) is the price of uranium at time T.
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In )+ (r+G)(T-t)
d2
dl = Ya TF -- t
2 2d2 a[Tln( t+r- 2 )(T- t)
and N (x) is the cumulative probability distribution function for a standardized normal
variable.
These equations give the value of the call as a function of the stock's current price (u), its
volatility (a), the continuously compounded risk-free rate of return (r), and the terms of
the contract - its strike price (x), and date (T) as measured relative to today's date (t).
The above equation is valid for any non-dividend-paying stock. However, a commodity
held for consumption purposes (such as uranium) may posses an inherent dividend. This
is because the holder of a commodity typically assigns an added value (or dividend) to
physically holding the asset. The magnitude of this effect can be seen through an exami-
nation of forward prices for the commodity. A forward contract is a contract to sell the
underlying asset at a fixed price on a future date. It is an obligation not an option.
The forward price (the price the asset will be sold for at time T) is related to the current
price by (Hull 1996: 67):
F • Ue(r+s) (T-t) (EQ 14)
The right hand side of this relation is the cost of purchasing the commodity today and
storing it until the execution date. (Storage costs (s) have been expressed as a cost pro-
portional to the price of uranium). If this amount was less than the forward price, riskless
profits could be made by entering into the short position of the forward agreement (i.e.
agreeing to sell) and immediately covering your position by buying and storing the asset.
As this arbitrage situation cannot hold for long, the forward price has an upper bound.
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For commodities held only for investment, the relation in Equation 14 becomes an equal-
ity. Here storage costs are viewed as inevitable so that selling the commodity would pro-
duce an immediate dividend in the form of avoided storage costs. An amount equal to the
revenue from the sale (and the present value of avoided storage costs) could be invested at
the risk-free rate and used to fulfill the contract position. This too produces a risk-free
profit and sets a lower bound. As this is the same price as the upper bound, a single for-
ward price is determined.
However, for consumption commodities the inequality still holds as a lower bound cannot
be fixed by an arbitrage argument. In this case storage costs are not a foregone conclusion
(e.g. the commodity may be consumed) and the holder may assign additional benefits to
physically holding the commodity. This convenience yield, by definition, represents the
degree of inequality in Equation 14. Including this dividend (y) in the relation forces:
F= Se(r+s - y ) (T-t) (EQ 15)
The total dividend for consumption commodities is therefore q = -s + y. By looking at for-
ward prices in the marketplace we can determine if indeed a dividend does exist.
A standard industry pricing practice allows us to determine uranium's dividend yield with-
out dissecting recently inked forward contracts. In the uranium industry, forward prices
are closely tied to spot prices. A standard approach, termed "base escalation", is to add $1-
2 to the current spot price and escalate this value to the forward date (Fuller 1995: 16). If
this initial increase is expressed as a fraction (B) of the current stock price we arrive at the
following equation for the forward price:
F = (U+BU)ei(T- t) (EQ 16)
The escalation factor (i) is typically taken to be the gross national product implicit price
deflator.55 If this factor is known, the following relation holds:
55.Separate communications with Dr. Thomas Neff and Ms. Treva Klingbiel of TradeTech in June, 1996.
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or
In(l+B) = (r+s-y-i) (T-t) (EQ17)
If B is small and (T-t) is large
(r+s-y-i) =0 (EQ 18)
Therefore, inserting q into the relation gives;
q = -s+y = r-i (EQ 19)
Equation 19 shows that as long as the risk-free rate of return differs from the escalation
rate, uranium will posses an inherent dividend.
Extending the Black-Scholes equation to cover dividend-paying stocks is straight forward
(Hull 1996: 261). If the underlying stock pays a dividend over a time period, it effectively
reduces the price the stock would have reached by the amount of the dividend. Therefore,
if we deflate the current stock price by this amount we can value the derivative on a divi-
dend-paying stock.
The Black-Scholes equation for a European call option on a dividend-paying stock
becomes (for uranium):
c = Ue N-q(T-t)N(dl) -Xe -r(T-t)N(d 2) (EQ 20)
where
In( + r-q + (T- t)di= (YIT•-•- t
ln +(r-q- G(T-t)
2- • d 1 -•Tt
This version of the Black-Scholes equation uses the same variables described previously
with u being the price of one pound of uranium ore. (The option can be sized to any
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i(T-t) (r+s-y) (T-t)(U+BU) e = Ue
amount of uranium.) If these variables are known a price for a uranium option can be cal-
culated.
5.2.3 Terms of the Option
Having developed a theoretical basis, a uranium option can now be valued. What is
needed are the required inputs. This section gives a description of the data used in the
analysis and how it was determined.
5.2.4 Strike Price
The strike price should be set at the uranium ore price which makes cLEU = CMOX. This
value was determined by varying the price of uranium ore until the cost of one kg of 4
wt% enriched uranium fuel equaled the cost of one kg of MOX fuel of the same enrich-
ment (on a fissile atom density basis, assuming free WGPu). Using the values in Table 8
and Equation 9, the break even strike price was calculated to be $8.84/lb U308 . Having
access to uranium ore at this price is equivalent to having access to free plutonium.
TABLE 8. Nuclear Fuel Cost dataa
UF6 Mixed-
SWU Conversion Fabrication Oxide Fab
($/SWU) ($/kg U) ($/kg U) ($/kg HM)
110 8 275 1100
a. data taken from OECD (1994: 50)
The current price of U308 was taken to be $16.50 per lb.56 As this is higher than the
break even price, this methodology assigns weapons grade plutonium a current value of
$4.87/g or $244M for 50 tonnes. But this value could only be realized if the Pu could be
used to offset uranium fuel purchases today, which it cannot. Again, WGPu will only
have commercial value when it can be used as commercial fuel.
56.Interview with Ms. Treva Klingbiel of TradeTech.
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Strike Date
The strike date for the option is open to negotiation. It should represent the time at which
Russia is able to monetize the value of its Pu. For illustrative purposes I will choose 10
years from today. This number was chosen to represent the shortest time frame that global
stockpiles of RGPu could be reduced to a point where Pu from Russia may be desired for
fuel.
Volatility
Uranium volatility must be estimated from its price history. Volatility is the standard devi-
ation of returns divided by the square root of the time period spanned. Monthly price data
from NUEXCO were used for this calculation. Uranium's estimated volatility changes
with time. Table 9 shows its volatility over several time periods. The price data from 1986
to 1996 were used to calculate the volatility in the base case analysis. 57
TABLE 9. Uranium Ore Volatilitiesa
1/70 - 1/96 1/86 - 1/96 1/76 - 1/86 1/91 - 1/96
volatility 14.7% 16.4% 11.6% 15.1%
(1/sqrt yr)
a. volatilities calculated from Exchange Values published by
TradeTech
Risk Free Rate and Inflation Rate
In order to price the option, estimates of the risk-free rate and inflation rate are also
needed. The risk-free rate was assumed to be 8% per year. The escalation rate was taken
to be 5%. By Equation 19, this gives a continuous dividend of 3%. These values are were
assumed to be representative and will be varied to gauge their importance.
57.Hull (1996: 233) notes that the volatility should be calculated over a period of time equal to to the time
period over which it is to be applied.
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Summary of Base Case Values
Table 10 provides a summary of the base case values used in this analysis.
TABLE 10. Base Case Values Used in BS Equations
Current U308 risk-free strike strike escalation
Price volatility rate price date rate
$16.50/lb 16.4 % 8% $8.84/lb 10 yrs 5%
5.2.5 Results
Using these inputs, the price of a call option on one pound of U308 was found to be $8.27.
To convert this into a Pu value we must consider the size of the contract (i.e. the amount of
ore covered). First we must calculate the uranium required to produce a quantity of LEU
fuel equivalent to what the WGPu could have produced. We then subtract the amount of
uranium ore that would have been needed in any regard for diluting the Pu in MOX fuel.
Fifty tonnes (MT) of WGPu could be used to produce approximately 1409 MT of MOX
fuel (@ a fissile atom density equivalent to 4% U-235 enrichment). To produce 1409 MT
of low enriched uranium fuel, 35.3 million lbs of U308 is needed. The MOX fuel would
require 3.53 million lbs. This leaves a net amount of 31.8M lbs. The option contract
should be sized to cover this amount of uranium ore. This gives a total value of $263M for
50 MT of WGPu.
Interestingly , for the base case values WGPu is more valuable as a potential fuel than if it
were utilized today. If the WGPu could be substituted for 4% LEU fuel today it would
have a current value of $244M. This is less than the option value calculated above.
Therefore even if Russia could sell the fuel today, the expected revenue from the material
would be greater is she stored it (assuming no storage costs).
However storing WGPu is not free. While the uranium option replicates the potential ben-
efits from holding WGPu, it does not replicate all costs. Storage may be quite costly due
to safety and security issues. The cost of storing WGPu must be subtracted from the calcu-
lated value of the option.58
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Including the cost of WGPu storage has a dramatic effect. Cost estimates for Pu storage
range from 430-2000 $/kg/yr.59 If a storage cost of $400/kg/yr is assumed for ten years, a
present value cost of $132M is incurred. This reduces the value of 50 MT of WGPu to
$131M. If storage costs are assumed to be $1000/kg/yr, storage costs rise to $331M. This
eliminates the entire value of the Pu. Therefore, unless storage costs are assumed to be
low, the option value of plutonium is minimal. Figure 31 shows the value of the option
relative to three low estimates for Pu storage costs.
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FIGURE 31. Storage Cost Effects on Option Value
Extending the duration of the option reduces its value while increasing the storage costs.
As seen in Figure 31, for short term (10 year) contracts and low storage costs, the value of
the uranium option exceeds storage costs. Eventually, however, storage costs dominate.
Therefore the combination of strike date and storage costs are primary factors for valuing
WGPu.
58.1 will assume no convenience yield for the plutonium. Convenience yields result from the ability to keep
a production process running or profit from temporary shortages. Relative to the amount of RGPu the
Russians have in stock the WGPu is a small fraction. It will not be a production factor. They also cannot
profit from temporary shortages as there is currently no market for Pu sales.
59.Lower value taken from Chow (1993: 69), higher value take from OECD(1994: 40).
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The way option value changes with duration is due to the market's estimation of future
uranium prices as evidenced in the forward prices. These prices reflect uranium's inherent
dividend. It is this dividend rate that determines the option response to duration.
The role of the dividend in calculating option value is shown in Equation 20. The equa-
tion shows that the dividend rate governs the reduction in the current stock price and alters
the cumulative normal values. For the uranium option, q is estimated as r - i. For the ref-
erence case, q is greater than zero. The dividend therefore reduces the probability that the
option will finish in the money by decreasing the cumulative normal values. However, the
reduction is small as the low strike price virtually assures option execution.
The greater reduction in option value comes from the modification of uranium's current
price. When calculating the value of the option, the stock price is discounted by the divi-
dends paid over the life of the option. This reduces the expected payoff (relative to a non-
dividend-paying stock) and thereby the value of the option. Increasing the duration of the
option only magnifies the effect.
Figure 32 shows the value of the option for three escalation rates as a function of option
duration for a constant r. This figure demonstrates the dividend effect. For the no divi-
dend case (i.e. i=r), the option approaches an asymptotic value; the current price of the ore
covered by the contract. The determination of the dividend rate (through estimations of r
and i) is essential to determine the value of the option and the effect of option duration.
It may be the case that the escalation rate is found to be higher than the risk-free rate. This
would give uranium a negative dividend. This would cause the value of the option to
increase in an unbounded manner. The option evaluated here cannot possess this behav-
ior. If Pu storage costs (which are higher than uranium storage costs) were expressed as a
fraction of uranium price rather than an explicit fixed annual cost as it is treated here, the
option would again be bounded. For this reason escalation values that would give a nega-
tive dividend were not evaluated.
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FIGURE 32. Option Value Dependence on Strike Date
The risk-free rate has multiple impacts on the value of the Pu. Figure 33 displays the
effect of interest rate on option value and storage costs. As noted earlier, the dividend rate
is proportional to the interest rate. Therefore as interest rates rise, dividends increase
which has the effect of reducing the expected growth of uranium price. The payoff of the
option at time T is also discounted at a higher level. This combination decreases the value
of the uranium option as interest rates increase. Increasing interest rates cause storage
costs to decrease as future costs are discounted at a higher level. However, the net effect is
a reduced value of Pu as the value of the option is reduced by a larger amount. shows this
effect for the base case values.
The value of the option is relatively insensitive to the volatility estimates as shown in Fig-
ure 34 (note the scale). The figure shows that as the volatility increases (over the range of
values in Table 9), the value of the uranium option increases slightly with volatility . The
effect is limited due to the low strike price which almost assures option execution. Rela-
tive to the selection of a strike date, the inflation rate, and the risk-free rate of return, vola-
tility has a small effect on the value of the option.
151
I,
~
2,
3.108
Option_Value( r, i)
StorageCost (r, 500 k-yr)
-0-
2010 8
StorageCost (r, 400 1 2 10
Storage_Cost (r, 300. _1yr)
-e ky1108
0.06 0.08
FIGURE 33. Risk Free Interest Rate Effects on Option Value
2.65.108
2.64.108
Option_Value ( o, X)
2.63*108
2.62 108 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17
FIGURE 34. Volatility Effects on Option Value
152
--- e r- -- -G _
-0 I -- _ e - B )-
I I I
I
5.3 Discussion
The derivative analysis reveals several significant facts. Depending on storage costs, sur-
plus WGPu may have value even if it cannot be utilized today. What we do know is that
this value is bounded. Figure 32 shows the option value heading towards an asymptotic
limit. This value is $524 million for an option with an infinite strike date.
Storage costs are bounded as well but can be much higher than the option value. Assum-
ing a low storage cost of $400/kg/yr, infinite storage would have a perpetuity cost of
$250M. At a storage price of $1000/kg/yr the cost of storing WGPu exceeds the maxi-
mum value of the option. Storage costs are capable of eliminating any market value of the
material.
The low strike price means the option will quite likely be executed. This means the price
of the option is roughly the difference between the escalated price (from the forward
prices) and the strike price, discounted at the risk-free rate. Unless the strike price is
increased significantly the probability that the option will be exercised will remain high.
The strike price/break even price should be calculated using cost data valid at the time of
execution of the contract. These values were assumed to be constant for this analysis.
While these values will certainly change, there appears to be no reasoned way to inflate or
deflate the values.
To account for shifting costs of other fuel inputs (namely the price of SWU) a different
option should be valued. The payoff of this option would be a function of these costs as
well as uranium. Such an option is termed a "basket option" as it represents a basket of
assets rather than just one (Nelken 1996: 161).
It is not clear whether the basket option would assign a higher value to Pu or not. It will
depend on the market's expectation of price movement for each individual cost and the
correlations between them (Hull 1996: 305-307). A basket option for this problem is
being pursued.
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To obtain the rights to Russian WGPu, the US could write this call and give it to Russia or
give her the cash equivalent. While the cash transfer would be the simplest to execute, the
US would probably favor giving them the option contract. This would avoid arguments
over the appropriate duration and storage costs needed to price the contract. However, the
US would be accepting the risk of uranium price escalation. The next section will provide
a discussion of how the US may reduce its exposure.
5.4 Hedging the US Position
If the US writes a call option on uranium it may desire a hedging strategy to avoid the
associated risk. A simple solution would be to simply purchase the uranium call that they
have bartered away. This would eliminate the risk (as the short position would be matched
by the newly acquired long position). Unfortunately derivatives are not traded on ura-
nium. This effectively eliminates this approach, but there are others.
5.4.1 Synthetic Hedge
When an option cannot be purchased directly it is necessary to "create a protective posi-
tion through trading strategies that replicate the payoffs to the protective position" (Bodie
1993: 693). We again turn to Black and Scholes for assistance. Although the asset is not
traded, we can use their equations to determine how the theoretical option's price would
behave if it did.
What we are interested in is how the option's value would change as the price of uranium
changes. This is termed the option's "hedge ratio "or "delta" and is found by differentiat-
ing Equation 13 with respect to the price of uranium. This yields the following equation:
acA = = N(dj) (EQ 21)
We then must create a portfolio that behaves in an equal and opposite manner. For exam-
ple if a call option has a delta of 0.8, a $1 increase in the price of the underlying asset
would cause the value of the option to increase by $0.80. We now must find a portfolio
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that would respond the same way to an increase in asset price. Holding that portfolio will
be equivalent to holding the option itself.
Holding a specific amount of uranium today would provide the necessary hedge. The base
case option has a delta of 0.735. To make its portfolio "delta neutral", the US must pur-
chase 0.735 lbs of ore for every pound covered by the option.
Figure 35 shows the behavior of delta with changing price. The curve approaches an
asymptotic value less than one. Therefore only a fraction of total ore is needed to entirely
hedge the position. This is due to the implied dividend that will be realized by the holder
of the uranium. These payments, invested over the life of the option, reduce the amount of
material needed to assure adequate resources at the execution date. The corresponding
amount of uranium is roughly equivalent to 47 reactor-yrs worth of fuel. Such a purchase
would appear feasible as the market frequently deals in contracts of this size.60
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FIGURE 35. The Effect of the Price of Uranium on the
Hedge Ratio
It should be noted that in practice, hedging any non-traded option can be difficult. It is a
dynamic process. The delta of the option will change over the life of the option. As it
60.Near-term transactions in the US are typically on the order of 100,000 lb of ore. Long-term (> 1 yr but
less than 10) contracts are typically for 1 million lbs of U308 .
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changes the portfolio must be rebalanced. In addition, merely holding the underlying
commodity will not remove all risks. The value of the option is sensitive to volatility and
interest rate changes that cannot be hedged using the underlying asset. Nonetheless, delta
hedging is an important mechanism for reducing risk.
Fortunately the US may already possess the hedge it needs. It is in the form of another
weapons usable material - highly enriched uranium (HEU). The prospect of using the
material as a de facto hedge is explored in the following section.
5.4.2 A Highly Enriched Uranium Hedge
Arms control agreements have made available large amounts of HEU in both the US and
Russia. Two hundred tonnes of HEU in the US arsenal is scheduled to be retired. In addi-
tion, the US has entered into a contract with Russia to purchase HEU from weapons,
blended down to LEU fuel for reactors. As a result the US government already possesses
or has contracted for vast quantities of uranium. In fact, either source alone can easily ful-
fill hedging requirements.
HEU of US Origin
In contrast to WGPu disposition, US plans for the disposition of surplus HEU have pro-
gressed rapidly. The US Department of Energy has issued a record of decision for the
roughly 200 MT of HEU declared "surplus to defense needs" by President Clinton (DOE
1996a). The US plans to blend this material with natural uranium to denature the material.
Approximately 85% of this HEU will then be sold on the commercial nuclear fuel market.
The US is expected to net a profit of $340 to $770 million from the sale. The projected
profit and technical ease of HEU disposition has put it on a fast track for implementation.
The government may nonetheless have to wait to receive this windfall. A provision in the
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Privatization Act requires the DOE to sell
the fuel in a manner that has no adverse impacts on the domestic nuclear fuel industry.6 1
61.USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-134, SS 3112(d)(2)(B)
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The DOE must also factor in the sale of blended Russian HEU in the US market when it
decides to sell this fuel. As a result sales are likely to be spread over a 15 - 20 years and
perhaps longer.
The delayed sale of fuel could serve as the hedge for the option contract. Storage of ura-
nium fuel for decades is a long position in uranium. A cost comparison performed by the
DOE estimated that the average enrichment of the 170 MT of HEU available for blending
and commercial sale is 50% (DOE 1996b). This material could be blended to produce up
to 2125 MT of LEU fuel of 4% enrichment. This is much more than the 1409 MT of LEU
covered by the option contract. Incredibly, the surplus HEU the government already owns
would completely cover this option contract.
HEU of Russian Origin
An even larger amount of uranium fuel will come under US government possession during
the next two decades. In February of 1993 the US government agreed to purchase 500 MT
of HEU (blended down to LEU) from Russia over a 20 year period (Allison 1996: 229).
What the US really agreed to do was to allow an enrichment company it owned to buy and
sell the fuel. The formal contract was signed the following year between Minatom and
the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the legislated broker of the deal. This
contract gave USEC the exclusive right to purchase up to 10 MT annually for the first five
years and 30 MT annually for the following 15 years. The objective of the deal is to
increase US security by easing the way for Russia to denature her HEU.
Domestic concerns have hampered the execution of this agreement as designed. The
increased sale of uranium from the former Soviet states produced fears over uranium price
deflation. In 1991, US uranium producers petitioned for and attained anti-dumping laws
restricting the sale of uranium and SWU of former Soviet origin (Allison 1996: 245). The
sale of fuel derived from Russian HEU is restricted under these laws. A compromise
designed to further the HEU deal while still protecting US companies will result in the
long term storage of large quantities of natural uranium.
157
A Suspension Agreement was passed (and amended) that allows Russia to be partially
compensated for her uranium fuel from HEU. The amended Agreement allows Russia to
be paid for the SWU value of the material upon delivery to USEC. However, the feed-
stock value of the fuel will be held to the terms of the anti-dumping laws. (The feedstock
manifests itself in the form of the uranium ore delivered to USEC but displaced by the
Russian fuel). This means that USEC will only be able to sell a small amount of the Rus-
sian uranium on the US market.
Depending on global sales (allowed under the agreement), some fraction of the material
will be stockpiled. Over the life of the current Agreement 1994-2003, USEC will have
purchased 200 MT of HEU. Assuming 95% enrichment, this could produce 4750 MT of
4% fuel, displacing 53,967 MT of natural uranium. Under the terms of the Agreement
during this same period only 16,517 MT of Russian uranium may be sold on the entire US
market. Even if all of the quota were filled by HEU uranium, 53,967-16,517=37,450 MT
of natural uranium will remain in storage. The option contract covers a mere 12,218 MT
of natural uranium.
This natural uranium, contracted for purchase but not yet paid for, represents another
hedging source. The problem is the nebulous terms of the Russian agreement. The price
is subject to renegotiation every year. For this material to function as a hedge the US gov-
ernment should set the forward price (i.e. direct USEC to do so). However if one charges
the risk to the HEU deal and not WGPu, (the HEU deal has progressed independently) the
fact that an agreement exists to purchase the material is sufficient. Three hundred tonnes
of HEU is scheduled to be purchased during the last 10 years of the HEU contract. If the
sale of this material is limited as well, even more uranium will be in storage.
5.5 Conclusions
Viewing surplus WGPu as a derivative provides a fair, market based mechanism for valu-
ation. The material has been removed from military service. Therefore the only value it
can posses is of an economic nature. While current factors suggest the material is worth-
less, under certain future conditions the Pu may gain value. Derivative theory allows us to
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replicate this expected future value without assuming the inherent proliferation risk of
storing WGPu.
Assigning WGPu a derivative value avoids polarizing statements regarding the Pu fuel
cycle. While separated Pu may represent a future avoided cost for a projected fuel cycle
project, the global market would be hard pressed to quantify this value as the expansion
itself is based solely on governmental plans. The ability to discuss Pu's value as depen-
dent on specific market variables provides bounded flexibility to negotiations. This flexi-
bility may result in a successful disposition agreement.
The concept of bounding the value of the WGPu is important. As the option most cer-
tainly will be exercised (due to its low strike price), the US offer in effect compensates the
Russians for the revenues from future sales. This is equivalent to saying "although you
can't sell this material today, we'll pay you the present value of the revenues you could
receive in the future." The most this could cost would be the current value of all the ore
covered by the option. This ore could then be given to Russia today. As the convenience
yield will at a minimum cover storage costs, this is the maximum value of the option. Any
payment above this level would purely represent an incentive for action. This upper limit
gives both parties a reference point for negotiation. Knowing when compensation ends
and pure incentive begins should normalize the expectations of both parties and aid the
formulation of an agreement.
Nonetheless, certain variables selected for this analysis may be challenged. Primarily the
selection of LEU as the Pu substitute fuel. If the replacement fuel were of higher enrich-
ment (e.g. fast reactor fuel), the strike price would be lower which would increase the
value of the option. While this is true it should be noted that such reactors are not com-
mercial entities today. We are in essence taking a non-tradeable asset (WGPu) and mak-
ing it tradeable. It seems reasonable therefore to restrict the fuel to that which can be
found in the market today and has a reasonable expectation for commercial demand in the
next several decades.
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The potential role of surplus HEU in WGPu disposition is intriguing. We have already
decided not to sell the HEU for some time. Therefore we have decided to accept the asso-
ciated interest and storage cost penalty. So the marginal cost of using it as a hedge is zero.
Given the quantity of HEU available, the fuel option in exchange for Pu offer could be
extended to other countries holding separated Pu. Used in this manner, HEU may do more
to improve security than it did in warheads.
In summation, the derivative framework is a pragmatic response to legitimate Russian
financial and US proliferation concerns. The proposal could clear the way for immediate
processing or transfer of Russian WGPu to the US. Russia would receive reasoned com-
pensation and the US would receive tangible movement on a security issue it views as crit-
ical. The implementation of this approach should be seriously considered.
160
6.0 Summary and Conclusions
Historic achievements in arms control were the catalyst for an international debate on sur-
plus weapons-grade plutonium disposition. For the first time, superpowers are develop-
ing strategies for eliminating a portion of their nuclear stockpiles. While the reductions
are welcomed, managing the fissile materials from retired warheads is a complex technical
and political challenge. To be implemented, any proposal must satisfy constraints
imposed in both areas.
6.1 Plutonium Disposition Problem
The total US inventory of all grades of Pu (both in the Department of Energy and Depart-
ment of Defense) is 99.5 MT (OFMD 1996b: Ch.1 p.2). This includes 85 MT of WGPu
(<7% Pu-240), 13.2 MT fuel grade (7-19% Pu-240), and 1.3 MT of RGPu (>19% Pu-
240).51 The US has declared a total of 52.7 MT of this Pu as surplus to security needs.
Therefore at least this amount will be dispositioned in some manner.
The Russian inventory has been estimated at a total of 140 MT of Pu but Russia has not
made public the true value. Of this, 25 MT are believed to be RGPu. While agreeing to
disarm, Russia has not declared any of its Pu as surplus.
In a speech before the United Nations on September 27, 1993 President Clinton
announced a series of initiatives designed to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion. The President stated that the US would "seek to eliminate where possible accumula-
tion of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium and to ensure that where these
materials already exist they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and
international accountability."52
51.The isotopic concentration of Pu-240 in Pu determines its classification as the spontaneous fission of this
isotope increases the potential for predetonation in an explosive device.
52.White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, September 27, 1993
161
The President also called for "a comprehensive review of long-term options for pluto-
nium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budget-
ary and economic conditions." President Clinton invited Russia and other nations with
relevant interests and experience to participate in the study. This set of initiatives was
termed the U.S. Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy.
There has been much concern regarding the security of Russian Pu. During Senate testi-
mony in 1996, John Deutch, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, described
four confirmed thefts of weapons-usable material. This included thefts of 6 grams of Pu, a
single gram of HEU, and approximately 500 grams of a Pu/U mixture (Deutch 1996: 9).
The most significant was a case involving three kg of HEU in December of 1994. There
have been numerous other unconfirmed reports of theft in Russia.
The underlying US objectives regarding WGPu disposition can be described as follows:
1. rapidly move Russian Pu into a form that provides sufficient barriers to
unauthorized diversion and host-state retrieval;
2. as Pu storage in the US is more secure, dispose of US Pu in an environ-
mentally sound manner with attention to cost (there is little imperative
to act swiftly other than to encourage Russian action);
3. demonstrate US commitment to nonproliferation and in the process
establish an international standard for Pu storage.
In order to aid decision making, a standard for Pu disposition was adopted and alternatives
for meeting the standard were investigated. The standard, proposed by the National Acad-
emy of Science and subsequently revised by the DOE, identifies the goal of Pu disposition
as: "to make the plutonium as unattractive and inaccessible for retrieval and weapons use
as the residual plutonium in the spent fuel from commercial reactors" (OFMD 1996c: ES-
1). The standard has been termed the Spent Fuel Standard (SFS).
The word unattractive was added ostensibly to avoid debate regarding the inaccessibility
of various Pu matrices. The modification is widely interpreted as requiring a radiation
barrier.53 However, no specific measurable parameters were, nor have been, established
to determine compliance with the Standard.
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The NAS report stated that disposition options that did not meet this standard would repre-
sent "a unique safeguards problem indefinitely" (NAS 1994: 12). It was also noted that
going beyond the standard would not be justified unless the same treatment was per-
formed on the much larger stocks of Pu presently found in spent fuel. As this seemed
unlikely, due to the enormous cost and complexities, the SFS was adopted. The Standard
has become the basis for the administration's disposition activities.
In her Record of Decision (ROD) for the disposition of US surplus WGPu, Secretary
O'Leary described a dual path strategy for meeting the SFS. Both a reactor burning option
and the immobilization with HLW would be pursued. By pursuing a hybrid approach the
ROD contends that WGPu disposition could begin earlier and be completed faster. It was
also argued that the two paths will serve as insurance for meeting schedule goals.
However the strategy appears prone to stagnation. The US has stated that it will require
reciprocity from Russia before it processes any of its WGPu. Russia has expressed a
desire to burn its Pu in reactors but presently lacks the infrastructure to do so. Russia has
flatly rejected the other SFS alternative, mixing the Pu with HLW, as this treats the Pu as
waste and does not extract the fuel value of the material.
It would appear that US security interests would be served if the US were to financially
aid the processing of Russian Pu. However, to be consistent with the present US Pu fuel
cycle policy the US cannot support Pu burning activities in Russia. The policy reads: "The
United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not
itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive pur-
poses." 54 An alternate strategy that approaches the functional capabilities of the SFS, yet
is capable of being supported by both countries, is proposed in this thesis.
53.Actually a radiation barrier would not be required for the direct disposal of Pu in boreholes option or the
space disposal option.
54.White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, September 27, 1993.
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6.2 Proposed Strategy for Plutonium Disposition
6.2.1 Material Processing
The US should propose the following steps be executed in coordination with Russia:
1. immobilize surplus Pu in a glass or ceramic matrix without HLW;
2. do not require the addition of HLW in the future;
3. produce a high unit size/mass;
4. add integral off-site tracing capability; and
5. allow the conditional retrieval of Russian Pu in the future for use in
energy production.
It is proposed that the US and Russia address their mutual proliferation concerns (prima-
rily unauthorized diversion) by initiating bilateral processing of their surplus WGPu
immediately. Plutonium would be processed into a glass or ceramic matrix expected to be
acceptable for repository disposal. The matrix would include sufficient neutron absorbers
for long-term criticality control based on the present state of knowledge and expected reg-
ulatory limits. High-level radioactive waste could be added at a later time but should not
be required under any agreement.
A high unit size and mass product could be attained by immobilizing the Pu in canisters of
the dimension of those being filled with HLW at the Defense Waste Processing Facility
(DWPF) in South Carolina. These containers are approximately 3 meters in length and 60
cm in diameter. When filled with HLW glass they weigh approximately 2 tonnes. The
size and weight would simplify safeguarding activities and provide barriers to unautho-
rized diversion. The canisters would be stored at an internationally safeguarded facility
where they would be subject to periodic direct verification. Such verification would not
be possible (using present technologies) if radioactive fission products were included.
In addition, it is proposed that an electronic device that would allow individual canisters to
be tracked be encapsulated within the Pu matrix during glove box operations. A 'beacon'
from such a device could be used to locate and retrieve individual cans should they be
diverted. The design of this device has not been explored in detail, however the absence
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of highly radioactive elements would eliminate radiation damage concerns. Similar track-
ing devices are commercially available and have been used to aid the retrieval of stolen
vehicles.
Russia could retain the option of retrieving the Pu but only if her energy needs demanded
it. Russia would have to prove alternate stockpiles of RGPu were not available and Pu
would be directly fabricated into MOX. The processed Pu would be treated as a safe-
guarded ore, much like a HLW repository. The US could financially support the produc-
tion of this storage matrix as it would not contribute to the development of a Pu fuel cycle
in Russia.
6.2.2 Financial Compensation for Russian Pu
If Russia refused even the material processing offer the US could propose an outright pur-
chase of the material. The agreed upon Pu could be transferred directly for processing and
storage in the US. Such proposals have been offered before but not pursued as a frame-
work for pricing Pu has not been established.
Recent evaluations place the present value of WGPu at zero due to the low price of ura-
nium fuels and high price of plutonium fuel fabrication (Chow 1993: 75). It is simply
cheaper to use uranium fuels. However, this may not always be the case. It may be that
Russia values Pu not for its current worth but for its potential value in the future. By
adopting this view they are in effect valuing Pu as a call option on nuclear fuel. An asset
of this type will produce a positive cash flow if the value of uranium fuel is above a certain
price on a specified date. Realizing this, we have found an alternative, market-based
mechanism for valuing Pu that should be acceptable to Russia.
Assigning a derivative value to WGPu gives the US a reasoned mechanism to compensate
Russia and thereby promote Pu disposition. Compensation may be in the form of a cash
payment or a portfolio that replicates the potential cash flows from holding WGPu. The
latter allows Russia to retain her hedged position in the nuclear fuels market without
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stockpiling Pu. The former could provide Russia with hard currency. This proposal is dis-
cussed further in Section 6.5.
The issues related to the disposal of immobilized Pu in a repository (listed as the second
objective in Section 6.1) are assessed in Section 6.4.
The following section describes the analyses that were performed to determine a reasoned
strategy for Pu disposition.
6.3 Strategy Formulation
A system analysis was performed on the disposition problem. The marginal proliferation
benefits and costs of processing were combined with an understanding of relevant uncer-
tainties to identify components of an effective and robust disposition strategy. An effec-
tive strategy would meet the US disposition objectives outlined above.
To develop a strategy for meeting the US Pu disposition goals, it was necessary to develop
a functional definition of these objectives. What specifically are the barriers to prolifera-
tion? How can these barriers be attained in the context of the present US/Russian disar-
mament process? How could they be extended to provide a Pu disposition standard for the
international community ? At what cost? These questions are addressed in this section.
6.3.1 Proliferation Risk
To be considered a barrier to proliferation, a modification to the present Pu material form
should result in reduced proliferation risk. A model for determining proliferation risk is
proposed. Proliferation risk was assumed to be dependent on three factors: desire, ability
and opportunity.
From the perspective of a proliferator, surplus plutonium in a storage matrix represents:
* something I want to some degree (defined by my ability to use it and
alternate sources of the fissile material);
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*something I have some prospect of successfully obtaining (defined by
degree of safeguards, physical form, tracking potential);
* and, given a degree of opportunity, I will acquire it.
The greater the motivation and the ability of a group to divert fissile material given the
opportunity, the greater the perceived risk. The 'ability' factor was taken to represent bar-
riers to theft from a safeguarded storage facility. The 'desire' factor includes the ability to
process the material into an explosive device once it has been transferred off-site. This
factor also include the attractiveness of the Pu relative to other sources of fissile material
(e.g. highly enriched uranium). Each of these factors is needed for proliferation risk to
exist, however the relative risk contribution of each is unknown.
The strategy proposed in this work utilizes two approaches to reduce proliferation risk.
The proposed material processing of Pu will affect each of the factors contributing to risk.
As the opportunity for diversion of Pu exists primarily in Russia, the transfer of this mate-
rial to the US via a purchase would also reduce proliferation risk. Both approaches are
capable of dramatically reducing the risk posed by surplus Pu.
The Pu purchase, while amenable to implementation in stages, would in one step provide
tangible security benefits. The benefits from material processing could be more incremen-
tal in nature. Individual processing steps were evaluated on the basis of their ability to
minimize proliferation risk by attacking the individual risk factors.
In order to assess the impact of material processing on risk it was necessary to identify the
potential proliferator. This is important because processing has unique and disparate
effects on individual proliferators. A strategy that does not impact the class of proliferator
that is of most concern would provide little benefit.
Four general classes of proliferators were selected and their potential proliferation motives
and capabilities postulated. The classes of divertor were: Host Nation (US or Russia),
other Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS), or a Sub-
National Group.
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The effect of processing on the desire, ability, and opportunity on the risk of proliferation
for each class of threat was examined. The general material modifications assumed for
this investigation were:
* pit processing - submitting the pit to a process where its geometry is
changed and perhaps transformed into oxide form;
* isotopic blending;
* chemical dilution with or without a radiation barrier, and
Sincreasing the unit size and mass.
The means for achieving these modifications are presented in the context of immobiliza-
tion activities as immobilization was the focus of this research.
General Findings
The political debate has also produced confusion over what can be achieved by the Record
of Decision alternatives. While irreversibility has been stated as a major political objec-
tive, it simply cannot be attained through the alternatives under investigation. Only
through a deep-burn alternative (Pu elimination in a non-fertile matrix) or a similar
approach would Pu disposition be entirely irreversible (Chodak 1996).
For the alternatives examined, irreversibility is more a function of proliferator infrastruc-
ture and required retrieval rate. If irreversibility were truly desired, each country could
destroy its reprocessing facilities. This would greatly increase the time and cost of extrac-
tion and make uranium enrichment more attractive.
The destruction of reprocessing infrastructures would also be a stronger statement of the
US commitment to arms reduction than Pu disposition. If such capability is maintained,
the world would recognize that relatively small investments in infrastructure would be
needed to reverse any disposition action.
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6.3.2 Material Processing - Benefits and Costs
Pit Processing
The processing of Pu out of pit form would reduce proliferation risk in several ways.
There have been some questions regarding the ability to adequately verify pit storage. The
Nonproliferation Assessment stated that "acceptable verification and monitoring measures
for pits in storage have not yet been resolved" (DOE 1997: Ch.5 p. 5 1). Processing the Pu
into non-pit form would allow the material to be accounted for directly and safeguarded
by multinational parties. This would reduce the opportunity for diversion by all would-be
proliferators.
Pit conversion would eliminate weapon design information eliminating any gain for a
NWS proliferator and would slightly reduce the attractiveness of the material for other
proliferators. This material would also not be available for direct reinsertion in a host state
warhead. As this would be the first step for any disposition action it would appear that
every effort should be made to achieve this action immediately.
As the opportunity for proliferation is a function of time, the schedule for this step is espe-
cially important. Pit conversion/Pu recovery operations could be initiated immediately in
the US if sufficient shipping/receiving facilities along with glove box and ventilation sys-
tems were available. The availability of of such facilities in Russia is unknown. The
ARIES process is currently being designed to process 250-500 pits per year (OFMD
1996c: Ch.3 p.2). Such a prototype could be replicated to increase throughput.
The operational start time for the ARIES process, combined with a vitrification step was
estimated as 7 years (OFMD 1996c: Ch.5 p.10). For the immobilization alternative these
processes were not individually evaluated as they would be treated as a single, integrated
front-end process for combining the vitrified Pu with HLW. This estimate includes further
R&D and licensing activities. It is possible that such processing could be done faster and
cheaper in Russia.
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The cost of Pu processing in the US was identified as a major life cycle cost. In the Exist-
ing LWRs - Existing Facilities alternative, a net life cycle cost of $1390 M was assigned to
ARIES processing with Ga removal. The total undiscounted life cycle cost for this alterna-
tive was estimated to be $1920 M. For the vitrification can-in-can variant, front-end costs
were $1340 M including the initial vitrification step. The total life cycle cost for this vari-
ant was $1830 M.
Isotopics
The Red Team confirmed prior statements regarding the usability of various isotopic
grades of Pu in weapons. It issued a single summary statement on the manner (Sandia
1996: Ch.4 p.7):
"All plutonium is good plutonium; some is better than other."
In the past there have been debates regarding the suitability of reactor-grade Pu (RGPu)
for weapons use. RGPu has higher concentrations of Pu isotopes above Pu-239. This
results in two potential problems for weapons designers: pre-initiation and heat dissipa-
tion. Pre-initiation can reduce the expected yield of the weapon and the high heat rate can
cause problems with regard to the high explosives and other materials in the weapon.
Despite the problems associated with RGPu, its ability to produce a nuclear explosion
seems certain. "Even if pre-initiation occurs at the worst possible moment (when the
material first becomes compressed enough to sustain a chain reaction), the explosive yield
of even a relatively simple first-generation nuclear device would be of the order of a few
kilotons" (DOE 1997: 38). It has also been noted that the issue of heat generation can be
mitigated by heat sinks and/or delayed assembly of the weapon until just before use (NAS
1994: 33). Therefore the Assessment concluded that "reactor-grade plutonium is weap-
ons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon
states" (DOE 1997: 39).
While the isotopic dilution of WGPu to approximate RGPu may not prevent its use in
weapons designed for RGPu , it may be possible to demilitarize the material for service in
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the host nation's present designs. Both countries have a fleet of warheads designed for a
particular grade of Pu. It may be that sufficient isotopic blending would make the Pu
unusable in a significant portion of the designs (Sylvester 1996).
While new designs could be utilized, the inability to test them due to the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could be an obstacle. 55 This may effectively demilitarize the Pu
as the reliability of new designs may be insufficiently characterized.
The schedule for isotopic blending is limited in the US by the availability of RGPu. The
US halted its civilian Pu fuel cycle activities in the 1970's. However, approximately 14.5
MT of "non-WGPu" is available in the US for such a purpose. Russia has approximately
25 MT of RGPu. The schedule and cost for such blending is uncertain but would appear
to be similar to that of the Pu processing described above.
Alternatively, the Reactor burning option would have to be utilized to achieve isotopic
dilution. The US schedule for inserting Pu in reactors (should this alternative be pursued)
is 9 yrs. One could argue that the marginal cost of isotopic dilution is negative as revenues
are expected from fuel sales. However this is not appropriate as the total life cycle costs of
this option are not completely offset by revenues.
Chemical Dilution With or Without Additional Radioactive Elements
The creation of a chemically mixed Pu product, by itself, has a minimal effect on prolifer-
ation risk. Producing a sufficiently radioactive mixture by commingling Pu with other
radionuclides could in theory provide a diversion barrier if it required shielding to be used
during an attempted theft from a safeguarded storage facility. This would complicate
unauthorized on-site manipulation of the material.
However, in a report published by Sandia it was asserted that "none of the alternative final
forms emit radiation fields large enough to require shielding for dedicated aggressors"
55.The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions. All declared weapon states have signed
the treaty.
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(Sandia 1996: 16). Therefore, the inherent radiation levels of the alternatives under inves-
tigation would not be a "significant accessibility barrier to unauthorized parties."
The Assessment Report, while acknowledging the Red Team's devaluation of radiation
barrier, asserted that the larger barrier provided by adding radionuclides would be related
to detectability (DOE 1997: 54). (In the framework of this analysis, the ability to success-
fully divert the material would be reduced.) The Report asserted that a radiation field
would make the transport vehicle easier to detect and that gaseous fission products would
be released upon reprocessing that could be detected. (The fact that the immobilization
alternative proposed in the ROD does not contain volatile fission products was not noted
in the DOE's assessment.)
The ability of further chemical processing to hamper off-site activities (desirability) is also
limited. Chemical processing could complicate the fabrication of a weapon or make alter-
nate sources more attractive. The effect is dependent on the capabilities and options avail-
able to the proliferator.
Both host countries possess industrial size, operating, shielded separations facilities as
well as uranium enrichment facilities. Therefore, the desirability of the material would
depend on cost of retrieval of the Pu relative to alternative fissile sources (e.g. highly
enriched uranium (HEU)). Plutonium extraction costs will be influenced by several fac-
tors. In addition to the processing infrastructure, the desired rate of Pu recovery and the
waste management practices of the proliferator are also important.
For the host state the addition of a radiation barrier would not reduce the attractiveness of
the material as it would still be cheaper to extract the Pu (roughly 1/2 the price per kg)
than producing HEU. If the aqueous HLW produced from separating the Pu from a SFS
was not vitrified the cost would be further reduced. In contrast if shielded separations
facilities did not exist (and the desired recovery rate remained high), a radiation barrier
would reduce the risk of host state diversion as such a facility would have to be con-
structed at great cost.
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For a NNWS or sub national group that wished to develop some level of nuclear weapons
capability, any of the processing steps would seem to have marginal effect on their desire
for the material. Cost would not be relevant as they do not have an alternate source of fis-
sile materials. These proliferators are likely to desire only one or a few weapons and
would probably accept clumsy and slow laboratory reprocessing. The radiation barrier
would be a nuisance, requiring additional time and personnel for Pu extraction. But
according to the Vulnerability Assessment only 2 additional weeks and 2 additional peo-
ple would be needed to retrieve 8 kg of Pu (a significant quantity of Pu as determined by
the IAEA) (Sandia 1996: Ch.4 p.6).
A radiation barrier would also hamper if not prevent direct verification. The Nonprolifer-
ation Assessment notes that it will "no longer be possible with current technology to accu-
rately measure the amount of Pu in the glass -just as it would not be possible to accurately
measure Pu in spent fuel" (DOE 1997: 111). While this is also true for the much large
quantities of civilian spent fuel it is not viewed as a beneficial trait.
For the immobilization variants, chemical dilution would be achieved as the last stage of
pit processing. Therefore the schedule for dilution would mimic that of Pu processing.
The marginal cost of chemical dilution for this alternative was included in the ARIES esti-
mate above.
For the can-in-can variant, the radiation barrier would be simultaneously added with the
unit size and mass step. The additional cost was estimated to be $490 M, $390 M for vit-
rification with HLW and $100 M for the disposal costs of the estimated 200 additional
canisters produce by vitrifying 50 MT of WGPu.
For the reactor alternative, chemical dilution in a large unit size and mass container is
achieved at the price of MOX fuel fabrication. This results in an added life cycle cost of
$1540 M. The addition of a radiation barrier would require $380 M in reactor related
costs but result in a fuel displacement credit of $1390 M.
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It could be argued that given the marginal cost of adding a radiation barrier ($390 M for
the can-in-can variants) is so low that we should add it even though the benefits are debat-
able. This would be true if there were no risks associated with the radiation barrier. If
waste form qualification issues arise we run the risk of having to re-extract Pu, vitrify the
HLW again and determine a suitable form for the Pu. This is identified as a relevant
uncertainty in Section 6.3.3.
Unit Size and Mass
Unit size and mass is capable of reducing proliferation risk by reducing the likelihood of
a successful theft from a safeguarded facility. While there is virtually nothing to prevent
retrieval by a host state, the prospects for successful diversion by other proliferators may
be reduced somewhat. The most important factor appears to be the use of unit size and
mass to hamper on-site manipulation and off-site transport by requiring industrial size
equipment.
Schedule and cost information for attaining high unit size and mass were included in the
discussion of the chemical dilution step above.
6.3.3 Disposition Uncertainties
The disposition of WGPu is subject to programmatic risks due to uncertainty. This uncer-
tainty goes beyond the uncertainties in detailed estimates of processing costs and other
data. This uncertainty relates to the risk of negative outcomes resulting from disposition
decisions today.
While the expected outcome of a strategy may be desirable, uncertainties may mean that a
wide range of possible outcomes may be produced. Some of these outcomes may be quite
undesirable. These uncertainties should be identified and an efforts made to reduce the
probability of a negative outcome.
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Schedule Uncertainties
Schedule uncertainties increase the risk of delay and the opportunity for diversion. A
strategy that leaves Pu in an extremely secure material form yet cannot be implemented is
of little value.
A particularly meaningful uncertainty is Russian Pu disposition activities. Russian reci-
procity will be required for US disposition to proceed. None of the disposition alterna-
tives explicitly address this reciprocity issue. The disposition of US Pu will not reduce the
obstacles Russia faces in burning its Pu. Without an accompanying strategy for effec-
tively promoting Russian disposition, it is likely that US Pu will remain in pit form as
well.
All of the immobilization alternatives may face delays due to waste form qualification
issues. Even if Pu disposal forms meet disposal requirements at the beginning of process-
ing, they may not be acceptable upon completion as standards are subject to change.
Indeed, the performance requirements for a repository have not yet been established. If
disposition requires the operation of other facilities such as the DWPF, disposition will be
dependent on its availability. The processing delays of the DWPF will become delays for
Pu dispositioning.
External Uncertainties
Uncertainties also exist in the long-term benefits provided by Pu disposition. As
described previously, proliferation risks were shown to be conditional on proliferator
motives, capabilities and more importantly their alternatives. Over the several decades of
disposition these factors are likely to change. The changes may reduce the marginal bene-
fits of Pu processing in the long-term.
For example, the diffusion of centrifuge and AVLIS technology over the several decades
of disposition may exceed the long-term proliferation risk posed by surplus Pu. Alterna-
tively, options that are presently viewed as proliferation resistant may ultimately be
viewed as unacceptable (e.g. the can-in-can variants). Given the uncertain benefit, alter-
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natives that meet expected long-term goals should not be pursued over those that can
reduce risks known to be present today.
The existence of a repository will also impact ultimate benefits. It has been noted that
only when the SFS forms are placed in a geologic repository would proliferation resis-
tance be dominated by intrinsic barriers rather than institutional ones. If such a facility is
delayed or never materializes, the Pu will need to be safeguarded indefinitely. In such a
scenario, the benefits realized from pursuing a Spent Fuel Standard matrix for Pu storage
will be debatable.
As external uncertainties cannot be controlled by strategy formulation, emphasis is further
placed on prioritizing near-term issues as uncertainty prevents us from knowing the long-
term benefits of current decisions.
6.3.4 Conclusions
While the ultimate benefits are bounded, material processing is capable of meeting valu-
able nonproliferation objectives. However, strategy formulation must begin with well
articulated nonproliferation objectives. The risk to be reduced must be identified. The
benefits and costs of various actions must then be weighed to form an effective strategy
that minimizes the programmatic risks of Pu disposition.
The proposal would reduce the risk of subnational and NNWS diversion.
Processing Pu into a clean storage form would provide virtually all the proliferation risk
reduction attainable by material processing. Removal from pit form and placement in a
safeguarded facility would reduce the ability and opportunity of any proliferator to divert
the material. Critical design information would also be lost. Increasing the unit size and
mass of the Pu host matrix would reduce the ability for NNWS and subnational groups
(the primary target of the proposal) to successfully divert the material. This is the primary,
near-term risk posed by this material.
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The presence of off-site tracking capability would provide a new form of deterrence for
these proliferators. It has been said that "The current inability to locate a nuclear device
without intelligence cueing is perhaps the greatest limitation of our neutralization capabil-
ity" (Mullen 1996: 20). The primary benefit of the radiation barrier was its ability to aid
the detection of Pu after a theft.
The signal frequency could also be known by the international community, allowing any
nation to independently monitor the location of dispositioned Pu at any time. This would
serve to further increase confidence in the arms control process.
The possibility for direct verification would be retained by this proposal. Without the
background radiation from HLW, isotopic and total Pu concentration in the matrix could
be non-destructively determined. This was not developed in this work but it would appear
that standard spectrometry techniques such as gamma-ray spectrometry could be utilized.
If the presence of a radiation barrier were truly desired the DWPF canisters could be
stored alongside fully radioactive DWPF canisters. This would not differ appreciably from
the can-in-can alternatives which have been promoted in the disposition Record of Deci-
sion.
The proposed processing would also prevent retrieval and subsequent direct use by the
host nation. The fact that it has been declared surplus and would be under international
safeguards most likely provides the highest deterrent for host state retrieval. In any case,
it is recognized that host state retrieval of Pu in any form is possible. It is for this reason
that the proposal was largely designed to reduce the security risk from other proliferators.
Timely processing of both US and Russian surplus Pu would be possible.
Perhaps the biggest benefit of this alternative is its prospect for US/Russian cooperation.
The proposal was designed to harmonize with Russian fuel cycle ambitions and yet allow
for US financial support. Contentious fuel cycle commitments are not required. The pro-
posal represents a compromise between two polar alternatives for Pu disposition and in
doing so provides a reasoned path forward for both countries.
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Without a resolution to the Russian fuel value issue it appears no processing will move
forward. By allowing retrieval or providing compensation, the proposal provides two
means of addressing this concern. Either approach appears capable of being accepted and
thereby reducing the risk of stagnation.
By completely separating Pu disposition from other fuel cycle activities its execution can
quickly begin to reduce the opportunity for proliferation. Processing could proceed at vir-
tually any pace through the use of multiple process lines and/or higher capacity systems.
Schedule uncertainty would also be reduced by uncoupling Pu processing from other
activities such as DWPF or reactor operations.
As the proposal is capable of providing security in the near-term, its benefits are not
dependent on predictions of future proliferation risks. The most pressing dangers posed
by the Pu can be addressed. In addition, the proposal does not prevent further processing
should it be desired.
The flexible nature of the strategy would reduce implementation risks.
The modular nature of this design could provide valuable flexibility to address both tech-
nical uncertainties and political differences. If criticality control was deemed insufficient,
the DWPF canisters could be repackaged to address regulatory concerns. In the extreme
case the Pu could be reprocessed for other waste treatment without requiring the re-vitrifi-
cation of HLW.
As time goes on, political tensions may cause intermittence in international oversight at Pu
storage facilities. Confidence in treaty compliance may erode during such periods. The
ability to directly verify Pu content would eliminate such uncertainties.
This approach would also buy time for each country to fully evaluate their respective Pu
objectives. The US could further weigh disposal options and Russia could develop the
necessary infrastructure to burn Pu. Neither would be forced to execute Pu programs
requiring large industrial investments without thorough analyses.
178
The proposed form could be utilized in further Pu disposition initiatives.
The proposal could be formalized into a Surplus Plutonium Storage Standard which could
be applied globally. Some non-weapons states may eventually want to disposition their
excess Pu. This form would give them an alternative other than MOX fuel or mixing with
HLW. Indeed the country may have neither alternative at their disposal. Such a form
could be used to demonstrate a commitment to arms reduction, ease safeguarding and stor-
age cost, and give verifiable proliferation resistance.
6.4 Technical Feasibility
As significant quantities of plutonium have never been vitrified, the technical feasibility of
such a proposal must be demonstrated. The feasibility of vitrification will require confi-
dence in repository subcriticality. Neutron absorbers may necessarily be vitrified with Pu
to control reactivity over geologic time periods. Rare earth elements have been identified
for their neutron absorption capabilities and relative insolubility in groundwater. The
homogeneous dissolution of these elements in glass is desired. The environmental dura-
bility of the glass is especially important if Pu is to be vitrified with HLW. Each of these
issues were investigated and the results are described in the following sections.
While a durable glass is desired, Pu release is not likely to be a major concern from an
EH&S perspective. Pu is relatively insoluble in groundwater and is not likely to migrate
to the biosphere (unless perhaps in colloid form). However, the release of non-radioactive
boron may be more important. Boron's inherent properties are a benefit to glass design,
however its aqueous solubility may allow for a criticality event as the glass dissolves in a
repository as it is the primary neutron absorber in boro-silicate glass.
The addition of insoluble rare earth elements (REE) is a potential strategy for addressing
this criticality concern. Several rare earth elements possess strong neutron absorption
characteristics. A list of relevant neutronic properties for boron and several REE is con-
tained in Table 11.
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TABLE 11. Neutronic Poison Dataa
thermal neutron resonance
atom% capture cross integral,
Element Isotope abundance section, barns barns
B 10 19.9 3,838 1722
Sm 149 13.8 5,900 4000
152 26.7 208 3000
Eu 151 47.8 5,900 4000
153 52.2 530 1500
Gd 155 14.8 61,000 1540
157 15.65 255,000 800
a. "Nuclides and Isotopes," 14th edition, General Electric Company 1989
In order to assess the durability of a Pu glass, a borosilicate glass loaded with a Pu analog
and several rare earths was leach tested. The release of neutronically relevant species was
of particular interest. The following section describes the experimental approach and the
results obtained.
6.4.1 Environmental Durability
The borosilicate glass ARM 1 was used for durability testing. The glasses tested were pre-
pared in the following manner. The ARM1 glass was crushed and weighed into fused sil-
ica crucibles. Nitrates of Th, Eu, Gd, and Sm were then weighed and added to produce
glass frits with the desired loading. The modified ARM1 frit was then melted to form
glass.
After cooling the glass bars were sectioned and prepared for leach testing using the MCC-
1P protocol. The samples were sanded, weighed and surface area measurements were
made. They were then placed in a Teflon® container with a measured volume of deion-
ized water. The containers were labeled and placed under controlled temperature for an
extended period of time.
Upon completion of the tests, glass samples were removed from solution, rinsed and then
dried. Measurements of the concentration of elements in solution were then taken.
Knowing the concentration of the element in the leachant, the total mass of the leachant
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and the surface area of the glass allowed key parameters related to glass durability to be
calculated.
Elemental releases from glass are typically reported in units of normalized grams of ele-
ment i per square meter of glass. The mass of released element i is normalized by its con-
centration in the unreacted glass. The figures presented here display the normalized
release data for the specific elements of interest.
Leaching of unmodified ARM1 glass at 90oC in deionized water agreed reasonably well
with HLW glasses in the literature and accurately reflected trends in elemental leaching. 56
The pure ARM1 tests were done to provide a baseline for comparison with modified glass
behavior.
Figure 36 displays the normalized release behavior for pure ARM 1 over a leaching period
of one year. The glass reacts at a maximum initial rate, termed the forward rate. As glass
components begin to enter into solution, glass reaction affinity begins to drop and the
leach rate slows. During flow-through type tests borosilicate glasses will continue to react
at the forward rate.
If every glass element entered into solution their normalized release curves would be iden-
tical. The boron and Na release curves are nearly identical. Both elements are quite solu-
ble in DI water. A shown in Figure 36, a portion of the Si (roughly 20 wt%) does not enter
solution but remains, most likely as a constituent of the reacted glass. Boron and Na were
assumed to represent the bulk reaction rate of the glass.
The addition of Th and the rare earth elements to the ARM 1 glass resulted in a product
with roughly equivalent durability as pure ARM 1. The release curves for Si, B, and Na
are shown in Figure 37. While three of the samples had releases slightly higher than those
for pure ARM 1, two were lower. All releases were within a factor of two.
56.See Lutze (1988: 105 and 122) for example.
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FIGURE 36. Silicon, Boron, and Sodium Release From Pure
ARM1 Glass Leached in DI Water at 900 C
The ARM 1 glass was effective at retaining the additional elements. The concentrations of
Th, Eu, Gd, and Sm were below detection limits in three samples and within 1 ppb of the
limits in the other two. (As the values were not corrected for elemental interference these
value may actually be below detection limits as well.) Figure 38 shows the release data
for the samples in which these elements were barely detectable. It is interesting to note the
general order of elemental concentrations found either in solution or colloidal form. Tho-
rium and Sm were the most soluble and Gd and Eu were the least. However, these con-
centrations are very near detection limits and should be viewed carefully.
In comparison with boron all the rare earth poisons exhibited superior performance. Fig-
ure 39 shows that while boron entered solution as the glass reacted, europium was much
more resistant. This was the desired behavior for the added reactivity control. It is not
known if the rare earths remained in the alteration layer or were sorbed on container walls
as strip tests were not performed. In the ARM1 glass the rare earths did not form colloids
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FIGURE 37. Silicon, Boron, and Sodium Release from ARM1
Glass Loaded with 2 wt% ThO2 , EuzO3 , Gd20 3 , and Sm 2 03
Leached in DI Water at 900 C
smaller than 0.45 gLm. If they did form they would have been redissolved upon acidifica-
tion and appeared in the measurements.
Another borosilicate glass formulation, known to possess low durability as it contains no
Al, was also tested to examine Th and REE behavior in a poor performing glass. (This
formulation would not be used in Pu or HLW vitrification.) In this glass, Th and REE
releases were below detection limits for three of the five glass samples tested. However
the remaining two samples had 1-2 ppm of each of these element in its leachate. These
concentrations are much higher than the expected solubility limits of these elements in DI
water and indicate the formation of colloids containing these elements.
Conclusions
The addition of Th and the REE does not harm glass durability and the potential exists for
positive contributions. Further investigation is needed, but it appears that these elements
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FIGURE 38. Detectable Thorium and Rare Earth Release
From Modified ARM1 Glass at 900 C
were dissolved in the glass network and did not promote the formation of a less durable
phase.
For glasses of reasonable durability it appears that Th will not enter solution. In this case
Th is likely to be sorbed on surfaces or retained in reacted glass products. However, for a
poor durability glass, dissolved species, high pH, or other factors allow Th to exist in col-
loid form. The Th could have formed a true colloid or sorbed on a Si or other colloid.
The rare earth elements had release characteristics virtually identical to that of Th in the
tests performed. Regarding criticality control, the REE were always much more insoluble
than boron. The formation of a colloid in the low durability glass is of concern as it may
provide a release pathway for these elements. However, the data showed that -99% of the
Th and REE remained either sorbed on the container wall or in the reacted layer. When
colloids were formed in the poor durability glass, both Th and the REE appeared to partic-
ipate. This is significant as even in this case the neutronic poisons were demonstrated to
mimic Th behavior.
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ARM1 Glass at 900 C
6.4.2 Criticality Assessment
Over extended periods of exposure to groundwater, sufficient neutron absorbers could
migrate from the near field to induce criticality. Plutonium has a half-life of 24,000 yrs
and decays to fissile U-235 which has a half-life of 704 million years. Uranium can be rel-
atively insoluble as well. Criticality is a concern as fresh fission products would be given
an aqueous transport pathway, potentially to the biosphere.
Glass Reaction with Groundwater
Glass reaction is a complex process dependent on both glass and solution properties. In
general, glass will react with water to release its soluble species and form more stable
amorphous and crystalline phases. It is the redistribution of neutronically relevant
nuclides during this process that is of primary interest in the work presented here.
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Extensive research has been performed on glass reaction with water, the results of which
have led to various descriptions of glass dissolution. One theory is that H+ diffuses into
the glass matrix and undergoes ion exchange, typically with alkali metals such as sodium
(prevalently at the non-bridging oxygen sites). The alteration of the glass also allows sol-
uble species (such as boron) to enter into solution. This produces a reacted layer that
retains the amorphous silica structure of glass but with concentration gradients of alkali
and soluble species. This layer has been termed the "diffusion layer."
Over time, the most depleted portion of the diffusion layer (its outer fringe) begins to
hydrolyze. This results in a restructuring or repolymerization of the Si matrix into a more
stable, hydrous "gel layer." This may or may not release Si into solution. The process
apparently "kicks out" metals incapable of entering into a new amorphous phase (Bourc-
ier 1991: 6). Eventually, the gel layer further reacts with water and is dissolved com-
pletely, releasing silica into solution. This reaction is termed "network dissolution."
This surface layer (the diffusion layer and gel layer combined) is typically less than a
micron in thickness and moves into the glass as the bulk reaction proceeds. Following
behind it is a layered region of amorphous and crystalline phases termed alteration layers.
This region has a complex elemental composition. Many of the metals that were either
"kicked out" during gel layer formation or released as a result of network dissolution,
quickly precipitate to form the alteration layers. These layers can be either amorphous or
crystalline in nature. The retention of fissile nuclides in these layers is of interest here.
Figure 40 provides a graphic description of the dissolution process.
A Glass Reaction Model
A simple model describing the composition and configuration of a single glass log in a
repository was constructed. Available data on glass/groundwater chemistry were used to
determine reacted glass and solution composition over time. System parameters were then
varied to determine their effect on subsequent criticality calculations.
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FIGURE 40. Dissolving Glass
The following physical situation was modeled. The model assumes a glass log with the
dimensions of a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) log (3 m long x 60 cm diam-
eter) and a nominal plutonium loading. The composition of the glass was assumed to be a
borosilicate glass used at the DWPF. This would represent the alternative of vitrifying Pu
directly with HLW.
The log was assumed to be placed in a horizontal drift at a repository with conditions sim-
ilar to those expected to be found at Yucca Mountain in the state of Nevada. The mountain
is under investigation as a potential high-level waste repository. A particular geologic for-
mation known as "tuff" is taken to be the reference composition of the host rock.
As water infiltrates the emplacement it reacts with glass, producing an annular region of
alteration layers. This layer moves into the glass as reaction proceeds. The depletion of
soluble poisons in this region may lead to a criticality event. Figure 41 is a graphical rep-
resentation of the system as it evolves.
As the glass reacts, its components enter into solution. Whether elements remain in solu-
tion or precipitate is determined by the contacting groundwater conditions. 57 Over time,
the glass reaction itself will alter solution chemistry. Available thermodynamic data were
used to investigate the evolution of solution concentrations during glass reaction and the
57.Sorption or colloid formation may also occur.
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FIGURE 41. Hortizontal Drift Emplacement
formation of precipitate phases. The composition of the phases over time was used to
determine if the near field system approaches a critical condition.
The durability of the glass can be described by its bulk dissolution rate (BDR). The BDR
was not calculated as the long-term reaction rate may be controlled by an unknown silica
phase. A range of BDR's was assumed. This was combined with a range of water infiltra-
tion rates to examine the dynamic behavior of elements entering and exiting the alteration
layers.
The behavior of the following elements was examined: Pu, U, B, Li and Eu. Plutonium
and uranium are fissile elements. While no uranium is found initially in the glass, Pu-239
decays to produce fissile U-235 (Pu-239 half-life=24,100 yrs). Boron and lithium are
neutron control elements that are normal components of the glass. It is the higher solubil-
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ity of boron and lithium relative to Pu and uranium in solution that could lead to a critical-
ity event.
Europium is a neutron absorber not used in the current DWPF glass frit that was evaluated
for its neutronic control capabilities and its expected insolubility. Europium was identi-
fied in prior work by the author as being particularly detrimental to a Pu explosive device
if not removed (Sylvester 1994). It is hoped that their similar aquatic chemistry, as dem-
onstrated in the leach tests, will keep them commingled and thereby keep the near field
waste emplacement subcritical.
The oxidation state and the degree of complexation will depend on solution composition.
As the assumed repository is Yucca Mountain, water from a well located at the site (J13)
was taken as the reference solution. The J13 water is neutral pH and slightly oxidizing. It
is a carbonate water with significant amounts of silica, sodium and calcium. Notably it
also contains sulfate and fluoride species which are known to form complexes with
actinides.
Solubility/Phase Calculation
The speciation/solubility code EQ3/6 was used with its associated thermodynamic data-
bases to determine solution concentrations as the glass reacts (LLNL 1992).58 EQ3 uses
mass action and redox relationships to solve for the thermodynamic equilibrium state of a
specified ground water, identifying species concentrations and supersaturated phases. The
order of phase precipitation, which may allow initially supersaturated species to remain in
solution, is not addressed.
EQ6 models the addition of reactants to a solution allowing supersaturated phases to pre-
cipitate as reaction proceeds. The order of precipitation is determined by the degree of
disequilibrium of the saturated phases. After the phases are removed, additional reactants
are added and the process repeats. The onset of saturation can be observed in this way.
58.The composite data file 'dataO.com' compiled and maintained by Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory was used for all solubility/speciation calculations.
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EQ6 was run in titration mode to model the effect of dissolving glass. 59 In the titration
calculation glass components are stoichiometrically added to a constant volume of water
where they are completely dissolved and new phases are allowed to precipitate. The cal-
culation results in a description of the aqueous species and insoluble phases that form dur-
ing reaction progress. Points along this reaction pathway were taken to represent
alteration layer composition for various degrees of glass reaction. The associated phases
and solution concentrations were then used in the analysis.
Elemental solubilities used in the dissolution model were calculated based on equilibrium
with phases formed during various stages of glass reaction. The elements of 10 grams of
DWPF glass were added stoichiometrically via a titration process into one kilogram of J 13
water. The glass contained 8 wt% PuO 2 and one mole of Eu20 3 per mole of Pu.
EQ6 produced a history of phase production and solution chemistry during glass reaction.
Figure 42 shows how the concentration of the relevant elements changed over time. At no
time during the reaction were Li or B predicted in the alteration layers.
Europium enters into solution as the carbonate species EuOHCO 3 and eventually precipi-
tates as Eu2(CO 3)3 :3H 20. When HCO 3- starts to drop , Eu(OH) 3 begins to form. Compe-
tition ensues between the formation of several carbonate complexes and precipitation.
Ultimately Eu reaches a maximum concentration of 1.5E-5 M. Europium concentration is
reduced with increasing pH caused by the glass reaction itself. Europium remains in the
+3 state throughout glass reaction.
Plutonium from the glass is immediately precipitated as PuO 2 (log Ksp=-7.36). The small
amount remaining in solution exists in the +5 and +6 state (PuO2+ and PuO2F3-). As glass
59.There are three alternate methods for reaction path modeling in EQ6 : titration, closed system or fluid-
centered flow-through system. The closed system differs in the way it treats saturation. At saturation in
the closed system the reactant is reclassified as a secondary mineral with which equilibrium is reached.
As the available reactant is now "gone," reaction stops. The titration model forces dissolution while the
closed system reaction halts the reaction upon saturating.
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FIGURE 42. Reaction Path for DWPF Sludge-Supernate Borosilicate Glass in J13
Well Water from Yucca Mountain
reaction continues, Pu concentration dips due to HCO 3- reduction to a concentration of
5.8E-15 M. Eventually Pu is reduced to +4 and hydrolyzes (complexes with OH-) causing
the solubility of Pu to increase. This complexation allows the Pu to be more soluble under
reducing conditions than earlier oxidizing conditions. Pu solubility is then controlled by
pH.
Replacing the Pu with equal molar U in glass provided similar information. As the glass
reacts, the uranium concentration rises until haiweeite forms (Ca(U02)2(Si20 5)3:5H 20).
The carbonate complex UO2(CO 3)34- keeps the U concentration initially at approximately
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1E-9 M, otherwise the concentration would have been much lower. As pH drops and
HCO 3- concentration is reduced, uranium concentration drops to a minimum value of
2.6E-10 M. As the glass continues to react, uranium is reduced to the +4 state and forms
aqueous U(OH) 4, causing uranium concentration to rise. Eventually no carbonate com-
plexes exist and uranium is in equilibrium with uraninite. Uranium concentration stabi-
lizes as solution pH stabilizes. For determining U solubility, the initial U loading was not
important.
Conclusions
Carbonate and hydroxide appear to be the most significant complexing agents in the sys-
tem studied. While chloride and nitrates are present in J13 water, at no time do Pu or U
form their complexes. This is consistent with the observed trend in complexation
strength. It is the 'over' complexation of the actinides (hydroxide and carbonate) to pro-
duce negatively charged species that could increase solubility in the J13 water.
The oxidation potential appears to be sensitive to the combined Eu and Pu loading. With-
out these elements the eH drops roughly 0.2 mV during glass reaction. With these ele-
ments it drops 1.2 mV. This reflects the strong reducing properties of rare earths and
actinides. In contrast the loading of these elements does not affect pH.
The worst regime from a criticality perspective appears to occur when pH is around 9.
This produces the greatest difference between Eu and Pu solubility. Uranium concentra-
tion is relatively constant throughout glass reaction. At higher pH Eu becomes less solu-
ble, reducing this difference and the criticality concern. Due to the ion exchange reactions
of dissolving glass, the groundwater closest to the surface is likely to be basic.
Criticality Calculation
For the criticality assessment the lowest solubility achieved by the fissile elements was
used with the highest calculated solubility for the control element. This was done to repre-
sent a conservative estimate of the highest potential for fissile/control separation. This
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information was combined with various estimations of bulk dissolution rate and water
infiltration rate to examine the potential for criticality to occur in the near-field.
The system was modeled as three regions: the unreacted glass, the surrounding tuff and
the alteration layer. The unreacted glass was assumed to be comprised of the major com-
ponents (>1 wt %) of the glass. Various amounts of Pu and REE were added to this com-
position. The neglected components could contain neutron absorbers so their exclusion
was deemed conservative.
The porosity of the tuff was taken to be 0.3. While unfractured tuff is likely to posses a
lower porosity, the tuff backfill would not due to disruption during emplacement. This
value provided a upper bound on the amount of water that could be found in the tuff.
After determining the concentration of the relevant nuclides in the alteration layers the
remaining mass of alteration layer was assumed to be amorphous SiO2 . The total mass of
the alteration layer was assumed to be 25% of the original glass. This also fixed the poros-
ity of the alteration layers at 0.75.
After fully characterizing the system, the compositional information was used to deter-
mine the system keff over time using the criticality code system SCALE-PC. SCALE-PC
is a modular code system for performing criticality safety analysis (ORNL 1992). It is
comprised of various functional modules for cross section processing, criticality and
shielding calculations. The XSDRN-PM module was used to produce 1-D, discrete ordi-
nates, solutions to the neutron transport equation.
A repository containing dissolving glass logs was modelled as a lattice of infinitely long,
annular 'fuel' cells. However, the pitch was chosen large enough so that neighboring logs
would not contribute to the neutron economy. The alteration layer, depleted of boron, was
assumed to be analogous to the fuel region of a large annular fuel pin. The interior region
contained the unreacted glass and the tuff represented the moderator portion of the unit
cell.
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Results under "Worst Case" Conditions
In the interest of bounding the criticality problem a set of criticality calculations were per-
formed using values most favorable for control removal and fissile element precipitation.
The model parameters bulk dissolution rate and volumetric flow were set their highest val-
ues, 0.1 g/m 2/d and 0.01 m3/m2/yr. These assumptions were assumed to represent a
"worst case" scenario.
Initially, a glass loaded with 8 wt% PuO 2 was modeled. As 10 wt% ThO2 was shown to
devitrify this was assumed to limit the solubility of Pu in the glass. Europium was
assumed to be dissolved in the glass at various concentrations.
Without additional Eu, the glass log was shown to go critical well before it was com-
pletely reacted. Figure 43 shows the results for the 8% PuO 2 case with no Eu under the
"worst case" conditions of extremely low durability and high water infiltration rate. The
boron in the unreacted glass did not provide significant criticality control. The hydrous
alteration layer loaded with fissile elements was too reactive. It appears that the relevance
of boron in the glass is low for criticality control purposes and additional control is
needed.
Figure 44 shows the effect of control element removal for a glass log loaded with 8 wt%
PuO 2 . Even at the assumed maximum Pu loading, only a relatively small concentration of
Eu is needed to hold down reactivity. Both the thermal neutron cross section and reso-
nance integral of Eu-151 are an order of magnitude higher than those of Pu-239. A mole
ratio of 1/2 Eu to Pu kept the system subcritical for more than 800 thousand years. Due to
the atomic mass differences between Pu and Eu, this corresponded to a loading of less
than 3 wt% Eu20 3 (2.6 wt%).
As the Figure shows, while Eu was able to control criticality for hundreds of thousands of
years, the critical state was ultimately reached. Europium eventually exited the near field
entirely while sufficient U-235 remained. The system required only 0.014 g/cc U-235 to
be present in the alteration layer to go critical. After 1 million years the U-235 concentra-
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FIGURE 43. Boron Control (8 wt% PuO2)
tion was 0.18 g/cc. Uranium's insolubility and 704 million year half-life assured that it
would remain over the time period examined.
Europium loading can be thought of as an effective method for extending the time to criti-
cality. However, if criticality at any time is viewed as unacceptable, this strategy may not
be sufficient. If an absolute loading limit of 30 wt% Eu is assumed (i.e. a waste glass
loaded only with Eu), for the worst case conditions, Eu will be gone after 13 M years.
The concentration of U-235 will remain well above 0.014 g/cc at this time. If subcritical-
ity must be assured over this time period, relying solely on dissolved Eu in the glass may
not be sufficient.
The physical mechanisms affecting keff can be elucidated by a close examination of Pu/
Eu/U system behavior over time. Initial glass dissolution and removal of soluble poison
increased the neutron multiplication of the system. After 23,000 years the entire glass had
reacted and keff began to drop as Pu-239 decayed to U-235. However, this reduction was
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FIGURE 44. Europium Loading Effect (8 wt% PuO2)
countered by the removal of Eu. Eventually, Pu-239 completed decayed and additional Eu
losses caused keff to rise to its limiting level, slightly above 1.6.
Reduced plutonium loading can also limit the keff of the system. Reducing the Pu concen-
tration from 8 to 2 wt% pushed the time to criticality to roughly 225 thousand years.
However, increasing the Eu concentration from 0.65 to 2.6 wt% pushed the time to criti-
cality to approximately 900 thousand years. While Pu loading was effective at limiting
the maximum reactivity possible, it was the Eu concentration that had the larger impact on
when criticality occurred.
Nonetheless, the potential for diluting Pu to a level below which criticality cannot occur
under the worst case conditions would be possible. If a radiation barrier were not
required, a dilute waste form could be produced. It was determined that a loading of 0.45
wt% PuO 2 would keep the initial peak in keff below 1.0 without added reactivity control. 60
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The benefits of this approach would have to be weighed against the increase in disposal
costs as more than 6600 additional DWPF size canisters would be produced. The DWPF
facility will produce 6105 canisters of vitrified HLW waste over 20 years of operation
(McKibben 1993: 21).
The presence of a moderator was shown to have a significant impact on criticality. Calcu-
lation showed the system to be undermoderated at all times. The spectrum benefits of
added water outweighed the additional hydrogen absorption. Full saturation of the 0.75
porosity alteration layer was not required for the system to go critical. Less than 25% sat-
uration was needed for a glass loaded with 8 wt% PuO 2 and an Eu/Pu mole ratio of 1/8.
The effect of reducing the bulk dissolution rate was also evaluated. This corresponded to
scenarios of improved glass performance. The better performing glass effectively elimi-
nated the local keff maximum observed during the early stages of less durable glasses dis-
cussed above. The effect of Pu-239 decay to U-235 is also masked by the longer-lived
glass. However, even glasses possessing the best expected long-term durability can not
guarantee subcriticality indefinitely.
Reducing the volumetric flow rate also had the effect of delaying the time to criticality.
As with the bulk dissolution rate, an increase in the time to criticality was observed with a
decrease in this variable. If the volumetric flow is low enough, sufficient Eu will remain
to ensure subcriticality until U-235 has decayed away. However, flow rates lower that
those observed today at Yucca Mountain would be required.
"Expected" Conditions
Having explored system behavior under limiting conditions, calculations based on
"expected" parameters were performed. The bulk dissolution rate was set at a value of
0.001 g/m 2/d. Today's flow rate of 0.001 m/yr was also used. The assumed solubilities
60.The U-235 limit in the layer (- 0.014 g/cc U-235) would produce a loading limit of 0.5 wt% U-235 in the
glass. The Pu loading limit is lower as Pu-239 has a higher fission cross section and emits more neutrons
per fission than U-235.
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were not changed. The reference loading for both the can-in-can alternative and homoge-
nous alternatives have been set at a nominal 5 wt% PuO 2 (DOE 1997). Figure 45 displays
the results from this Pu glass loaded with an equal molar quantity of Eu. While the time
scale is shifted into the tens of millions of years, the system does go critical at approxi-
mately 13 million years. An even higher loading of REE could be used or other, stronger
control elements utilized to push this time to criticality farther into the future.
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FIGURE 45. System Behavior Under Expected Conditions
(5 wt% PuO2 with an Eu/Pu Mole Ratio of 1/1)
6.4.3 Conclusions
The potential for a criticality event during borosilicate glass reaction in a repository envi-
ronment does exist. Criticality may occur while much of the glass remains intact or long
after the glass has completely reacted. However, several approaches for addressing criti-
cality concerns can be pursued.
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The most obvious approach is to limit the Pu loading in the glass. The coupled dissolu-
tion/criticality model developed in this work predicts that if the reference borosilicate
glass were loaded with 0.45 wt% PuO2, or lower, criticality would not occur. If higher
loadings of WGPu are desired, Eu or other rare earths could effectively delay the onset of
criticality.
The model showed that relatively small amounts of an insoluble absorber can delay criti-
cality for hundreds of thousands of years. At a minium, REE loading should be added in
sufficient quantities to control reactivity through the early keff peak that could result under
worst case conditions.
Additional REE could be added to meet regulated time requirements for subcriticality
when they are established. The analyses presented here show that even with Eu added to
the glass, subcritcal conditions cannot be guaranteed indefinitely for the expected loading
of Pu in borosilicate glass. If multi-million year assurances of subcriticality are needed
under worst case conditions, alternate strategies may be necessary.
The proposed non-HLW storage matrix may have additional criticality benefits. If a can-
in-can design were utilized, the remaining voids could be filled with a substance such as a
monazite concentrate (from sand) which has high rare earth concentrations, rather than
HLW glass. Monazite concentrates from Florida beach sand (produced via a caustic soda
process) contain about 70% monazite (Benedict 1981: 299). Of this 40% are REE oxides.
This would add both criticality control and weight to the container (added proliferation
resistance). Monazite could also be used as a backfill material.
Such a design would provide flexibility benefits as well. The time requirement for sub-
criticality in a repository is presently unknown and when it is established becomes subject
to change. The modular nature of a can-in-can variant, without HLW, would allow modi-
fications to meet new requirements. For example, the ratio of Pu cans to REE filler could
be easily modified in response to the time frame subcriticality would be required. This
capability would appear valuable given the present regulatory uncertainty.
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6.5 Financial Compensation
The preceding chapters have been devoted to the desirability and technical feasibility of
the vitrification alternative. To be applied in Russia, vitrification will have to address a
major political hurdle as well - the fuel value of WGPu.
By relating the value of Pu to a traded commodity a market assessment can be made. If
plutonium fuel is assumed to be a close substitute for uranium fuel, its worth in the market
must be related to uranium.
Assuming these commodities are close substitutes (i.e. 1 kg LEU is interchangeable with
1 kg of MOX fuel of the same fissile atom density), their price in the market place should
be equal. This gives:
ULEU + CON + SWU + FAB = Pu + UMOX + MOX (EQ 22)
or, rearranging,
Pu = ULEU + CON + SWU + FAB - UMOX
- 
MOX (EQ 23)
where ULEU is the cost of the required ore for low-enriched uranium fuel, CON the conver-
sion cost (from U30 8 to UF6 for enrichment), swu the enrichment cost and FAB the fabri-
cation cost. These factors are represented here in units of $/kg heavy metal of LEU.
Today, fabricated plutonium fuel is most often burned in low-enriched, mixed-oxide
(MOX) form. Equation 22 shows the cost of MOX fuel as a function of Pu production
cost (Pu), the cost of uranium ore diluent (uMox), and MOX fabrication costs (Mox).
Equation 23 gives the value of the Pu contained in 1 kg HM of MOX fuel based on its
ability to avoid uranium fuel expenditures. Its actual market value may be much lower
due to supply and demand factors. This appears to be the case today as none of the
world's plutonium burners have offered to purchase Russia's plutonium. This is true even
though (as will be noted later) the equation assigns a present value to the plutonium.
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6.5.1 Plutonium as a Uranium Derivative
A European call option gives the holder the right to purchase something for at a fixed
price on a future date. (An American option may be executed any time prior to the 'strike'
date.) If the price at that time is higher than this 'strike' price, the holder of the option
receives the difference. Plutonium is equivalent to a call option on uranium fuel. Hold-
ing on to it pays off when the price of uranium fuel is above a certain level.
The future value of uranium fuel (and thereby Pu) will depend largely on the price of ura-
nium and SWU. These two components are and will continue to be the greatest contribu-
tors to the cost of LEU fuel. Other costs are service charges which may change over time,
but if Pu is to dramatically increase in value it will be due to increases in these two factors.
In this thesis plutonium is valued as a derivative on uranium only. Including enrichment
costs would require valuing a "basket" option of uranium ore and enrichment services
(Nelken 1996: 161). This is beyond the present scope of this work and SWU was there-
fore assumed constant with time. The potential effect of SWU volatility on option price is
discussed qualitatively.
If SWU is held constant, the price of uranium ore alone will determine the future price of
uranium fuel. Plutonium can therefore be valued as a call option on uranium ore. To price
an option, the expected behavior of prices over time is needed. This information is used to
assess the likelihood that an option will pay off. This section describes the common
assumptions used in derivative theory.
6.5.2 A Price Path for Uranium
In order to value a derivative security it is necessary to understand how the price of the
underlying asset moves (in this case uranium ore). One can then produce a distribution for
the expected price of the asset at some future time. By combining the probabilities the
asset will reach a certain price with information about how the market prices the risk asso-
ciated with the asset, it becomes possible to value the derivative.
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If we assume uranium ore follows a Brownian motion, we produce an equation for
changes in the price of uranium ore (u $/lb) of the following form:
dU = a (U, t) dt+ b (U, t) dz (EQ 24)
The first term on the right hand side is the expected change in price over time and the sec-
ond is a stochastic factor. The dz is the Wiener process eIdt, where e is a random drawing
from a standardized normal distribution. It is this random sampling that makes the future
price uncertain.
If we further assume that a (U, t) = tu and b (U, t) = aU we produce the geometric Brown-
ian motion:
dU
U =- dt + adz (EQ 25)
where gt is the expected return over dt, and a is the volatility.
Volatility represents the uncertainty we have about the asset's price movement. Sigma
squared is the variance 'rate' of the fractional change in price. The higher the volatility
the greater the spread of possible future prices.
Having fixed the mechanism for the price movement of an asset it becomes possible to
value a derivative asset. However we must recognize that uranium possesses an inherent
dividend. This is because the holder of a commodity typically assigns an added value (or
dividend) to physically holding the asset. The magnitude of this effect can be determined
by examining the forward prices for the commodity.
The Black-Scholes equation for a European call option on a dividend-paying stock is (for
uranium) (Hull 1996: 261):
c = Ue-q (T- t)N(d) -Xe-r(T- t)N (d 2) (EQ 26)
where
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ad =
In+1 + r-q+ (T-t)
I A = = d1 - fitFT --t I - YJT:--
and N(x) is the cumulative probability distribution function for a standardized normal
variable.
These equations give the value of the call as a function of the stock's current price (u), its
volatility (a), the continuously compounded risk-free rate of return (r), a factor account-
ing for the dividend (q), and the terms of the contract - its strike price (x), and date (T) as
measured relative to today's date (t). If these variables are known a price for a uranium
option can be calculated.
6.5.3 Terms of the Option
Having developed a theoretical basis, a uranium option can now be valued. What is
needed are the required inputs. Table 12 provides a summary of the base case values used
in this analysis. (The quantity 'q' was found to be equivalent to the risk-free rate minus the
escalation rate used in pricing forward uranium contracts.)
TABLE 12. Base Case Values Used in BS Equations
Current U308 risk-free strike strike escalation
Price volatility rate price date rate
$16.50/lb 16.4 % 8% $8.84/lb 10 yrs 5%
The volatility was calculated based on uranium ore price history over the last ten years.
The strike price was set at the uranium ore price which made cLEU = CMOX for 4 wt%
enriched fuel (assuming free WGPu). Using the values in Table 13 and Equation 23, the
break even strike price was calculated to be $8.84/lb U30 8. Having access to uranium ore
at this price is equivalent to having access to free plutonium.
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TABLE 13. Nuclear Fuel Cost dataa
UF6 Mixed-
SWU Conversion Fabrication Oxide Fab
($/SWU) ($/kg U) ($/kg U) ($/kg HM)
110 8 275 1100
a. data taken from OECD(1994: 50)
6.5.4 Results
Using these inputs, the price of a call option on one pound of U30 8 was found to be $8.27.
To convert this into a Pu value we must consider the size of the contract (i.e. the amount of
ore covered). First we must calculate the uranium required to produce a quantity of LEU
fuel equivalent to what the WGPu could have produced. We then subtract the amount of
uranium ore that would have been needed in any regard for diluting the Pu in MOX fuel.
Fifty tonnes (MT) of WGPu could be used to produce approximately 1409 MT of MOX
fuel (@ a fissile atom density equivalent to 4% U-235 enrichment). To produce 1409 MT
of low enriched uranium fuel, 35.3 million lbs of U30 8 is needed. The MOX fuel would
require 3.53 million lbs. This leaves a net amount of 31.8M lbs. The option contract
should be sized to cover this amount of uranium ore. This gives a total value of $263M for
50 MT of WGPu.
Interestingly, for the base case values WGPu is more valuable as a potential fuel than if it
were utilized today. If the WGPu could be substituted for 4% LEU fuel today it would
have a current value of $244M. This is less than the option value calculated above.
Therefore even if Russia could sell the fuel today, the expected revenue from the material
would be greater is she stored it (assuming no storage costs).
However storing WGPu is not free. While the uranium option replicates the potential ben-
efits from holding WGPu, it does not replicate all costs. Storage may be quite costly due
to safety and security issues. The cost of storing WGPu must be subtracted from the calcu-
lated value of the option. 61
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Including the cost of WGPu storage has a dramatic effect. Cost estimates for Pu storage
range from 430-2000 $/kg/yr.62 If a storage cost of $400/kg/yr is assumed for ten years, a
present value cost of $132M is incurred. This reduces the value of 50 MT of WGPu to
$131M. If storage costs are assumed to be $1000/kg/yr, storage costs rise to $331M. This
eliminates the entire value of the Pu. Therefore, unless storage costs are assumed to be
low, the option value of plutonium is minimal. Figure 46 shows the value of the option
relative to three low estimates for Pu storage costs.
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FIGURE 46. Storage Cost Effects on Option Value
Extending the duration of the option reduces its value while increasing the storage costs.
As seen in the Figure, for short term (10 year) contracts and low storage costs, the value of
the uranium option exceeds storage costs. Eventually, however, storage costs dominate.
Therefore the combination of strike date and storage costs are primary factors for valuing
WGPu.
61.I assume no convenience yield for the plutonium. Convenience yields result from the ability to keep a
production process running or profit from temporary shortages. Relative to the amount of RGPu the Rus-
sians have in stock the WGPu is a small fraction. It will not be a production factor. They also cannot
profit from temporary shortages as there is currently no market for Pu sales.
62.Lower value taken from Chow (1993: 69), higher value take from OECD(1994: 40).
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The way option value changes with duration is due to the market's estimation of future
uranium prices as evidenced in the forward prices. These prices reflect uranium's inherent
dividend. It is this dividend rate that determines the option response to duration.
Discussion
The derivative analysis reveals several significant facts. Depending on storage costs, sur-
plus WGPu may have value even if it cannot be utilized today. What we do know is that
this value is bounded at $524 million for an option with an infinite strike date.
Storage costs are bounded as well but can be much higher than the option value. Assum-
ing a low storage cost of $400/kg/yr, infinite storage would have a perpetuity cost of
$250M. At a storage price of $ 1000/kg/yr the cost of storing WGPu exceeds the maxi-
mum value of the option. Storage costs are capable of eliminating any market value of the
material.
The low strike price means the option will quite likely be executed. This means the price
of the option is roughly the difference between the escalated price (from the forward
prices) and the strike price, discounted at the risk-free rate. Unless the strike price is
increased significantly the probability that the option will be exercised will remain high.
The strike price/break even price should be calculated using cost data valid at the time of
execution of the contract. These values were assumed to be constant for this analysis.
While these values will certainly change, there appears to be no reasoned way to inflate or
deflate the values.
To account for shifting costs of other fuel inputs (namely the price of SWU) a different
option should be valued. The payoff of this option would be a function of these costs as
well as uranium. Such an option is termed a "basket option" as it represents a basket of
assets rather than just one (Nelken 1996: 161).
It is not clear whether the basket option would assign a higher value to Pu or not. It will
depend on the market's expectation of price movement for each individual cost and the
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correlations between them (Hull 1996: 305-307). A basket option for this problem is
being pursued.
To obtain the rights to Russian WGPu, the US could write this call and give it to Russia or
give her the cash equivalent. While the cash transfer would be the simplest to execute, the
US would probably favor giving them the option contract. This would avoid arguments
over the appropriate duration and storage costs needed to price the contract. However, the
US would be accepting the risk of uranium price escalation. The next section will provide
a discussion of how the US may reduce its exposure.
Hedging the US Position
If the US writes a call option on uranium it may desire a hedging strategy to avoid the
associated risk. A simple solution would be to simply purchase the uranium call that they
have bartered away. This would eliminate the risk (as the short position would be matched
by the newly acquired long position). Unfortunately derivatives are not traded on ura-
nium. This effectively eliminates this approach, but there are others.
Arms control agreements have made available large amounts of HEU in both the US and
Russia. Two hundred tonnes of HEU in the US arsenal is scheduled to be retired. In addi-
tion, the US has entered into a contract with Russia to purchase HEU from weapons,
blended down to LEU fuel for reactors. As a result the US government already possesses
or has contracted for vast quantities of uranium. In fact, either source alone can easily ful-
fill hedging requirements.
Conclusions
Viewing surplus WGPu as a derivative provides a fair, market based mechanism for valu-
ation. The material has been declared surplus for military purposes. Therefore the only
value it can posses is of an economic nature. While current factors suggest the material is
worthless, under certain future conditions the Pu may gain value. Derivative theory
allows us to replicate this expected future value without assuming the inherent prolifera-
tion risk of storing WGPu.
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Assigning WGPu a derivative value avoids polarizing statements regarding the Pu fuel
cycle. While separated Pu may represent a future avoided cost for a projected fuel cycle
project, the global market would be hard pressed to quantify this value as the expansion
itself is based solely on governmental plans. The ability to discuss Pu's value as depen-
dent on specific market variables provides bounded flexibility to negotiations. This flexi-
bility may result in a successful disposition agreement.
The concept of bounding the value of the WGPu is important. As the option most cer-
tainly will be exercised (due to its low strike price), the US offer in effect compensates the
Russians for the revenues from future sales. This is equivalent to saying "although you
can't sell this material today, we'll pay you the present value of the revenues you could
receive in the future." The most this could cost would be the current value of all the ore
covered by the option. This ore could then be given to Russia today. As the convenience
yield will at a minimum cover storage costs, this is the maximum value of the option. Any
payment above this level would purely represent an incentive for action. This upper limit
gives both parties a reference point for negotiation. Knowing when compensation ends
and pure incentive begins should normalize the expectations of both parties and aid the
formulation of an agreement.
6.6 Conclusions
Separated weapons-grade plutonium in insecure storage represents a global security
risk. Unfortunately, the option of swift elimination is not available. Complete Pu elimi-
nation options could be developed but would be hard to justify if only applied to separated
plutonium and extremely costly to implement for Pu presently in spent fuel. Even if we
could eliminate every atom of Pu on earth, institutional measures would be needed to
assure that additional Pu or HEU were not being produced covertly.
Accepting that institutional controls will play a role in global security under any condi-
tions, and that Pu elimination appears impractical, the relevant question for surplus WGPu
disposition becomes "How do we ease the safeguarding burden posed by surplus Pu?" As
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all disposition alternatives under investigation transfer Pu from one form (e.g. pits) to
another, this question accurately reflects the nature of the Pu disposition mission.
In order to answer the question, a practical understanding of what secure storage truly
means is necessary. The Spent Fuel Standard must be understood in terms of its functional
components. The rational for processing Pu into any form should be based on precise
security objectives not standardization of Pu storage forms.
The work presented here concludes that the focus of US disposition activities should be:
identifying and swiftly moving insecure Pu into verifiable, internationally safeguarded,
and trackable forms around the world. The notion of "which Pu and when" is important.
The reason Pu disposition has become so urgent is that difficult economic conditions in
Russia have raised questions about the control of its weapons material. Therefore, the US
disposition strategy should be designed primarily to address the risk of theft of Pu in Rus-
sia today.
Alternatives that can be implemented quickly and in cooperation with Russia should
receive first priority. This implies that as many obstacles to implementation should be
removed as possible. Plutonium storage issues should not be intermixed with contentious
Pu fuel cycle issues. They can and should be separated. The work presented here has
shown that mechanisms for addressing Russia's concerns regarding Pu's energy value do
exist. Such proposals should be carefully considered as they may provide valuable flexi-
bility to US/Russian negotiations.
Flexibility is a valuable disposition asset for numerous reasons. The Pu storage matrix
should allow for the option of direct disposal. It has been shown that criticality could
occur in a repository under certain conditions. While engineered barriers have been pro-
posed to address this problem, given the uncertainty, the penalty for reprocessing the Pu
into a safer or perhaps more secure form in the future should be low. This would aid
timely decisionmaking as the probability of a costly outcome would be reduced. Our
inability to know the optimum final form for Pu should not prevent us from addressing
near-term security issues.
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6.7 Future Work
Continued evaluation of Pu storage forms should be pursued. The addition of off-site
tracking capability appears to be valuable from a safeguards perspective. The feasibility
and effectiveness of including transmission devices as an integral part of a Pu storage
matrix should be investigated. The system must be able to withstand the immobilization
process environment and the power source should be long-lived. Similarly, techniques for
verifying the composition of an immobilized Pu matrix should be developed.
The cost savings associated with storing Pu in such a form should be evaluated. With suf-
ficient reactivity control, Pu could be stored in more dense configurations. Storing Pu in a
chemically stable, bulk matrix would reduce the risk of oxidation with exposure to air and
subsequent dispersion. This may reduce the costs of installing and maintaining safety sys-
tems. Costs of safeguards could also be reduced.
For the vitrification alternative a detailed understanding of how Pu and added neutronic
control elements participate in the glass network is needed. Any ternary compounds or
stable complexes that form should be identified. Mechanisms for separating Pu/U from
rare earth elements during and after glass reaction must continue to be evaluated. Colloid
formation is a particularly interesting process and its potential impact should be evaluated
under a variety of potential repository conditions.
If credible scenarios for colloid formation are identified and/or it is shown that current
forms allow unacceptable quantities of REE to be separated from Pu or U, alternate matri-
ces may be needed. A mixed ceramic/glass form may have preferable characteristics. In
these matrices, controlled devitrification is allowed as the glass formulation is tailored to
provide durable host phases. Fabricated glass is reheated to encourage devitrification for
this matrix. Glass ceramics have been shown to incorporate various REE in durable
phases. Attention to Pu devitrification may not be necessary if crystals of PuO 2 are
formed as this oxide is extremely insoluble.
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The use of neutron absorbers outside the immobilized matrix itself could be effective.
Fabricated or mined rare earth phases could be added in a can-in-can type system or used
as backfill for the waste emplacement area. Monazite ores should be explored for this pur-
pose.
The potential impact of a repository criticality should also be assessed. The behavior of
the system during and after the predicted criticality should be investigated to determine
radionuclide production over time. From this information a calculation of the risk to the
environment and to human health can be made.
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Appendix A - Glass Compositions
TABLE 14. Lanthanide Boro-Silicate Glass(LaBS)*
Oxide wt %
SiO2  25.8
B20 3  10.4
A120 3  19.04
ZrO2  1.15
Gd2 0 3  7.61
La203 11.01
Nd20 3  11.37
SrO 2.22
PuO 2  11.39
*. Composition from
Dr. Henry Shaw,
LLNL August 1997
TABLE 15. Alkali-Tin-Silicate Glass (ATS)*
Oxide wt%
SiO2  47.3
B20 3  13.7
AI20 3  2.6
ZrO2  6.0
Gd20 3  3.5
Cs20 0.8
K20 5.9
Li20 4.6
Na20 10.4
TiO 2  2.3
*. (Plodinec 1995: 235)
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TABLE 16. ARM1 Composition
Oxide wt%
SiO 2  46.50
A120 3  5.59
CaO 2.23
TiO 2  3.21
Na2 O 9.67
3203 11.3
Nd20 3  5.96
Li2O 5.08
ZnO 1.46
P20 5  0.65
ZrO2  1.80
BaO 0.66
MoO3  1.67
CeO 2  1.51
Cs20 1.16
SrO 0.45
*. Materials Character-
ization Center,
Pacific Northwest
Laboratory, Richland,
Washington
TABLE 17. SRL165 Compositoin*
Oxide wt%
SiO2  68.0
B20 3  10.0
Li20 7.0
Na20 13.0
MgO 1.0
ZrO2  1.0
*. Savannah River Labo-
ratory, Aiken, South
Carolina
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Appendix B - Dissolution Model
Introduction
This Appendix contains a description of the glass dissolution model used in the criticality
analysis. Each calculation step is explained in detail below.
Problem Setup
DWPF Reference Waste Form parameters (Baxter 1983):
Length L = 3-m Radius R log : 0.3-m Glass density Ps = 2.75- g 3
cm
Emplacement hole radius (sets the effective cross section and volume of the near-field):
R hole := 0.35.m
Mass of the log: M log :-P s n 'AR log2-L M log = 2.333 103 *kg
Unreacted Glass Radius
Bulk Dissolution Rate of the Glass (BDR): BDR := 0.1. gm
2
m day
First order approximation for radius of the unreacted log :
BDR-t BDR-t
R(t) := if R log- - - epsilon>0, R log - - -
Ps Ps
(IF/THEN statement is used to avoid negative values.)
epsilon 0.0001 -cm (epsilon needed to avoid division by 0)
Surface area of log (less the top and bottom):
Volume of the unreacted log:
A log(t) : z-2-R(t).L
vol log(t) :=i.R(t)2.L
Alteration layers occupies this volume (taking no credit for gap dilution) :
V(t) := L-n-(R log2 - R(t) 2
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epsilon, 0
Elemental Solubilities and Loading in Glass
Now we input the solubility limits (CL) and loadings in the glass for the elements of interest
(Concentrations shown are for the Glass Control case as calculated by EQ3/6.)
BORON
Boron solubility is more than 5000 ppm according to EQ3
gmCL b := 5000
10 -cm3
CL b = 5 10 3 gm
3
cm
Boron loading (g B/g glass): fob :=0.113- 2103.812.10.81 +3-16
PLUTONIUM
CL := 10-14.2194). mole 239 gm
liter mole
CL = 1.44210 - 15pu
Sgm
3
cm
phase: PuO2
Plutonium loading (g PuO2/g glasspuo 2-0.0045
loading (g Pu/g glass): 239fo pu := PuO 2
239 + 2-16
WGPu Isotopics (wt%):
Pu 2 3 8 :=0.00012 Pu 2 3 9 = 0.939 Pu 24 0 :=0.0581
fo pu = 3.969- 10-
Pu 2 4 1 := 0.0023 Pu 242 := 0.00022
EUROPIUM
SCL 1-4.8165\ mole 1 gm
CLeu liter mole
CL = 2.304*10 - 6 gm
eu c3
cm
phase: Eu(OH)3
Mole ration Eu/Pu: 1Ratio mole :
8
151.96
fo eu fo pu-Ratio mole 239
eu' pu239
Europium loading (g Eu/g glass): fo = 3.154*10-4
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fob = 0.035
URANIUM
CL = (0 ,-9.5857).mole 2 3 5. gm
liter mole
CL = 6.101*10 -
phase: haiweeite Ca(U02)2(Si205)3:5H20
The loading of uranium will depend on
the input for relevant decay processes.
the decay of Pu-239. The following section provide.
Radioactive Decay
Decay parameters
In(2)
24123924100.yr
In(2)
235 :=
7.04.10 
-yr
In(2)
6.5240 10
6.56.103. yr
In(2)
241 4.40yr14.40.yr
(239 and 240 are the only Pu isotopes
that will remain after a few thousand yrs)
Isotopic loading per g glass as a function of time
P 2 3 8 (t) :=Pu 2 38-e
X 238't
*fopu
P239 ( t ) 2 3 9 (t) e P 23 9e fo put
P 2 4 0 (t) :=Pu 24 0 -e 2.fo DU
P 2 4 1(t) :Pu 2 4 1.e
P 24 2 (t) := Pu 2 4 2 -e
- 241'
- 242.1
*fo Pu
-fopu
S2 3 5 (t) Pu 239fo pu239 235 (e 2 3 9 t -e 235 t
235(t) e -•  e
235- 239 239
f pu(t) := P 239(t) + P 240(t) <--- approximation as we are mainly past a few thousand yrs
P 2 3 9 (t)
Pn 239(t) -2
fpu(t) <--- normalize Pu concentrations
Pn 240(t)
P 240(t)
f pu( t )
216
.gm
3
cm
In(2)
238 87.8-yr
ln(2)
432.70-yr
Groundwater Flow
This is the groundwater flux through the repository (volume per unit area per unit time):
m
vw = 0.01* (today's flow is 0.001 m/yr)
yr
Cross sectional area of near-field (taking credit for gap):
Volumetric flow rate through the near-field:
XArea := 2R log.L
FR := XArea.vw
Alteration Layer Composition Over Time
The concentration of relevant isotopes in the reacted glass region was calculated via
mass balance relations. The BDR determined the rate of addition of glass elements to
the growing volume of alteration layers. Equilibrium of the glass elements with
groundwater was then assumed, fixing solution concentrations. The volumetric
groundwater flow determined the rate of element removal from the alteration layers.
Decay was accounted for in both the glass and the alteration layers.
Vector solution for coupled differential equations
D(t,N) is a vector of 1st order differential equations. Each vector element describes the
change of mass of a radionuclide in the alteration layer per unit time. N is a vector of the
initial conditions for Pu-239, Pu-240 and U-235 which were based on the initial loading in
the glass.
P 2 3 9 (0)'P s-V(0)
N := P 2 4 0 (0)0p s.V(O)
0
<---Initial conditions for Ni variables (Pu-239, Pu-240 and U-235)
BDR-2-r-R(t).L-P 239 (t) - v w-XArea-CL pu-Pn 239(t) - X 2 3 9.N 0
D(t,N) = BDR.2-nR(t)-L.P 240(t) - v w-XArea-CL pu.Pn 240(t) - X 2 4 0 .N1 <-- Rate Equations
235
BDR-2--R(t)-L-U 2 3 5 (t) - v w-XArea-CL u - 2 3 5 N2  2 3 9 N 0 2-
(The variables "Ni" in D are elements of the vector N.)
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10-mm
w2
yr~mm
The differential equations were solved via a Runge-Kutta technique ( the rkfixed function in
Mathcad PLUS). For this calculation a time period of interest is needed as well as a fixed
time step for calculating solutions.
Time period of interest in yrs: T := 2.5-10 4
Step size in yrs: S :=0.5-103
Z is this matrix of solutions: Z := rkfixed N, 0, T, T, D
The result of the calculation is a matrix (Z) of solutions to D giving the mass of the individu;
radionuclides in the alteration layers at various times in the future. A similar calculation is
performed for the stable elements Eu and B. This mass data can then be combined with the
calculated volume of the alteration layers as a function of time to give the concentration of
elements in the alteration layers.
Unreacted glass compositions were calculated using the decay parameters specified above.
Combined with the alteration layer data, and the surrounding rock composition, this provide
complete model of the near-field environment.
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